Brain:... Half a Whole

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---kenneth gaburo:
WHOLE LANGUAGE LANGUAGE

BRAIN:

... HALF A WHOLE

SR projection 1
It may at least be said that concerns about the brain have been operative from Hippocrates to the present time.

The brain is a double organ: ---a cerebrum consisting of two symmetrical halves, designated as the Right and Left Hemispheres. These hemispheres are connected by an isthmus of nerve tissues,---the corpus callosum and other commissures.

Various historic views of brain function have generally hinged on the following two conceptualizations:

1. We possess one brain with two distinct halves: i.e., a duality, with the halves acting more or less independently.

2. We possess one brain with two halves acting more or less synchronously.

A third view was advanced more recently. It was discovered that when the connecting fibres between the two hemispheres of the cerebrum were cut (cerebral commissuratomy), each hemisphere functioned as-if it were a complete brain. This observation led to one current question:

3. Does cerebral commissuratomy produce a splitting
or a doubling of the mind? 

Brain descriptions depend on observations with regard to capacities which the hemispheres exhibit. An extraordinary amount of such information is based on observed lesions, that is, on brain damage to either the left, right, or both hemispheres, which cause humans to exhibit certain dysfunctions (disturbances) when contrasted with humans without lesions. This kind of observation has led to rigorous analysis, now generally referred to as lateralization, as well as lateral specialization, of brain functions. In sum:

Do functions exist in the right hemisphere, the left hemisphere, or both?

Concerns for lateral specialization, in particular, of the left hemisphere, are of recent origin. They appear to have been initiated around 1874 when dysphasia was postulated as a left hemispheric symptom. Jackson says:

"Not long ago, few doubted the brain to be double in function as well as physically bilateral; but now that it is certain...that damage to one lateral half can make a man entirely speechless, the former view is disputed... (It is) supposed that but one half of the brain—the left in the vast majority of people—is educated in words.

And so, given a culture caught up in rational thought and the power of the word; and, given the social disabilities of the dysphasic which were "so much more obvious than the defects of right hemispheric lesions", it turns out that focus, almost immediately, was put on the left hemisphere. Moreover, overwhelming support for this direction was provided by observations that the left and right hemispheres cross-function, such that left hemispheric outputs control the right side of the body, and right hemispheric outputs control the left side of the body. Cunningham says:

"It thus comes about that the left cerebral hemisphere controls and regulates the muscles of the right side, and its functional superiority over the right hemisphere is indicated by the servant position which the left hand holds with reference to the right.

Strong & Elwyn say:

"In man the higher cortical functions are vested principally in one cerebral hemisphere, the left one in right-handed individuals, the dominant hemisphere...lesions of the other hemisphere producing as a rule no recognizable disturbances."
As functions were observed and lateralized, so were descriptive terminologies formulated. The following list of pairings spans from 1864 to the present:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Left Description</th>
<th>Right Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1864</td>
<td>Expression</td>
<td>Perception</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1874</td>
<td>Audito-articular</td>
<td>Retino-ocular</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1876</td>
<td>Propositionizing</td>
<td>Visual imagery</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1935</td>
<td>Linguistic</td>
<td>Visual or kinesthetic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1951</td>
<td>Storage</td>
<td>Executive</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1951</td>
<td>Symbolic or propositional</td>
<td>Visual or imaginative</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1952</td>
<td>Education of relations</td>
<td>Education of correlates</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(abstract reasoning)</td>
<td>(analogic reasoning)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1958</td>
<td>Verbal</td>
<td>Perceptual or non-verbal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1960</td>
<td>Discrete</td>
<td>Diffuse</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1961</td>
<td>Symbolic</td>
<td>Visuospatial</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1963</td>
<td>Linguistic</td>
<td>Pre-verbal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1965</td>
<td>Verbal</td>
<td>Visuospatial</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1968</td>
<td>Logical or analytic</td>
<td>Synthetic perceptual</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1969</td>
<td>Propositional</td>
<td>Appositional</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1976</td>
<td>Parts</td>
<td>Whole</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1977</td>
<td>Language</td>
<td>Non-language</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Concomitant with these investitures comes the expression: cerebral dominance. However, this expression does not, as one might informally assume, refer to the whole mind/body connection (thereby giving hierarchical weight to the brain as our central control system), but, contrarily, almost always refers to the left hemisphere, per se. I submit:

THERE IS SOMETHING EXTRAORDINARILY PEJORATIVE IN THE USE OF DESCRIPTIVE LANGUAGE WITH REGARD TO LEFT/RIGHT HEMISPHERIC ACTIVITY.

Following are further extractions taken from responsible scientific literature:

"The hemisphere which controls handedness, expression, and comprehension, is known as the dominant hemisphere."  

"The right hemisphere assumes a compensatory role following left hemispheric lesions."
"In every case the right hemisphere shows a manifest inferiority when compared with the left, and plays an automatic role only."

"The right hemisphere is probably a regressing organ."

"The data indicate that the mute, minor hemisphere is specialized for Gestalt perception, being primarily a synthesist in dealing with information input. The speaking major hemisphere, in contrast seems to operate in a more logical, analytic, computerlike fashion, ... The findings suggest that a possible reason for cerebral laterization in man is basic incompatibility of language functions on the one hand and synthetic perceptual functions on the other."

Descriptions such as these, no matter how seemingly transformed by current inquiry, continue to resonate all about me. Neither are they only minimally pejorative and astonishingly naive with respect to the brain, per se, especially since the assumptions to which they also refer are made in the absence of rigorous right hemispheric analysis; nor are they only maximally evident and complexly biased in and by that larger domain commonly referred to as our "culture"; but also, I, for one, am frequently debilitated by the immensity of those collected thoughts which, by their practitioners localize (reduce) linguistics/language essentially within the left, and music/art essentially within the right. This is so even when the practitioners are well-wishers. Desmedt says:

"Because speech is such a salient feature of human culture, this fact led to the view of the absolute superiority of the left hemisphere. This concept of cerebral dominance now appears to be misleading and recent data increasingly document the apparently major role of the right, non-language, hemisphere for several non-verbal cognitive functions ... such as the perception of melodies ..."

Wertheim says:

"It has been asserted that there is a wide relation between the musical function and speech. As a matter of fact, music is completely different from speech: whilst speech is a precise symbolic system, the 'contents' of music are vague and subject to interpretation."

I submit:
Furthermore, of music has been so localized, has been so to within brain, and not, (of Ravel who suffered left hemispheric Aphasia^29), Alajouanine says:

"... (his) analytic recognition of musical notation, and playing the piano to sight were grossly disabled; ... (his) melodic, rhythmic, and stylistic sense were unimpaired, ... (his) playing or singing from memory were largely retained: ... although all artistic realization is forbidden, his artistic sensibility does not seem to be in the least altered^30."

Given observations, assumptions, and assessments, such as the foregoing,

Either I have been provided with a functioning brain-description for music by which I may presumably proceed with impunity, or I might seriously ask:
What, ---of MUSIC, ---and of BRAIN, ---to say nothing of MIND, could possibly be preserved or advanced by such descriptions?

WORST CASES:

...ACTUAL

SR projection 5
---But we need descriptive language. If it is true, as Humberto Maturana suggests:

"Anything said is said by an observer, ... (and) to an observer."

---then
descriptive language *says* what is said. Unless we acquire descriptive language in order to *view* descriptive language, we are ultimately left with the issue of self-evidence, e.g.:

In what sense would corporeality, as it is contextually operative within Partch's *Revelations*, be self-evident without cognition of both the word and its conceptual description?

In what sense could a freshman theory student of WOES, (parenthetically, the expression: WOE, I assure you, *is* a proper name), without cognition of both the word and its merest description, locate an augmented sixth chord, or recognize one, if only told: "On this page is an example of an augmented sixth chord; find it!"?
In what sense can self-education ever find anything?

In what sense can self-education ever lead to self-discovery? --- unless, of course, it could be said:

"All of that is self-evident".

---Still, (even though I don't believe it for a moment), I could say:

---but, I could not possibly say:

---unless, of course, it could be said that cognition is operative when reduced to a state of signs looking at signs.

(Unfortunately, I cannot even say that without invoking descriptive language.) And so, it is not trivial to ask:

CAN A DESCRIPTIVE LANGUAGE EXIST without DESCRIPTIVE LANGUAGE?
Actually, the issue is neither do I, nor do I not need descriptive language, (as-if I could ever do anything about that); ---nor is the issue resolved by asking: "What IS descriptive language?", (as-if the descriptive language necessary to answer the question could do so without corrupting definition by its own terminology); ---but the issue is:

ON WHAT DOES a DESCRIPTION of
DESCRIBITIVE LANGUAGE DEPEND?

---precisely:

On WHAT does it depend, and on
what does IT depend?; ---the
one,

---and the other,

---on each side

Following are some notions:

Descriptive language, on either side, depends on its make-up, (---that is: on its structure); on its acquisition, (---that is: on its procedures); and on its functions, (---that is:

1) is descriptive language the language of an observer?; ---if so,
I describe it as: interpretive function.

2) is descriptive language the language of the observed?; ---if so,
I describe it as: translational function.

3) is descriptive language the language of the observer and the observed?; ---if so,
I describe it as: intrinsic function.

4) is descriptive language neither the language of the observer nor the observed?; ---if so,
I describe it as: articulative function; (---but, no-one merely mutters:)

I think each and every descriptive utterance involves the above language states, and depends on them. Thus, these states may be referred to as conditions of descriptive language, and conditions which exhibit descriptive language.

But, exhibited conditions may be described as actual or potential. As
potential, descriptive languages require actuation in order to be fulfilled; as actual, descriptive languages become fulfilled. Moreover, conversion from one state to the other requires a switch. A switch could be you, me, you and me, or neither of us. However, each time a switch is activated, a switch which converts potential descriptive language into actual descriptive language, we find ourselves in some particular location. That location may be described as contextual, or, if you like, environmental. I submit:

LANGUAGE IS CONTEXT-BOUND, AND
CONTEXT IS LANGUAGE-BOUND.

In the unfolding of this paper, I shall elaborate this statement.

It might be difficult to see an issue here, precisely because we carry an extraordinary amount of language around with us. In every situation, as we view it, we are in a state of superabundant language with regard to the language of that particular situation. This is not to say that a particular situation is not superabundant with respect to its language:

SUPERABUNDANT LANGUAGE FACES
SUPERABUNDANT LANGUAGE.

Perhaps it would be nice if psychologists could resolve this condition by providing us with an operational language which would flawlessly map each and every linguistic stimulus into appropriate response, under each and every condition. But, alas, in the absence of such operational language, and in contemplation of the absolute sterility of such refinement, I submit that language, itself, would disallow it!

But, there are actual situations, surely experienced by each of us, in which our superabundance fails. I refer to those conditions in which superabundant language cannot produce intrinsic language. Remember, an intrinsic language is one which includes the language of the observer and the observed. I put focus on this particular condition because superabundance can always produce interpretive,
articulative language, and almost-always can produce translational language.

However, in those contexts where intrinsic language is inoperative, it is not the failure or inadequacy of language which is disenabling, but the absence of necessary and sufficient intrinsic language which is. The lack of intrinsic language, I shall refer to as lack of appropriate language, and the environment which gives rise to the condition as: worst-case. Still, in worst case, it remains to be seen whether appropriate language will have resided in an observer's superabundant language after all, or whether the context, which gave rise to the question says: it must be acquired.

---

Recently, I had occasion to meet with a linguist at Salk Institute, an insightful person with regard to sign language, the language of deaf-mutes. During a lively discussion, Ella Mae entered the room and sat down with us. Ursula introduced Ella Mae to me, commenting that she was a deaf-mute.

I verbalized: "hello".

Ella Mae signed: "hello".

Ursula then commented:

"Ella Mae is working on certain problems having to do with the structure of sign-language poetry, and she is an actress as well."

I verbally expressed great interest.

Ella Mae answered in sign.

I had many questions,
and thought:

"Now what do I do?", ---"I cannot sign, cannot read lips, but can speak; Ella Mae can sign, can read lips, but cannot speak." Still,

there were certain other bi-directional linguistic modes available:

1) We could write notes (which we did);
2) We could point (which we did);
3) We could engage in an assortment of sensorial, kinetic languages (which we did not do since most seemed too intimate at the time).

And so, the available modes proved extraordinarily inappropriate. We literally faced each other with worst-case languages. We both pressed a switch. The switch was Ursula. But Ursula faced a different contextual problem:

Variously, her descriptions were clearly those of an observer, (i.e., she interpreted); of the observed, (i.e., she translated); of neither the observer nor the observed, (i.e., she articulated).

We all faced worst-case languages. Our collective superabundance failed us. And: we knew it! Ella Mae finally asked me if I wanted to learn to sign. I did not ask Ella Mae if she wanted to learn to speak. Instead I said: "Yes".

Ursula commented: "It was a beginning". 
But, superabundant language, when not faced by actual worst-cases, allows for all sorts of things. Here are some:

1) *familiarity* (one can indulge in it, and be indulged by it);
2) *fuzziness* (one can get away with it);
3) *precision* (one can not get away with it).

At the same time, it is my observation that I need superabundant language in order to take any first step. As well, ---unless I am deceived in and by its very existence, superabundant language, ---when faced by actual worst-case contexts reminds me, not of its *un-necessity*, but of its *insufficiency*. When it does that, it should also remind me of another, ---perhaps self-forgotten language: the language of *admission*. Can I admit that I don't have *enough* language, ---that is, not quite enough, ---yet?

(Beckett says: "never admit"!)

I conclude this section with the following:

1) Actual worst-case contexts give rise to the observation that they are worst-case.
2) Actual worst-case contexts *evidence* conditions which describe what *could* be done in order to acquire appropriate language.
3) Actual worst-case problematics can only be resolved in, and by the conditions of that context which generated them. To not do so is to deny the influence of context on membership, and membership on context.38.
"We would do well therefore to choose arbitrarily a word, homologous in structure with the word 'propositional' but sufficiently ambiguous to permit provisional use. For example, we can say that the right hemisphere has a highly developed 'appositional' capacity. This term implies a capacity for apposing or comparing of perceptions, schemas, engrams, etc., but has in addition the virtue that it implies very little else."

I agree that a word, any word, in its isolated state implies very little. However, even single word utterances are never completely non-implicative, neutral, or context-free. Assuming the merest recognition, any single word utterance is action-directed. If a direction is not supplied, we will, in our thought, supply one.
intentionally directs a particular term, such as "appositional" to some designated location, ---for instance: the Right Hemisphere, a potentially loaded contextual spark is initiated. In the above description, the following actualities obtain:

1) The expressions: "propositional/appositional", are each respectively directed to lateralized hemispheric functions of which (for instance) linguistics is left, and music is right. If the respective hemispheres are propositional/appositional, then linguistics and music are; i.e., they, somehow, do not exhibit the same structure.

2) The expression: "homologous", is directed to both class-expressions: appositional and propositional. If the hemispheres are homologous, then linguistics and music are; i.e., they, somehow, do exhibit the same structure.

Given these resonances, I doubt that anyone would wish to maintain the notion that the term: "appositional", has the virtue of implying "very little else".

The recent history of refining terminology, presumably in order to more rigorously characterize brain functions, is not, however, due to any substantial increase in appropriate language acquisition. In the absence of such, class-terminology is substituted by class-terminology; models are substituted by models.

We are inundated.

Such procedures, too, may be described as superabundant. Moreover, the extent to which appropriate language may be absent within any context is the extent to which language may be described as dysfunctional.
Quite recently, a psychologist/linguist advanced the term: \textit{[part]} as a substitute for propositional, and the term: \textit{[whole]} as a substitute for appositional, \textit{via} the same claim that they are homologous to within left/right hemispheric functions. Tom\textsuperscript{41}, with a certain logic, suggested that these substitutions are to be regarded, \textit{not only as more "appropriate", or more "controversial", ---but as more "radical" departures from current terminological brain-thinking.}

(parenthetically, I agree that the mere substitution of any class-term, by another, changes \textit{sensibility} to within context; ---for instance:

\begin{align*}
\text{RH= appositional (music)} \\
\text{RH= whole (music)}
\end{align*}

;---but, I do not agree that Tom's terms \textit{clarify} or \textit{characterize} any better. However, they do \textit{classify}, and they do \textit{involve us} in the issue of action-directed words.)

I carried these thoughts in my head as I listened to Tom elaborate. His parts/whole distinction, ---certainly with reference to music, seemed to rest on a distinction between \textit{melody} and \textit{chord}. Tom placed melody in the \textit{left} hemisphere, ---presumably because it is linear, i.e.: \textit{parts}, ---and linearity appears to be a function of left hemispheric activity.

(parenthetically, in order to accept \textit{that} localization, I had to dismiss a neurological position which localizes melody in the \textit{right} hemisphere as evidenced by patients with left-hemispheric lesions\textsuperscript{42}.)

Tom placed chord in the \textit{right} hemisphere, ---presumably because it is non-linear, i.e.: \textit{whole}, ---and non-linearity, in the sense of
gestalt, appears to be a function of right hemispheric activity.

Notwithstanding my difficulty with assigning conceptual term: [part] to half a brain, and conceptual term: [whole] to half a brain, and notwithstanding that Tom assigned music to within brain, (---referring to brain functions as "behavioral"), but not brain to within music, (---I suppose I could regard music functions as 'behaviors') , ---when provided with an opportunity, I asked: "Where would the sense of whole reside if I were to consider chord, contextually, as verticalized melody, and part reside if I were to consider melody as horizontalized chord?" Tom smiled knowingly, and began looking for another question. For the hell-uv-it, I persisted, rephrasing mine: (I quote myself): "quote: In what manner can you describe whole, aside from merely articulating the sign: whole, which will not refer as well, to its parts?; ---AND, in what manner can you describe part aside from merely articulating the sign: part, which will not refer as well, to its whole? (I un-quote myself)." Un-quote. To these Tom responded: "You sound like an Aristotelean". In the sense that his response could have been a partial answer to my question, ---and not a dismissal, I answered: "But I am ---Aristotle".

It would be easy enough to suggest that the problematic is lack of information, e.g.: I lack neurological information, and the neurologist lacks musical information. (If we could only exchange roles for awhile.)

Perhaps it is that simple.

But, I argue that the issue is lack of focus, awareness, and attention to what language, itself, is doing as it describes and addresses particular contexts.

Further, it would be easy enough to suggest that the problematic is terminological (if we could only find the right word), or logical, (what do we replace syllogistic reasoning by?).

Perhaps it is that simple.

But, I argue that the issue is lack of focus, awareness, and attention to what language, itself, is doing as it describes and addresses particular contexts. From a large number of language dysfunctions I shall refer to two: ---they are means and word-processing. By the former I do not intend: meaning, ---by the latter I do not intend: process. I submit:

MEANS:

---Bogen says:

"(a) We recognize that the lateralization
of higher functions is not invariable, (b) there have been reports in which a unilateral lesion disturbs both propositional and appositional functions. (c) But we must not permit the rich diversity of natural phenomenon to obscure our recognition of the common and representative types."

---Thus in one and the same language-location exists an action-directed linguistic clue which cries for a context, cf. (a) above; an insight by which the clue could be fulfilled, cf. (b); and a rule which takes away the clue and the insight, cf. (c).

LANGUAGE FUNCTIONS AS MEANS.

WORD-PROCESSING: ---Bogen says:

"We would do well ... to choose arbitrarily a word, homologous ... with the word 'propositional' but sufficiently ambiguous to permit provisional use ... If it is correct that the right hemisphere excels in capacities as yet unknown to us, the full meaning of 'appositional' will emerge as these capacities are further studied and understood."

---Certainly on the level of surface structure, this outwardly directed language exhibits denotative and connotative attributes. As a self-reflexive language, particularly in its deeper structure, however, the language exhibits the following:

The expression: "propositional", ---further qualified by the expressions: "arbitrarily" and "ambiguous", is concluded by: "full meaning will emerge". In the space of ten lines (by actual count), a significant transformation has taken place. What IT says is that the word: "Appositional" will not be easily given up; ---and if not, what will eventually emerge, in any case, is: Appositional (music) is Appositional.

Process, in whatever sense that expression can have meaning here, subsists merely in the initiation of the word: Appositional. Whatever follows, ---by whatever means, will only validate the term.
If language is doing that to thinking, then thinking is doing that to language. But in those instances when neurologists exhibit brain-language, or lawyers exhibit law-language, or musicians exhibit music-language, or linguists exhibit language-language, on whose shoulders does responsibility for descriptive language of any kind rest? In what manner(s), precisely, can anyone of us acquire appropriate language, with regard to another context, if the language issued forth from context is, in itself, not appropriate?

It seems to me that responsibility for descriptive language rests with the describer, --since descriptive language IS a describer's language. I think one could notice this crucial structural aspect of language except in those contexts where language, --by any language, --by its describer functions as means, or as word-processing.

What I wonder about is why it generally seems so essential that one proceeds from definition rather than toward it.

A PRIORI;
A POSTERIORI;
is in world: I views self, I views world, I views self.
In viewing self, I cannot dismiss world.
In viewing world, I cannot dismiss self.
From whichever vantage point, I is present.

I appears to be central.
I observes: self is here, world is there.
I finds it incomprehensible that self can be there, and world here.
Since viewing appears to depend on self's presence, ---from here,
I takes world in.
Other bi-directional relations implicit in the expression: I views self, I views world, I views self, become subverted by self's presence.

Because I cannot stand the notion that items observed could possibly exist disconnected, I attempts connection.
Words help.
Self helps.
I locates a few words.
The words are subject, object.

Self converts subject into I (and I allows it to).
I converts object into world (and self allows it to).
Within I, self-subjects appear intimate.
Within self, I-objects appear not to be;
(objects reside outside47).
There are too many.

I attempts gathering, ---to get a handle on things, ---to manage the seeming incomprehensibility of separate existences.\textsuperscript{48}

(Luria says:
" ... What is it which is actually localized in the brain, or in other words, what is the nature of the mental functions which can be correlated with the brain, and \textit{How} must mental activity be localized in the brain ... \textsuperscript{49}"

Commenting on these observations, Bogen says:
"Furthermore, if we could solve this fundamental difficulty ..., we would have another; our understanding of brain function would consist of a myriad of items without cohesion\textsuperscript{50}."

So, I gathers and self groups. I observes and self interprets. I allows self to group and interpret. Self seems satisfied and tells I so. I is encouraged.

There are still too many objects; so,

I, by the encouragements of self, begins to group and self gathers. I interprets and self observes. Self allows I to group and interpret. I seems satisfied and tells self so. Self is encouraged.

The collusion between I/self takes on a kind of resonance. Objects are imbued with a kind of intimacy. I/self seems full. Whatever controversies remain are resolved within I/self. I/self has gathered world in by language. Language becomes superabundant. I/self is satisfied. I/self cannot go back over all that ground. I/self applies language. Applied language appears to be appropriate. The appearance of appropriate language, applied, results in the appropriation of language.
(Bruner says:

"The elegant rationality of science, and the metaphoric non/rationality of art operate with deeply different grammars; perhaps they represent a profound complementarity."

I/self does not recognize that items have been consumed by the very words formulated to describe them. I/self believes: "Beauty is in the eye of the Beholder."

(Croce says:

"... Man, faced with natural beauty, is exactly the mythical Narcissus at the pool."

I/self has clues within its language but does not recognize them. I/self cannot correct, ---either by referring to old dictionaries, or by making new ones, because I/self cannot recognize that language is unable to correct itself.

I/self recognizes tone as a condition of music on the assumption that tone lacks word, and lateralizes it to the right; recognizes word as a condition of language on the assumption that word lacks tone, and lateralizes it to the left.

(Sperry says:

"Findings suggest that a possible reason for cerebral lateralization in man is basic incompatibility of language functions on the one hand, and synthetic perceptual functions on the other."

It does not occur to I/self to ask whether objects are other I/selves, ( ---which, as such, also view I/self).

(Smith says:

"Hesitantly ... I predict
... some new principles of hierarchy that will enable the effective resonance between molecule and organism to be explored: ... ((to be)) understood only by a parallel aggregation of viewpoints, one intellectual, atomistic, simple and certain, the other based on the enjoyment of the grosser forms and qualities\textsuperscript{54}.")

I/self recognizes that its language descriptions have been formulated by comparative methods\textsuperscript{55}, but does not (---cannot?) recognize the states of the compared languages, nor the languages to which the states refer. In the absence of this recognition, I/self only compares output form with output form, and designates the action: "conceptual".

(Price says:

"... under fire from economic reaction and Romantic rebellion, science must look to a new political strategy ... I predict a more human future based on the symbiosis of exact knowledge ... and experience ... (((two)) processes of thought ... ((one)) analytic, reductionist, simple, or provable, ... ((the other)) variously, ... synthetic, concrete, complex, and disorderly\textsuperscript{56}.")

I/self cannot (---does not) recognize that it is in a lop-sided, supremely stretched, tautological loop.
But suppose,

by some happenstance,

it occurs that tone is only a sign which directs I/self, ---not to itself, but to the specific music of which that tone is a sign; ---and suppose,

by some happenstance, it occurs that word is only a sign which directs I/self, ---not to itself, but to the specific language of which that word is a sign?

Suppose,

by some happenstance,

it occurs that language is not brain-initiated, but only brain-comprehended?

Suppose,

by some happenstance,

it occurs that the expression: "extended vocal techniques", (e.g., vocal multiphonics), is not an extension of anything, but only inappropriate language description of functions already present in the trachea?

Suppose,
by some happenstance,

it occurs that items absorbed by word are not necessarily nor
intrinsically connected by word, e.g.:

WE;

YOU/ME;

I/SELF?

Suppose,

by some happenstance,

it occurs that output languages are not conceptual,---that each, in
itself, suggests the pointlessness of comparison by conceptual de-
scription at that level? Suppose, contrarily, that output languages
also are signs which, by way of physiological, acoustical, syntac-
tical attributes exhibited, direct I/ to deeper structures, ---at
the base of which reside: conceptual processes, ---ideas of order
for instance, which, once observed, could have generated either the
word or the tone?

Suppose,

by some happenstance,

all of that occurs?

---then what would /self do?
WORST CASES:

...AS-IF

If language is to be regarded:
not as a tool;
not as a piece of standardized equipment;
not as activity in the name of communication;
not as property endemic to, or characterized by, particular linguistic groups;

---then something has to happen to cause language to do more than these;
---more consistently more than these.

LANGUAGE CANNOT CORRECT ITSELF

I submit:

SR projection 22

By regarding language in the light of its mereness, and not in its superabundance, can it become more than words. Words, in their collective superabundance, have to become unloaded in each instance where appropriate language is desired; ---unloaded, once again, by regard for the mere signs of language, ---which, after all, is what language has always been:

THERE IS NOTHING ABOUT A SIGN WHICH IS intrinsically MEANINGFUL

Meaning is only possible when there exists an intricacy between language as a description of itself, coherent with that of which it is a description; as in a coherent performance of a new composition. Under such conditions a state of intricacy also could be said to exist;

each describes the other.

In the beginning was the "word" , ---but the word got 'loaded', ---so-to-speak.

SL projection 23
But, how does one *unload* superabundant language?

Between the impossible and incomprehensible state of *signs staring at signs*, and the excess which states of *superabundant language staring at superabundant language* generate, there exists a large number of other language conditions. I cite some, ---many of which will be familiar to you:

one may unload by genetic manipulation,
    psychiatric shock treatment,
    or Zen meditation;

one may unload by persuasion,
    seduction,
    outright submission,
    or political strategy;

one may unload by undefined gut,
    socialized admission,
    public confession,
    or mind-control as in bacteriological warfare;

one may unload by legislation, as in law.

However, ---for me at least, in these consist not nearly enough of merely.

But, how *does* one unload superabundant language?

I think of unloading as a matter of discipline, ---discipline available within the conditions of language itself. Following are two:

1) one can unload superabundant language
    by putting focus on its *mereness*,
    (i.e., its functions are operative,
        ---but barely).

2) one can unload superabundant language
    by temporarily *depriving it of functional biases*
        which reside within it;
        namely: interpretive, translational,
        articulative states;
        (i.e., it functions as
            context-free grammar).
"7/4/76: In the merest signs of language, I search for signs of life in language. I think a lot about periods, commas, colons, ---and coordinating conjunctions. The mereness of AND or BUT. In BUT resides the mereness of argument; in AND resides the mereness of connection.

Mereness, but deeply resonant; Mereness, and deeply resonant.

(In its mereness, can Brain be conceptualized as an AND-state? In its mereness, can Brain be conceptualized as a BUT-state? In its mereness, can Brain be conceptually reduced to merely one, or the other? ---I cannot think so. With both, one can compose.)"
In various locations of this paper I have tried to express that the correction of language, per se, has not resulted in more appropriate language as long as such corrections were made on the functional basis of interpretive, translational, or articulative languages, i.e.:

1) interpretive linguistic functions put focus on the language of an observer, to the probable exclusion of the language of the observed:
   
   (e.g., one notion of pianissimo will suffice).

2) translational linguistic functions put focus on the language of the observed, to the probable exclusion of the language of the observer:
   
   (e.g., some notion of pianissimo will suffice).

3) articulative linguistic functions put focus on neither the language of an observer, nor of the observed, to the probable exclusion of both:
   
   (e.g., any notion of pianissimo will suffice).

But in intrinsic, ---i.e., appropriate, language, the language of an observer includes the language of the observed, to the probable exclusion of neither:

   (e.g., no notion of pianissimo will suffice, ---yet!).

Together, another language, (perhaps a third one?), is formulated, to within context of both relationships:

   (e.g., my description of what pianissimo is doing in this measure, and this music's description of what pianissimo is doing in this measure: this and that; that and this. The relationship is not exclusively one or the other, or neither, but intrinsically one and the other$^{59}$. This is possible, unless, of course, I am forever condemned by the sound of my own voice, ---or unless I forget: ---yet!).

I hold that appropriate language is: intrinsic language is: compositional language. (Of course the other linguistic functions referred to may produce "compositions" as well.) However,
appropriate language is the only condition which offers the possibility for correction (here, I do not intend "correct"), within the formulation of language itself. I do not suggest this position because I wish to put forth compositional language as some lofty, elitist circumstance;---but contrarily and precisely because it contains within it the seeds for making its own corrections. Since in the formation of appropriate language I cannot distinguish myself from that which I do, composition also provides me with the possibility for self-correction.

In each beginning there are tiny, little words, and dots, and dashes, and commas, and notes, and pulses---

WORST CASES:

...WHOLE

---It makes sense
to consider my I/self as visible language. Visible language is not private. What lurks also shows: in a blink of an eye, ---a nervous twitch, ---a tight-ass, ---a twist of the pen, ---a voice print, ---what I stand for, by whatever signs, no matter how unobserved, ---but observable. Visible language seems frightfully public to me.

But, my private language: ---that which is issued forth, ---that which is not my public, visible state, ---that with which I associate the term: composition, is not public. It is not visible language.

It may be said that my public state is more of a whole than my private one.

No, my issued compositions are not part of me. It is their 'apartness' which makes them private.

Still---, each and every private utterance is not only an instance of my whole language, ---but instances me in the sense that it is not part of my visible, public language which is always instanced.

Yes: issued compositions are made; ---with my help.
In this paper I have tried not to provide a definition for whole language. I would not even if I could.

Each and every instance of it is only a description of each and every instance of it.

But, unless I think I am wholly within language, I cannot instance it.

However, one could say that each instance pushes the whole system.

In these senses, I initially regard each and every linguistic utterance which I observe, as worst-case;

---at the same time, I hope I do not merely play with words:
FOOTNOTES

1. This paper was first performed by its author on March 5, 1977. The occasion was the 12th National Conference of the American Society of University Composers, University of Illinois. It was revised during October, 1977.

2. In performance, a succession of 35mm slides are projected in three stage locations (stage left, right, center), of which this is the first. Those slide reproductions which, herein, appear in right columns (denoted as SL projection 2,3, etc.) are from Laurie Stokes' composition: Stair-well, and are used with her permission.

3. All italics and parentheses in this paper, ---in or out of quotations---, are the author's, except for the quote of A.R.Luria (cf. text and footnote 49).

4. i.e. with the corpus callosum intact.


9. Dysphasia: speech impairment, e.g., uncoordinated speech, and inability to arrange words in their proper order.


11. op.cit., see fn. 6.

12. This phenomenon is commonly known as "handedness".


15. The Dramatis Personae, in order of their appearance, are as follows:


(1874) ibid., see under "Affections of Speech: Notes on the Physiology and Pathology of Language," p.130.

(1876) ibid., see under "Affections of Speech: On Affections of Speech from Disease of the Brain," p.186.


(1968) op.cit., see fn. 8.

(1969) op.cit., see fn. 6.

(1976) Bever, T., Psychology Department, Columbia University in an address: "The Biological and Behavioral Basis of Language," Salk Institute, La Jolla, California, November 11, 1976.


16. Credit for the formulation of the Table, dates 1864-1969, inclusive, goes to J. Bogen, op.cit., see fn. 6; additional dates are those of the author.


19. Ibid.,

20. Ibid.,

21. A typographical error: "preception", or perception?


23. This is not to say that there have not been isolated instances of interest and inquiry with regard to the Right Hemisphere, nor is it untrue that current interest, in some sense, appears to be on the increase. Here are some instances:


Schlesinger, B., Higher Cerebral Functions and their Clinical Disorders, New York, Grune and Stratton, 1962


24. For instance:

(a) Parallelistic ideas of "psychomorphology"; i.e., the notion that psychological functions have their corresponding permanent "cerebral organs", and that an "isomorphism" exists between the mental processes and the brain structure generating them; see Luria, op.cit., fn. 7.

(b) The right-good, left-bad polarization; see Domhoff, G.W., "But Why Did They Sit on the King's Right in the First Place?" Psychoanal. Rev., 56, (1969), pp.586-596.

(c) Reductionism, dualism, either/or-ism, standardization-ism.


25. Op.cit., see fn. 15 (Desmedt). However, Desmedt is not the first to use the expression: non-language. I find it appearing at least as early as 1935, (see Weisenburg, op. cit., fn.15). Apparently there was something called the Pinter-Paterson performance scale, and the Pinter-Patterson non-language mental test. Weisenburg remarks (Chapter VI, p.134): "To make the extensive survey of mental functioning in Aphasia (the chief object of this research), a wide variety of tests were chosen". (Here follows an outline: speaking, naming, repeating, understanding spoken language, reading, writing, arithmetic, language intelligence tests, reproduction of verbal materials,
(and then: non-language tests, of which one was drawing))


27. Amusia: Impairment of ability to make or understand musical sound(s).

28. Strictly speaking, this is not quite the case. For instance, Wertheim (op.cit., p.178, see fn. 23) has developed certain 'criteria' by considering more fully the properties of music to which the brain (say in the case of Amusia) may be referenced. Here they are: (1) The ability to turn musical perception into emotion; (2) The rhythmic sense; (3) The sense of sounds (particularly "relative hearing" and "absolute pitch"); (4) The sense of musical intervals; (5) The agogical and dynamic sense.

29. Aphasia: Defect or loss of expression by speech, writing, or signs, or of understanding spoken or written language.


32. (author note) Here Maturana is speaking of human systems. His expression: "To an observer" refers to another which could, as well, be one's self.

33. At the moment, I regard the expressions: function, state, and condition as intimately linked, such that they form a linguistic (phenomenological) network. For me to think (use) any one of them is to invoke the others. At the same time, they are not interchangeable; i.e., they do not lack distinct features. In this paper, the use of any one of them implies the 'presence' of the others.

34. Given any particular describer/description, it may be that only one or another function may obtain. It may also be that motion between and among them may obtain. I suggest that these four functions, as a 'complex' entity, hold membership in a dynamic (not hierarchical) interactive system.

35. i.e., situation = location.

36. Ella Mae Lentz

37. Ursula Bellugi, The Salk Institute for Biological Studies, La Jolla, Ca. I cite some of her recent work:


38. For an elaboration on this point, see Gaburo, K., My, My, My,
39. Op.cit., see fn. 6. N.B., in what follows I do not argue with the important work which Bogen has done, and continues to do. I argue only with his descriptive language.

40. For an elaboration on this point, see Brun, H., and Gaburo, K., Collaboration One, (Statement no. 18), La Jolla, Lingua Press, 1976, and Gaburo, K., Privacy One (Words Without Song), La Jolla, Lingua Press, 1976.


43. i.e., a reflexive attribute of language; see Gaburo, K., C---IS, La Jolla, Lingua Press, 1976, and elsewhere in this paper for further discussion of the reflexive, denotative, and connotative attributes of language.

44. Op.cit., see fn. 6. In this particular quotation, the designations (a), (b), (c), are mine.

45. Ibid.

46. I contend that language, however one may already possess it, has always been, and is, acquired. It seems to me that one may never have made the connection between language and its acquisition, or soon forgets that this is the case. Perhaps this is so because language seems so "naturally" a part of one's being, ---as-if it was always there---, and so, whatever of it is possessed, may also be regarded as all that is needed.


48. Here, I equate the expression: "separate existences", with the expression: unique complex entities.


Ibid., see Carritt, E.A., (introduction), xxvii.

Ibid., see Ruskin, J., "Modern Painters," p.179.

Ibid., see Plotinus, "Enneads," p.49.

Ibid., see Lipps, T., "Empathy, Inward Imitation, and Sense Feelings," p.252.


57. For a more formal statement, see Conant, R.C., and Ashby, W.R., *Every Good Regulator of a System Must Be A Model of That System*, Biological Computer Laboratory publication 202, Department of Electrical Engineering, University of Illinois, Urbana, 1970, p.97.


59. i.e., interactive.

60. On March 3, 1977, (see fn. 1), previous to the first reading of *Whole Language Language*, and, as a structural link to it, my composition, *Privacy One: Words Without Song*, (see fn. 40) was presented. *Privacy One* is the first of a continuing series of compositions on the subject: *Private/Public*.

61. Insofar as I am aware, credit for the expression: "Pushing Whole Systems", (to which the statement is a reference), belongs to the artist Newton Harrison.
