PAN-SLAVISM AND WORLD WAR II

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In spite of later claims that it had been the leader of the anti-fascist camp and of the Slav world from the beginning of the second World War, the Soviet Union followed a strictly Russian policy, neither anti-fascist nor Pan-Slav, from August, 1939, to June, 1941. This policy clearly foreshadowed a nationalist revival of the language and aspirations that had been most characteristic of Old Russia but were assumed to have been definitely buried in the ten November days of 1917 which shook the world. During these two years not the slightest sympathy for the Czechs and Poles suffering under German occupation was expressed. Indeed, although Leninist communism during World War I had conducted a violent defeatist propaganda campaign in both warring camps, the subversive communist propaganda that was resumed in 1939 was directed only against the democratic nations. "Moreover, officially, even Ostentatiously, help was granted to the camp of fascism so that, from 1939 to 1941, the Soviet Union could be considered a non-belligerent partner of the Axis. From the policy of benevolent neutrality towards the Axis the Soviet Union was removed against its will. Circumstances made it an ally of the democracies. This change was performed reluctantly, only because no other choice was left."

The communist leadership was convinced even as late as May, 1941, that its policy of neutrality would safeguard Russia's peace, but in January, 1945, the same leadership boasted of having "always" correctly foreseen the course of events, as well as of being alone able to recognize how and whether events must develop in the future. In any event, in his report to the Moscow Soviet on November 6, 1941, Stalin rightly accused the German invaders of having "perfidiously attacked our peace-loving country." Clearly against its foresight and will, the Soviet leadership was forced to enter, not a war for proletarian revolution, social justice, or democracy, but a "war of national liberation"—

1 N. S. Timasheff, "Four Phases of Russian Internationalism," Thought, Vol. 20, p. 47 (March, 1945). In 1927, at the Fifteenth Congress of the Russian Communist Party, Stalin declared: "The revolution in USSR is only part of the world revolution, its beginning and the base for its successful advance."

2 Bolshevik, No. 10, pp. 1–2 (May, 1941).

3 "Our Party is theoretically equipped and united as no other party on earth because in its activity it leans on the Marxist-Leninist theory and masters the knowledge of the laws of social development. The duty of the Party and Soviet personnel... is unceasingly to study the theory of Marx and Lenin, remembering that it gives the Party the ability to orient itself in any circumstances, to foresee the course of events, to understand the inner connections of current developments, and to recognize not only how and whether events are now developing, but also how and whether they must develop in the future" (Bolshevik, No. 1, p. 10, Jan., 1945).

4 Stalin, O velikoi otechestvennoi voine Sovetskogo Soyuza [On the Great Patriotic War of the Soviet Union], 5th ed. (Moscow, 1946), p. 17. See also, from his radio address of July 3, 1941: "Germany suddenly and treacherously violated the non-aggression pact of 1939" (p. 10).
“great patriotic war,” the title previously given by the Russians to the war of 1812. In his report to the Moscow Soviet, Stalin accordingly used words not heard officially since the “Great October Socialist Revolution,” the twenty-fourth anniversary of which he was celebrating. Hitler, he said, was out to “exterminate the Slav peoples, the Russians, Poles, Czechs, Slovaks, Bulgarians, Ukrainians, and Byelo-Russians.” The Nazis had the audacity “to call for the annihilation of the great Russian nation, the nation of Plekhanov and Lenin, Belinsky and Chernyshevsky, Pushkin and Tolstoi, Glinka and Tchaikovsky, Gorky and Chekhov, Sekhov and Pavlov, Repin and Surikov, Suvorov and Kutuzov.” And in his address to the Red Army Parade the next day, Stalin called upon Soviet soldiers to let themselves be inspired in this war by “the manly images of our great ancestors—Alexander Nevsky, Dmitri Donskoi, Kuzma Minin, Dmitri Pozharsky, Alexander Suvorov, Mikhail Kutuzov.” The feudal saints of the Orthodox Church and the generals serving tsarist reaction, all of them exclusively Russian, were thus proclaimed the ancestors of the supernatinal revolutionary Red Army.5

In the war years themselves the Russian fatherland completely overshadowed the Soviet fatherland.6 Traditional national values were restored without any reference either to class war or to the revolutionary struggle and without any regard for the national feeling of the non-Russian Soviet nationalities. To the nationalist heroes and warriors of the past, everything was forgiven. At the end of S. Golubov’s novel General Bagration (1943), Prince Peter Bagration, the general mortally wounded in the battle at Borodino, was presented as kissing the Emperor’s signature on a letter of thanks just brought to him and as dying with the words, “Soul and body alike and my blood to the last drop, I give all to my fatherland and to his Majesty’s service.”7 Field Marshal Count

4 Ibid., pp. 26–28, 36. In his Order of the Day as National Commissar for Defense on February 23, 1942, Stalin rightly emphasized that the policy of racial equality of the USSR was a factor of strength in comparison to Hitler’s racial policy (ibid., p. 42).

5 In November, 1941, the popular young poet Konstantin Simonov (see the article on him by Elena Mikhailova in Soviet Literature, No. 8, pp. 40–49, Aug., 1946) wrote in a famous poem to his friend Alexei Surkov: “I am proud of this dearest of countries, this dear sad country that gave me my birth. I am proud that in Russia my life is to finish, that the mother that bore me was Russian of race, that when seeing me off, in the old Russian manner, she locked me three times in her loving embrace.” And Surkov replied: “In the midst of night and darkness we have carefully borne before us the inextinguishable flame of faith in our Russian, our native folk.” A fervent Russian patriotism became the theme of all the poems, short stories, novels, and plays, glorifying the “Holy Homeland” (svyashchennaya rodina). The general slogan was “za rodinu, za Stalina”—“for fatherland and Stalin.”

6 See Michael Karpovich, “Soviet Historical Novel,” Russian Review, Vol. 5, pp. 53–63 (Spring, 1946). This novel was translated into English by J. Fineberg under the title of No Easy Victories (London, 1945). A number of other Russian war novels and biographies about historical heroes are available in English translations, among them S. Sergeev-Tsensky, Brusilov’s Break-Through (London, 1944); S. Borodin, Dmitri Donskoi, trans. E. and C. Paul (London, 1944); Mikhail Bragin, Field Marshal Kutuzov (Moscow, 1944); K. Osipov, Alexander Suvorov; A Biography, trans. E. Bone (London, 1944); and R. Wipper (Robert Yuryevich Vipper), Ivan Grozny, trans. J. Fineberg (Moscow, 1947). In the last,
Alexander Vasilyevich Suvorov (1729–1800), who cruelly subdued, on the Tsar’s behalf, the peasant rebellion of Pugachev and the last resistance of free Poland, became the greatest hero of the communist youth; even General Alexei Brusilov, who was appointed in May, 1917, commander-in-chief of the Russian Army which the Bolsheviks did everything at the time to undermine, was honored by a great war novel and by the “deep respect” which the Red Army paper, Krasnaya zvezda, expressed on September 3, 1943, for “the man who in the stern years of the last war upheld with dignity the honor and glory of the Russian Army.”

The Russian nationalism set loose by events did not confine itself to a defensive patriotism, the chauvinism of which might be explained by the military catastrophe facing the country. It immediately asserted itself in an aggressive way. The annexation of eastern Poland, of Bessarabia, and of part of Bukovina could be “ justified” by nationalism, by the goal of uniting all Ukrainians and Byelo-Russians under the Soviet flag (though this unification deprived the Soviet Ukrainians of that consideration which they had received from Moscow when the Soviet Ukraine was yet to attract the “brothers by race” living in Poland and Rumania). No similar justification existed for the annexation of the Baltic Republics, but, quite naturally, many Russian non-Bolshevik nationalists greeted this step. People who had pleaded for the independence of the Magyars or the Irish accepted the control by Moscow of Transcaucasia, of the Baltic coast, and of the Ukraine, as justified by Russian needs of security and economy. Understandably, meanwhile the “Internationale” was abolished as the national anthem of the Soviet Union; its expansive promise the Internationale unites the human race, did not ring true in an atmosphere satiated with glory to Velikaya Rus, “the great Russia,” as distinct from the rest of mankind. And the daring challenge to the self-reliance of the masses, “Nobody will bring us liberation, neither a Tsar, nor a God, nor a hero,” became unacceptable in the era of Veliky Stalin, “the great Stalin”—Tsar, God, and hero to his people and, what no tsar had claimed, of all “progressive” mankind.

In his election speech broadcast from Moscow on February 9, 1946, Stalin praised the “Soviet multinational state system” as having survived successfully the test of the war, because it was built on foundations promoting the feeling of friendship and fraternal collaboration between the various peoples of the USSR. But in June, 1941, the Soviet government had thought itself obliged to apply against one of these peoples a “barbarous measure” which the tsarist government had long hesitated to decide upon. The victims were those Germans who, in the later eighteenth century, had settled along the lower Volga and developed a prosperous community there. In 1916, two years after the out-

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a historian of repute tried to save Ivan’s reputation as a reformer and “progressive” military strategist against moralistic “liberal” considerations. The liberal historians, according to Wipper, translated “the significant, and on the lips of Russians extremely majestic, surname ‘Grozny’ by the vulgar words... ‘Ivan the Terrible’ ” (pp. 233–234).

The Russian nationalist point of view was expressed, for example, in Walter Kolarz, Stalin and Eternal Russia (London, 1944), pp. 48 ff.
break of World War I, the Russian government had made up its mind to remove temporarily the Volga Germans, but the March Revolution had intervened before the plan could be carried out. After 1917 Lenin singled out these same Volga Germans for especially favorable treatment. Their Oblast, the first autonomous unit created by the communist government (in July, 1918), was raised in 1924 to the status of an autonomous republic of the RSFSR. Their city of Pokrovsk was renamed Engels and became the capital of the republic, while their other large town, Katherinenstadt, named after Catherine II who settled the Germans there in 1764, was rebaptized Marxstadt. However, in June, 1941, Stalin apparently became convinced that the two decades of Soviet life and education which supposedly had promoted the fraternal solidarity of peoples had been a failure. While Hitler's armies were still far away in western Russia, Stalin ordered, without any proof of collective treason or any trial, the permanent eviction and dispersion of the Volga Germans. Their autonomy proved to be nothing but a scrap of paper. The region was cleared of all traces of German culture and ruthlessly Russified, with the cities unprotected even by the names of Marx and Engels. Furthermore, this policy of wholesale destruction of cultural and political entity by the Bolsheviks themselves was not carried through on a class basis, but purely on a racial one.

Only somewhat different was the case of four Mohammedan peoples in the Soviet Union. On December 17, 1917, a proclamation of the new Soviet government signed by Lenin and Stalin was addressed to the Moslems of Russia and the East: "The rule of the robbers and enslavers of the peoples of the earth is about to end . . . A new world is being born, a world of workers and free men . . . Moslems of Russia, Tatars of the Volga and the Crimea, Kirgiz and Sarts of Siberia and Turkestan . . . Chechens and mountaineers of the Caucasus—all those whose mosques and chapels have been destroyed, whose beliefs and customs have been trampled under foot by the Tsars and oppressors of Russia. Henceforth your beliefs and customs, your national and cultural institutions, are free and inviolable. Build your national life freely and unhindered." But in 1943 and 1944, four of the Mohammedan autonomous Soviet states—the Kalmyk ASSR, the Crimean Tartar ASSR, the Chechen-Ingush, and the Karachayev autonomous regions in the northern Caucasus—were removed completely from the map and from life, the peoples transported to unknown regions in northern Asia, their languages eradicated, their cities and villages renamed. No trace was left of these historic communities, and the lands were resettled by Russians.

No reasons were given for any of these nationalist excesses, but apparently all were based upon the assumption of collective racial "guilt." And as the Mohammedan territories were in fact reached by the German armies, it can be

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9 On the establishment of the autonomy of the Volga Germans, see Rudolf Schilze-Molkau, Die Grundzüge des Wolgadeutschen Staatswesens im Rahmen der russischen Nationalitätentpolitik (Munich, 1931), and Manfred Langhans-Ratzeburg, Die Wolgadeutschen, ihr Staats- und Verwaltungsrecht in Vergangenheit und Gegenwart, zugleich ein Beitrag zum bolschewistischen Nationalitättenrecht (Berlin, 1929).
assumed that parts of the populations did collaborate with the Germans. In any case, many Soviet citizens of all nationalities went over to the German side; if Hitler had followed a less beastly policy of human extermination and degradation, the number of the elements disloyal to Stalinism probably would have been much larger. As it was, Stalin apparently became convinced that he could count only upon the support of the Great Russians, to whose emotions the annexations of the years 1939–1941 had appealed and among whom some began to look upon him as the leader who would bring about both the Pan-Slav and Pan-Asian expansionism of extreme Russian nationalists and the utopia of universal social justice of Slavophil messianists.

Conscious of the debt which he owed to the Great Russians, Stalin acknowledged it publicly in the toast with which he concluded the Kremlin banquet for the Red Army commanders on May 24, 1945: "I should like to drink to the health of our Soviet people—and first of all to the health of the Russian people. I drink first of all to the health of the Russian people because it is the most outstanding nation of all the nations forming the Soviet Union. . . . It has won in this war universal recognition as the leading force in the Soviet Union among all the peoples of our country. . . . The confidence of the Russian people in the Soviet government was the decisive force which ensured the historic victory over the enemy of mankind—fascism." The historical sorrows and triumphs of Russian imperialism became now officially Stalin's. After he had attacked Japan in August, 1945—breaking his pact of friendship and nonaggression of 1941 with Japan as treacherously as Hitler had broken his own with Stalin—he celebrated the quick victory in a broadcast from Moscow on September 2, in which he said: "The defeat of Russian troops in 1904 in the period of the Russo-Japanese War left grave memories in the minds of our people. It was a dark stain on our country. Our people trusted and awaited the day when Japan would be routed and the stain wiped out. For forty years we have, men of the older generation, waited for this generation, waited for this day. And now this day has come." This astonishing declaration, describing victory in a way which resembled so closely Mussolini's triumph in wiping out the stain of the battle of Adwa forty years later in the victorious war against Ethiopia, was a complete reversal of the official attitude of Russian Socialism in 1905—an attitude unaltered in high school textbooks published in 1941, which declared that "Lenin and the Bolsheviks worked for the defeat of the tsarist government in this predatory and shameful war, because the defeat facilitated the victory of the revolution over tsarism." And in one of his leaflets against the Russo-Japanese War, Comrade Stalin had written: "Let us wish that this war will become a still greater disaster for the tsarist regime than was the Crimean War. . . . Then serfdom was ended. Now, as a consequence of this war, we will bury the child of serfdom, the tsarist regime with it stinking secret police and gendarmes."10

10 The first quotation is from Istoriya SSSR, Vol. 3 (for the tenth grade), 2nd ed. (Moscow, 1941), p. 29. The quotation regarding Stalin's attitude is from Lavrentii Pavlovich Beriya, K voprosu ob istorii bolshevistskikh organizatsii v Zakavkazie [Concerning the
Thus when the Soviet Union after thirty years revived Russia's past, it revived that past in its most nationalist and imperialist mood, which had never before been sanctified as official policy and had always been resisted by strong liberal and humanitarian trends of thought. But the new Stalinist nationalism did not shed the worldwide implications and ambitions of Leninism; what emerged was the "universal Russian monarchy" which the Czech historian Palacký had dreaded in 1848, but with the addition of a new kind of monarch at its head, a man of the masses, a bearer of the social gospel endowed with qualities of "genius" and "omniscience" such as no Russian ruler and no leader of a people had ever claimed. It was only natural that in such an atmosphere the ghost of Pan-Slavism rose again—not the liberal Pan-Slavism of the Western Slavs of 1848, but the Pan-Slavism of Moscow and of the Pan-Slav Congress of 1867, a Pan-Slavism which preached the liberation of the other Slavs from alien influences by the Russian people, a Pan-Slavism which was Pan-Russism.

The Chairman of the Commission on Credentials of the Council of Nationalities of the Supreme Soviet, P. A. Sharia, as reported by Izvestiva on March

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*Question of the History of the Bolshevik Organizations in Transcaucasia*, 5th ed. (Moscow, 1939), p. 56. In the new edition of the *Istoriya SSSR*, published in 1946, the text has been changed and Stalin's speech on September 2, 1945, after the victory over Japan is quoted (Vol. 3, p. 45). The military technology of the tsarist army is blamed for its backwardness: "In Port Arthur there was not even a wireless telegraph, though it had been invented in 1895 by A. S. Popov" (p. 29).

The spirit of invincibility under a better government than that of the tsars was expressed in a pamphlet by N. M. Korobkov, *Mikhail Kutuzov* (Moscow, 1945), written especially for officers: "We are on the road to a new growth of the power of our country. Prepared historically for great feats, our army and our new Stalinist military art surpass everything that Russian history has ever known. But we do not forget our great ancestors, we do not forget the heroic past of our nation. [Their] memory is a faithful guarantee of the great future to which the genius of a leader (genialny vozhd), Generalissimus Stalin, leads the country on new paths" (p. 5).

Two official translations into English exist for the text of the pamphlet by Beriya, Stalin's fellow countryman and faithful follower: *On the History of the Bolshevik Organizations in Transcaucasia*, trans. from the 4th Russian ed. (New York, 1939) and trans. from the 7th Russian ed. (Moscow, 1949). Beriya's speech reveals the switch from "socialism" to "nationalism" in Stalin's line and establishes the official legend about Stalin's activities in his younger years. Stalin's attitude in 1905 is discussed on pp. 44–46 of the 1939 ed. (pp. 71–73 of the 1949 ed.): "In January 1904 the Russo-Japanese War broke out. The Bolsheviks of Transcaucasia, headed by Comrade Stalin, consistently pursued Lenin's line of 'defeat' for the Tsarist government, constantly urging the workers and peasants to take advantage of the military overthrow of the autocracy. The All-Caucasian Committee of the RSDLP (Russian Social Democratic Labor Party, the Bolshevik organization), the Tiflis and Baku Committees of the RSDLP issued a number of leaflets exposing the imperialist predatory character of the Russo-Japanese War on the part of both warring powers and calling for the defeat of Tsarism. One of the leaflets . . . said: 'However much they may call us non-patriots and the enemies at home, let the autocracy . . . remember that the RSDLP represents 99% of the population of Russia. . . . Their brothers are being driven into the jaws of death to shed the blood of the sons of the Japanese, a brother people! . . . We want this war to be more lamentable for the Russian autocracy than was the Crimean War. . . . ' Day in and day out the Bolsheviks urged the soldiers to support the revolutionary struggle of the people against Tsarism.'
15, 1946, enlarged on Stalin's statement of the Russian people as the leading force of the Soviet Union: "Every people in the Soviet Union understands perfectly well that the main, decisive role in the achievement of victory over the enemy in the Great Patriotic War... was played by the great Russian people. For this reason the prestige of the Russian people is so immeasurably high among the other peoples; for this reason the peoples of the USSR bear toward it boundless confidence and a feeling of tremendous love and gratitude."

The same love and gratitude were expected from the younger Slav brothers who had been liberated by the Russian Army. The new Pan-Slavism, turning away from the West and looking to Moscow, was also justified by the unique position of Russian culture. "Naturally our literature, which reflects a system much higher than any bourgeois democratic system, a culture many times higher than any bourgeois culture, has the right to teach others a new universal morality. Where can you find such a people or such a country as ours?" wrote Andrei Alexandrovich Zhdanov in Pravda on September 21, 1946, when he was probably the second most influential man in the Soviet Union. On June 27, 1947, Pravda declared: "We may say with confidence that the center of artistic culture of the world has now moved to Moscow. From here mankind receives the art of the most advanced thought, of great feeling, of highest morality and noteworthy artistry." This highest culture on earth had, of course, found its instrument in the Russian language. "The future belongs to the Russian language as the language of socialism," Moskovsky Komsomolets asserted on March 6, 1949; "the democratic peoples are learning the Russian language, the world language of internationalism." Under these circumstances, would not the Slav peoples of the West gladly accept the Russian culture and the Russian language, akin to them by blood and tradition and at the same time the most advanced on earth?

II

Less than two months after the German attack on the Soviet Union a Pan-Slav Committee was formed in Moscow, and on August 10, 1941, it held its first meeting under the chairmanship of General Alexander Semyonovich Gundorov. Though no official Soviet leaders participated, the Russian communist intelligentsia was well represented by such foremost members as the authors Nikolai Simenovich Tikhonov (the first writer to receive the Order of the Patriotic War, First Class), Alexander Alexandrovich Fadeev, and Alexei Tolstoi, and the composer Dmitri Shostakovich. The Poles were represented by Wanda Wassiliewska, wife of the Ukrainian playwright and communist leader, Alexander Korneichuk; the Czechs by Zdeněk Nejedlý, professor of musicology at Prague University and biographer of Smetana and Masaryk, and by Jan Šverma, a communist who died fighting in Slovakia in 1945. In his opening words, Tolstoi "rejected the old ideology of Pan-Slavism" as reactionary and contrary to the principles of equality among the nations. "Slavs, let us unite, that each Slavonic nation may be entitled, as the other nations are, to a free, peaceful existence—that the culture of our nations may flourish without restraint." The main emphasis of the meeting was on the fight against the
German enemy, a call upon all Slavs to establish armed forces and to sabotage the enemy’s efforts. Much more representative and more carefully prepared was the second meeting of the Slavs in Moscow on April 4 and 5, 1942. Shostakovitch issued a call to arms: “I am proud to be a Russian, I boast of being a Slav. . . . May all the spiritual forces, all the intellectuals of the glorious family of the Slavonic nations fearlessly fulfil the great mission entrusted to them by history!” And Tolstoi summed up the revised Slavophile interpretation of history in an article in Prawda: “We must revise the whole history of the Slav peoples. . . . During one thousand years, our young blood vitalized decrepit Byzantium. Thanks to the Slavs, Byzantium preserved ancient civilization and transmitted it to feudal Europe. The Slav peoples, hard-working, lovers of liberty and peace and culture, had as their neighbors on the East nomadic empires which always cherished the utopian design of world conquest, and on the West medieval emperors whose imposing cavalcades were equally vain. The aggressions from East and West broke against the fearless resistance of the Slav world. The role of the Slav peoples in the formation of European humanism has not yet been appreciated at its true value. . . .”

What no previous Slav congress had attempted was now realized, thanks to official government support. A monthly periodical Slavyane [The Slavs], began to appear in Moscow in January, 1943; special committees to work among Slav youth, Slav scholars, and Slav women were formed; Slav scholarship and publications were encouraged in the Soviet Union under the leadership of Professor Nikolai Sevastyanovich Derzhavin, who since 1898 had published numerous works on Slav history, especially on the Bulgarians, and who was awarded the Order of Lenin in 1945; above all, the Pan-Slav propaganda was carried to Britain, Canada, Latin America, and the United States, appealing as Hitler had done to the racial solidarity of citizens of Slav descent. A congress of Slavonic nations meeting in London on May 25, 1944, under the chairmanship of R. W. Seton-Watson, was attended mostly by Slavs living in England in temporary exile. Of much greater importance was the American Slav Congress which took place in Detroit on April 25 and 26, 1942. It made use of the wartime enthusiasm for “our Russian ally” and tried to organize the ten million Americans of Slav descent immediately in support of the common American-Russian struggle against Hitler and permanently in support of the Soviet Union and its policy.11

11 A good discussion of the Slav peoples in and after World War II is in Albert Mousset, The World of the Slavs (London, 1950), which is a revised edition of the French original, published in 1946.

12 Testifying before the House Committee on Un-American Activities, Judge Blair F. Gunther of the Court of Common Pleas, Pittsburgh, accused the American Slav Congress of being “the most dangerous fifth column operating among our Slav population. Its chief aim is to subvert millions of Slavic Americans operating in our basic industries in order to cripple our national defense apparatus. It gives every evidence of Moscow direction and control.” The Congress was listed as a subversive agency by the Attorney General of the United States on September 21, 1948. On June 25, 1949, the House Committee on Un-American Activities found that the Congress changed its keynote at the end of World
The official recognition of the Russian Orthodox Church by Soviet authorities in September, 1943, and the elevation of the Metropolitan Sergius of Moscow to the dignity of a patriarch of all Russia made the Church—as it had been among the Pan-Slavs of the second half of the nineteenth century—an instrument of Russian imperial policy. Patriarch Alexei, who succeeded Sergius in May, 1944, praised Stalin as "a wise leader, placed by the Lord over our great nation." All churches were ordered to offer prayers "for the health and well-being of the God-sent leader of the peoples of our Christ-loving nation." As in the nineteenth century, Pan-Orthodoxism was to support Pan-Slavism; Orthodox churches everywhere were to be united under Moscow's leadership. Patriarch Alexei, at whose coronation the patriarchs of Alexandria, Antioch, and Georgia participated, visited the Near East in 1945 to renew the ties which had existed in the time of tsarist Russia; Orthodox churches in Europe and America which had split away from the Moscow patriarchate were warned to reenter. In the same year Roman Catholics in Czechoslovakia held a conference at Velehrad in Moravia, where St. Cyril and St. Methodius had worked in the ninth century for the Christianization of the Slavs and where the Pan-Slav enthusiasm of the nineteenth century had led to many demonstrations of Slav spiritual solidarity. The keynote address at this conference called on all Catholic theologians of Slav descent to join "the general Eastward orientation of the country."

The victories of the Soviet Union in 1944 and 1945 in the Balkans, in the Danubian Basin, and along the Vistula completely changed the picture in central-eastern Europe. The Russian Army entered Königsberg, the cradle of the Prussian monarchy, and Berlin, Budapest, and Vienna; the Kremlin claimed the legacy of the Habsburgs and the Hohenzollerns. Though the Soviet Union had not entered the war for any purpose of "liberation," nevertheless it demanded the gratitude of the Slavs as their liberator. From London, King Peter of Yugoslavia declared on January 11, 1945, that "fraternal union with Russia is one of the most deeply-rooted sentiments of the Slav peoples." With greater clarity the new situation was put forward by a Bulgarian writer:

For one hundred and fifty years the Slav idea served the private interests of two parasitic classes, the landowners and the bourgeoisie, i.e., it was exploited to the harm of the Slav peoples themselves. Today for the first time in 1300 years, Slavdom lives through a propitious moment which will make its security forever possible. The German danger has disappeared. The governments which fanned hatred among the Slav peoples have been thrown out. Now the Slavs can proceed to build up their society. What should be their program? The Slavs form a racial, linguistic and cultural group with a common character. They constitute a geopolitical and economic bloc which can be an important factor in the preservation of European peace. The Slav nations, in order to liberate themselves from German capitalism, must build up technically perfected national economies which would secure their independence. Their inner structure must be democratic, freedom-loving and socially just. The Slav nations have to work out a political system for Pan-Slav coopera-

War II "from super-patriotism to outright treason." The Committee charged that the embassies of the USSR and of the Slav states cooperated actively with the American Slav Congress.
tion, the principle of which ought to be full equality of small and great nations. The USSR should organize and lead this Slav society.\footnote{Christo Gandev in \textit{Slavjansko bratstvo, sbornik [Slav Brotherhood; A Symposium]}, Biblioteka Izvori [Sources], No. 2 (Sofia, 1945).}

Pan-Slavism was to become the vehicle of a common civilization—the civilization of communist Russia, of the Soviet Union, and of its leading people, the great Russian people.

In 1946 the Soviet Union controlled all of Europe east of a line running from Stettin on the Baltic Sea to Trieste on the Adriatic Sea. Behind this line there were not only all the Slav peoples but, as Danilevsky in 1869 and other Pan-Slavs had demanded, the Magyars, Rumanians, and Albanians as well. That Greece and Constantinople did not live up to Danilevsky's expectations was due not only to the will of resistance of their own citizens, but also to the far-sighted statesmanship of Winston Churchill and Ernest Bevin. Yet there was no doubt that Königsberg had become Kaliningrad; Potsdam was under communist domination; the two western Slav nations, Poland and Czechoslovakia, had emerged from the war with their territory much diminished and (under communist inspiration) on a purely racial basis, since they had driven out the Germans and other national minorities; Moscow claimed now the right—which had fallen in 1919 to the Western democracies and had been exercised in 1939 by Hitler's Germany—of settling all territorial and other disputes in the area. In addition, by the annexation of Carpatho-Ukraine from Czechoslovakia, Russia became the immediate neighbor of Czechoslovakia and of Hungary, commanding a strategic foothold in the Danubian plain south of the Carpathian Mountains and establishing frontiers there and along the Oder-Neisse line which conjured up, as the fascist dictatorships had hoped to do, a racial past many centuries old. Of all the Slav peoples, only the Poles abroad and the Polish government in London raised a passionate protest. As they had so often in the last two hundred years, the Polish national traditions and hopes had to live on in exile. In the homelands, however, the Slav spokesmen stressed the "democratic" and "peace-loving" character of the Slavs. This was no new melody. The romanticists among them had done it since the time of Herder. It had been the constant chant of the Slavophiles, and it was not changed substantially by being communist-directed. The hope was now held out to all peoples that they might partake in this "democratic" and "peace-loving" community if they would affirm, as the Slavs did, their undying gratitude and indissoluble attachment to the great leader of the Slav world and of progressive mankind, Soviet Russia under Stalin.

In this atmosphere a Pan-Slav congress met in Belgrade for five days beginning on December 8, 1946. It marked the third great congress in the history of the Pan-Slav idea: the first, in Prague, represented the Western democratic trend among the Austrian Slavs of 1848; the second, in Moscow, expressed the aggressive Russian nationalism of the 1860's; the third, in the Yugoslav capital, was the triumphant affirmation of Moscow's hold over the Slav world. Of all
its members, at that time the Yugoslavs and their wartime leader, the old and trusted communist fighter and organizer, Marshal Tito, received the highest consideration, second only to that of Russia’s Marshal Stalin; and it was not by accident that Belgrade was chosen as the seat of the Pan-Slav Congress, the center of the new Pan-Slav movement. (After September, 1947, Belgrade was also the home of the newly established Cominform [Communist Information Bureau] and of its official magazine, the first issue of which appeared there on November 15, 1947.) The program of the Congress comprised three points: the Slav peoples in the world struggle for peace and democracy; the contribution of the Slav peoples to world culture; and organizational problems of Slav cooperation. For the first time in the history of Pan-Slavism, this program and this Congress were regarded as an official and not a private manifestation; for the first time, too, the Congress was worldwide, with Slav delegates from the United States, Canada, South America, Australia, and New Zealand attending—Auslandsslaven similar to the Auslandsdeutschen, or men and women of German descent and loyalty, though citizens of non-German countries, of Hitler’s time. Interestingly enough, however, the Slav representatives were organized not on a basis of nationality but of states. There was a representation from the Soviet Union (including Ukrainians and Byelo-Russians, but without taking into account the many non-Slav nationalities of the Soviet Union, which now acted officially as a Slav state), Yugoslavia (comprising Serbs, Croats, Slovenians and Macedonians), Poland, Czechoslovakia (comprising Czechs and Slovaks), and Bulgaria. The official state-concept definitely replaced the formerly predominant nationality-concept.

The Congress was opened by Marshal Tito, who was received, according to the official reports, with a “long-lasting ovation.” (“Equally enthusiastic” was the reception accorded to Marshal Fedor Ivanovich Tolbukhin, who had commanded the Soviet armies which victoriously entered Rumania, Bulgaria, Belgrade, and Vienna and thus “liberated” the southern Slavs.) In his opening address Marshal Tito said: “What would have happened if the glorious Red Army had not existed? What would have happened if this state of workers and peasants with Stalin, the man of genius, at its head, had not existed, which stood like a wall against fascist aggression and which with innumerable sacrifices and rivers of blood liberated also our Slav nations in other countries. For these great sacrifices which our brothers in the great Soviet Union made, we other Slavs thank them. . . .” He finished his talk with a three-fold toast: to Slav solidarity (using the word which the Slovak Pan-Slav poet Kollár had coined in 1837), to “our greatest Slav brother,” the Soviet Union (forgetting that the Soviet Union was not Slav but supraracial), and to its leader of genius, Stalin (a climax of personal adulation unthinkable at the Moscow Pan-Slav Congress of 1867). Marshal Tito was followed by the two main speakers, the Yugoslav Milovan Djilas, who discussed the struggle of the Slavs for peace and democracy, and Professor Boris D. Grekov of the Academy of Sciences of the USSR, who read a long catalogue of names as “Slav contributors to world culture.” The trite verbosity and the lack of ideas of these papers
distinguished the Belgrade Congress from the nineteenth century Pan-Slav congresses as much as did the harmonious unanimity manifest in all discussions and decisions. A Pan-Slav Committee was elected, on which each of the five states was represented by five members. A Yugoslav, Major General Bozhidar Maslaric, became its president; a Russian, a Pole, a Czech and a Bulgarian were elected vice-presidents. Belgrade became the seat of this Pan-Slav Committee, and the former Pan-Slav Committee in Moscow was reorganized in March, 1947, as the Slav Committee of the USSR, with Gen. A. S. Gunderov as its chairman, and three vice-presidents, Alexander A. Veznesensky, rector of the University of Leningrad, Alexander Vladimirovich Palladin, president of the Ukrainian Academy of Sciences, and Yakub Kolas, a Byelorussian poet and vice-president of the Byelo-Russian Academy of Sciences. In 1947 the monthly Slavyane, which so far had appeared as the organ of the Pan-Slav Committee in Moscow, became the organ of the Slav Committee of the USSR.

The Pan-Slav Congress in Belgrade represented the crest of the Pan-Slav tide after World War II. Its resolutions, plans, and hopes came to naught—as had those of all the previous congresses—when far-reaching designs broke upon the rocks of reality. One more success, however, was to be registered by Moscow's Pan-Slavism, interestingly enough among the Czechs, whose conciliatory realism and spirit of political maturity were unique among the Slavs. Despite this stability, it was only in Bohemia and Moravia, the Czech parts of Czechoslovakia, that the communists were able to achieve free elections in Europe—held on May 26, 1946—a vote of 40.17 per cent. Wide circles expected a recession of the communist vote in the elections of May, 1948, and it might have been the fear of such a defeat which prompted the communist leadership to seize total control of the country in February, 1948. Czechoslovakia quickly became an integral part of the Moscow-controlled and directed Pan-Slav empire, apparently adjusting fully to the intellectual, moral, and political model set by the Kremlin. But this success, achieved against the most Westernized Slavs, was more than balanced by the event of June 28, 1948, which took the world by surprise in its revelation of an open and widening rift between Moscow and Belgrade—between Marshal Stalin and Marshal Tito, the two most prominent leaders of the new Pan-Slavism.

The Yugoslav defection created in the Slav "family of nations" a situation similar to that which had existed between 1830 and 1945 as a result of the enmity of the Poles and the Russians. As Poland had done then, Yugoslavia now became the "Judas" and "traitor" to the Slav cause and a "tool" of "Western scheming" against the Slav world which the Russians, then as now, magnanimously identified with Moscow. The similarity, even to the very words used in the diatribes by Katkov and his generation and those now used by Stalin’s spokesmen, was astonishing. But while the Polish communists acknowledged that it was only thanks to Moscow that Poland could end the "feudal" age, and that Poland's liberation from German occupation was due only to the Red Army—forgetting that it was Soviet Russia's cooperation in 1939 which facili-
tated Poland’s subjugation by Hitler—the Serbs could point to a long tradition of peasant proprietorship and to their courageous fight, independent of Russian help, waged against Turks and Germans for independence. The communist leaders in Belgrade refused to admit that their country owed its liberation and its new order of “social justice” only, or primarily, to Russia’s help and guidance. They denied the thesis propagated from Moscow that the Slav peoples could not preserve their independence except under Russia’s protection. They did not wish to subordinate the economic modernization of their country to the needs of “the motherland” of the Slavs and of the socialist world revolution. Furthermore, Tito’s defection had repercussions in the Pan-Slav Congress in the United States; some of its most active leaders, like Louis Adamic, sided with the dissident communists. The growing hostility of the Kremlin to the democracies had made the American people more aware of the threat to the West implied in the theory and actions emanating from Moscow, the center of the now intimately-fused movements of Pan-Slavism and world communism, with the result that the American Pan-Slav Congress ceased most of its activities.

Altogether, the period of Pan-Slavism in its third, communist, Pan-Russian form came to its end. But even in its heyday it had been unable to solve, in spite of all totalitarian pressure and conformity, the old problems disputed among the Slav peoples: the control of Teschen contested by Czechs and Poles, the allegiance of Macedonia to Yugoslavia or Bulgaria, and the desire of the Ukrainian people for independence from the Great-Russians.

III

The Pan-Slavism of the war years, promising the equality of all Slav peoples, was openly replaced after 1947 by a Pan-Russism which imposed Russian predominance and leadership on the Slav peoples first, but also on Magyars and Rumanians, on Uzbeks and Caucasians. In fact, the new Soviet patriotism hardly distinguished between “Russian” and “Soviet.” Soviet historiography had to follow the trend; books written and praised as recently as 1941, were rejected as not patriotic enough in 1947. Russian scholarship now began to extol the Russian past beyond anything that the most extravagant instances of former Russian historiography had ever attempted. The Kievian state now received a Slav past on Russian soil. Its rise was now found to have originated in a very ancient high east-Slav civilization, much superior to that of its neighbors; the multinational and yet centralized Russian state was dated back for many centuries, even before the sixteenth century, with the Great Russians, thanks to their cultural superiority, the leading element. The Great-Russian people was now generally called “the great Russian people,” and more and more emphasis was put on the fact that the Russians owed their whole development to their own creative originality and initiative. As one writer has explained, “The Soviet imperial idea of a union of socialist peoples has given body to its own thinned spiritual substance by its absorption of the old Russian idea of the State, with all its expansionist and centralizing tendencies. It must by all means be made acceptable to the other peoples of the Soviet Union that
the Russian people—unlike Lenin’s idea—has at present become the true bearer of the world revolutionary tasks of Marxism. The Great Brother is now the leader on the road to progress and liberty. If subjection to Russia was once proclaimed ‘the lesser evil,’ it has now become no evil at all but sheer good fortune and a blessing.” Accordingly, it is not surprising that in 1951 Professor Militza Vasil’evna Nechkina (one of the well-known younger historians of Russia, author of many works on the Decembrists, and editor of the second volume, covering the nineteenth century, of the official textbook Istoriya SSSR) wrote in the official organ of the Soviet historians, Voprosy istorii, that the conquest of colonial peoples by tsarist Russia had been not only “the lesser evil” compared with the conquest by Britain or Turkey to which they might have otherwise succumbed—the official Soviet theory since 1934—but a positive good: the Ukrainians, Georgians, Armenians, and Usbeeks were actively helped in their economic progress by inclusion in the Russian empire. Tsarism oppressed the peoples, above all the Russian people, “the older brother of all the peoples of the Soviet land.” But the struggle against the common enemy, tsarism—a struggle led by the Russian people—became the foundation of a fraternity of all the peoples devoted to the common construction of a new socialist society, and the education of the non-Russian peoples by the Russians created the condition for their liberation and progress. To elucidate these more “profound” aspects of the annexation of the non-Russian peoples by the Russian Empire, had become one of the great tasks for Soviet historiography.15

In 1931 in Burzhua’nsnaya istoricheskaya nauka v Rossii [Bourgeois Historical Science in Russia] (p. 92), Sergei A. Piontkovsky had violently attacked the well-known book by Matvyei Kuzmich Lyubavsky, Obrazovanie osnovskoi gossudarstvennoi territorii velikorusskoi narodnosti [The Development of the State Territory of the Great Russian Nationality] (Leningrad, 1929), because it stressed “chauvinistically” the Great Russian element in the history of the Russian state. The book was then characterized by the disciples of Pokrovsky as the “political program of the NEP bourgeoisie.” Now, however, both Pokrovsky and Piontkovsky are regarded as un-Marxist and unscientific, and present-day Russian historiography goes infinitely further than Lyubavsky (1860–1936) and his generation in glorifying the Russian national element. In 1951 Voprosy istorii praised the thesis of Lt. Col. L. G. Beskrovny, professor of the history of warfare of the Military Frunze Academy, entitled “Stroitelstvo russkoi armii v XVIII veke” [“The Building of the Russian Army in the 18th Century”]. In it the author rejected the “cosmopolitan” views of “bourgeois


15 Mrs. Nechkina’s article “K voprosu o formule neimenchee zlo” [“On the Question of the Lesser Evil”], Voprosy istorii, No. 4, pp. 44–48 (1951) was in the form of a letter to the editor and was specially recommended by the editor. Yet her volume in the Istoriya SSSR, 2 vols., 2nd ed. (Moscow, 1947–49) had been censored in Voprosy istorii, No. 7 (1950) for insufficient understanding of tsarist colonial policy on the ground that she had not recognized the reactionary, pro-British and pro-Turkish character of the independence movement of the Caucasian peoples under Shamil against tsarism.
historians," according to which Peter I built the Russian army upon German models. On the contrary, Russia in the eighteenth century produced the best arms in Europe and made many inventions in the field of artillery; the Russian army was then trained according to its own national system, which was the most progressive in Europe; the leading officers were Russians and not foreigners, and Napoleon learned much from the tactics and the strategy of Suvarov.\footnote{Voprosy istorii, No. 1, pp. 155–156 (1951). The thesis had been defended on June 26, 1950.} The same issue of Voprosy istorii bestowed similar praise on a symposium on the "progressive influence of the great Russian nation on the development of the Yakut nation. . . . The Yakuts, as a result of their inclusion into the centralized Russian state, entered the most advanced culture of the period and accelerated thereby the process of their social-economic and cultural development. The concrete elucidation of this question has at present, besides its purely scientific interest, great political significance. The study of the process of the historical development of the nationalities in the light of their historical interaction appears as one of the important moments in the education of the workers of our country in Soviet patriotism."\footnote{Review of Progressive vliyanie velikoi Russkoi natsii na rozvitie Yakutskogo naroda, Pt. 1, ed. A. I. Novgorod (Yakutsk, 1950) in Voprosy istorii, No. 1, p. 140 (1951).} It is hardly astonishing that, in an official programmatic article about the tasks of historical science published in the same journal later in the year, I. Kon asserted: "Marxist historical scholarship must wage an incessant war against the falsification of history by the bourgeoisie. This war, which places Soviet historians in the firing line, is being conducted (and must be conducted) in all fields of historical science. . . . Soviet historical science develops under the constant and close leadership of the Soviet state, the Bolshevik party and Stalin himself. . . . All Soviet scholarship works under the guidance of Lenin and Stalin for the welfare of our nation."\footnote{I. Kon, "K voprosu o spetsifike i zadachakh istoricheskoi nauki," Voprosy istorii, No. 6, p. 63 (1951).} "The historians into the firing line" was not a new slogan but in line with Lenin's attitude. The "difference was in what they were firing at. In 1939 Bolshaya Sovetskaya Entsiklopediya, the great depository of communist scholarship, devoted to Pan-Slavism a very short article, less than a column. This article quoted Marx and Engels as pointing out that "the immediate goal of Pan-Slavism appears to be the creation of a Slav empire, from the Erzgebirge and the Carpathian Mountains to the Black, Aegean and Adriatic Seas, under Russia's rule." It also stressed the reactionary and expansionist character of Pan-Slavism; Marx and Engels were reported to have looked with horror on a result which would make all Slavs share "the terrible fate of the Polish nation."\footnote{"Pan-Slavism," Bolshaya Sovetskaya Entsiklopediya, Vol. 44 (Moscow, 1939), Cols. 68 ff. The reference to Marx and Engels there is to Sochineniya, Vol. 7, p. 277.} In their characterization of Pan-Slavism as Russian imperialism which would subject the other Slavs as the Poles had been subjected during Marx's lifetime, Marx and the Communist Encyclopaedia seem for once to have been proved
right. As in the worst period of tsarist nationalism, the right of national originality has recently been claimed for, and reserved to, the Russians alone; the other Slav nations, Poles and Ukrainians, have had to adapt themselves to Russian nationalism. The result, so far as the Poles are concerned, was made clear at the seventh congress of Polish historians which met in Breslau from September 19 to September 22, 1948: "It is interesting to note that, while the campaign for the cultural and national distinctness (of Russia) was being trumpeted, at least one significant exception was made. The seventh congress of Polish historians . . . was criticized principally for writing history from a nationalist point of view and for contrasting Russian and Polish culture rather than drawing comparisons between their fundamental similarity."\(^20\) Even the Poles who had propagated the new Pan-Slavism after 1945 came in for sharp criticism. Henryk Batowski, editor of the Pan-Slav magazine Życie Słowiańskie (which began publication in January, 1946) and author of Historia Współpracy Słowiańskiej [History of Slav Cooperation], was branded a bourgeois nationalist because he overemphasized Poland’s role in the Slav world and glorified past instances of Slav cooperation at the expense of the present.\(^21\)

Had Stalin forgotten the warning which he voiced in his “Report on National Factors” before the twelfth Congress of the Russian Communist Party on April 23, 1923? He then regarded Great-Russian chauvinism, “a force that is gaining in strength,” as a factor impeding the amalgamation of the Soviet peoples, undermining the confidence of the “formerly oppressed peoples” in the Russian proletariat. “This is our most dangerous enemy, which we must overcome; for once we overcome it, we shall have overcome nine-tenths of the nationalism which has survived and which is developing in certain republics.”\(^22\) In the discussion at the same Congress Bukharin went even further: “In our capacity as a former great-power nation, we must counter nationalist ambitions and place ourselves in a position of inequality, in the sense of making still greater concessions to national tendencies. By such a policy alone . . . whereby we artificially place ourselves in an inferior position as compared with others, only at such a price, can we purchase the real confidence of the formerly oppressed nations.” Stalin opposed this point of view because “We must not overshoot the mark in politics, just as we must not undershoot it.” Thirty years later, it seems that Stalin has more and more undershot the mark. In spite of all totalitarian control and of the ever-growing purges of “local nationalists,” Great Russian chauvinism has apparently aroused and strengthened the opposition of the Slav and non-Slav peoples subject to Moscow.\(^23\)


Soviet patriotism, the official term most frequently used, has become more and more tinged with Slavophile Russianism. On August 13, 1947, Izvestya published a lecture on the Soviet people's national pride which S. Kovalev had delivered in the Moscow All-union Society for the Dissemination of Political and Scientific Knowledge. Kovalev had said: "In the process of socialist construction in our country, the Soviet people have worked out their own world outlook, peculiar to themselves alone. One of its most important characteristics is Soviet patriotism, a feeling of the most profound love for and devotion to the Socialist Motherland. A most important peculiarity of Soviet patriotism is the profound understanding of the superiority of the Soviet system over the bourgeois and all other class systems. . . . It is precisely this peculiarity which above all characterizes Soviet patriotism as patriotism of the highest kind. . . ." Like the Slavophiles, he attacked Peter I for his Western reforms and the nineteenth century Westernizers for their "worship of the West." "Great are the services of our people to history. Our people have repeatedly saved Europe from destruction by barbarians. . . . The great Russian people, as well as the other peoples of Russia, was also in the past not dependent on other peoples in the struggle for progress, for the development of science, literature and art." Kovalev, the official report went on, "dwelt in detail on Russia's priceless contribution to world civilization in all spheres of culture." Prawda of the same day said editorially: "For centuries Russian intellectuals fell over themselves in servility and obsequiousness before everything foreign. For centuries their consciousness was poisoned with absurd prejudices which attributed leadership in science, technology, and culture to the West. . . . This most harmful survival from the past can still be found among a certain section of our intellectuals. It is a survival which Bolshevism propaganda must utterly destroy. Our intellectuals must be daily educated and strengthened in their feelings of Soviet national pride."

In spite of all these educational efforts, some Soviet intellectuals have continued to succumb to the sin of "cosmopolitanism." In 1951 L. Knipper wrote a long article, "Protiv kosmopolitizma, za russky natsionalny stil" ["Against Cosmopolitanism, for a National Russian Style"], in Sovetskaya Muzyka [Soviet Music], Moscow, in which he asked: "Can it be that Russian music is no

23 The future nationalist trend of Lenin's revolution had been foreseen by the Russian nationalists who published the symposium Smena vekh [The Change of Guideposts] in Prague, 1921. See especially Nikolai Vasilyevich Ustryalov, Pod znakom revolyutsii [Under the Sign of Revolution], 2nd enl. ed. (Kharbin, 1927), where in the introduction he writes: "No doubt, the motherland is being rebuilt and rises again" (p. v). His articles, written between 1921 and 1926 are divided into two sections: political articles on national Bolshevism, and sketches of the philosophy of our time. Some of the articles are remarkable for an understanding of the Russian nationalism of the twentieth century, especially "National Bolshevism," pp. 47-53 (originally published Sept. 18, 1921); "Of the Future Russia," pp. 132-135; "The Nationalization of October," pp. 212-218; "Russia and Blok's Poetry," pp. 346-350; and "Of the Russian Nation," pp. 374-393 (written originally for a Vseslavyansky Sbornik [Pan-Slav Symposium] published by the Union of Slav Committees in Zagreb in honor of the one thousandth anniversary of the Kingdom of Croatia).  The lecture by Kovalev was regarded as so important that it was published in English by Soviet Monitor, issued by Tass Agency (London), No. 8815, Aug. 13, 1947.
longer Russian music because it became Soviet music? The Russian nation, which has changed in some respect in the last thirty-three years, has in no way ceased being Russian by becoming Soviet. . . . For there can be no art which is not rooted nationally. . . . We own the treasure of the truly popular art of our great Russian classics. Only by going back to these glorious traditions, can we find new ways for the development of the Russian song of the Soviet era. . . . In the brotherly family of the Soviet republics, the Russian culture is the first among equals. The national cultures not only of the Soviet republics but also of the people’s democracies, orient themselves after the Russian culture and grow to strength through it.25 And the famous directives of Stalin on the question of language in 1950 had one purpose—to make clear that the “international” language of socialism would be Russian. In an article, “The Great Language of our Epoch,” in the Literaturnaya Gazeta of January 1, 1950, David Zaslavsky declared: “The Russian language is the first world language of international significance which rejects sharply the destruction of the national character by cosmopolitanism. . . . Nobody can regard himself as educated in the full and true sense of the word, if he does not understand Russian and cannot read the creations of the Russian mind in the original language.” The Russian nationalism of nineteenth century Pan-Slavs had never voiced such uncompromising claims.

In the nineteenth century even the Slavs most friendly to Russia never went so far as to back Russia’s claims to leadership, and at the Pan-Slav Congress in Moscow in 1867 even much milder pretensions aroused strong opposition on the part of the Czech spokesmen. Now, however, on March 4, 1952, the Prague communist organ Rudé Právo reported a long speech in which the Minister of Information, Václav Kopecký, speaking before a conference of teachers, had said:

It is known to us that one of the main weapons in America’s ideological war is cosmopolitanism, which destroys the tie to one’s native land and people. . . . The case of the miserable traitor Slanský . . . has shown how the malicious agents of Western imperialism tried . . . to use cosmopolitanism in its Trotskyite-Zionist form. Therefore we must resolutely destroy cosmopolitanism, this ideological monster which is today put to the service of American war-barbarism. We also know that, besides cosmopolitanism, the Western imperialist enemies use in their preparations for a criminal war another ideological weapon, nationalism. . . . The Judas-treason of the Tito clique in Yugoslavia . . . and the case of Clementis . . . prove that American imperialism . . . tries in this way to loosen the close ties of the people’s democracies with the Soviet Union. . . . Today before all the workers

25 The struggle against cosmopolitanism began with an article in Pravda, Jan. 28, 1949, “Ob odnom antipatrioticheskom gruppe teatraltikh kritikov” [“About an Anti-Patriotic Group of Theater Critics”], and in Kultura i zhizn, Jan. 30, 1949, “Na chuzhdikh pozitsiakh” [“On Foreign Positions”]. Stalin’s articles on linguistics began to appear on June 26, 1950, as a contribution to a discussion started by Pravda on May 9, 1950, about the theories of Nikolai Yakovlevich Marr (1864–1934), a Georgian like Stalin, whose recognition as the official and the leading Marxist philologist had been assured by Stalin and who was now completely repudiated by the same Stalin. See Clarence A. Manning, “Soviet Linguistic and Russian Imperialism,” Ukrainian Quarterly, Vol. 8, pp. 20–27 (1952).
of the world the question of a just and an unjust war and the question of patriotism are raised, and this in the sense that every action against the Soviet Union is unjust, while every action of the Soviet Union is sanctified with the seal of supreme justice because its goal is the welfare of the workers, of the whole working population of the world—the welfare of all peoples and of all mankind. . . .

IV

After 1950 communist dialectics had to solve the difficulty of harmonizing Russia's national uniqueness and the glorification of Russia's past with a denunciation of the slightest emphasis on the national originality of other peoples. This may explain the violence of vituperation, unusual even for communist language, used against violators of the new line, as it helps account for the uncertainties of Soviet policy. One result was that the Western Slavs faced the possibility of a new German-Russian rapprochement which would sacrifice them to Moscow's interests—a possibility foreshadowed in Stalin's wire of October 13, 1949, to Wilhelm Pieck and Otto Grotewohl on the occasion of the establishment of the German Democratic Republic: "The experience of the last war has shown that the German and the Russian peoples have borne the greatest sacrifices in that war and that these two nations provide by far the greatest potential forces in Europe for the accomplishment of great actions of world significance." In their reply the two German communist leaders acknowledged, on behalf of the German people, the historical guilt which Germany had assumed by attacking the Soviet Union. Thus a positive and a negative community of fate was again established between the two peoples: in 1945, as in 1918, they were the two chief victims of a World War; and Germany had become guilty not by her march into Prague nor her dismemberment and subjection of Poland (helped by the Soviet union), but only by her aggression of June 22, 1941.

Altogether, the little Slav brothers were bound to realize their dependence on the self-centered policy of the older brother, with whom Yugoslavia had broken because it felt itself treated as a colony and its communist party used as an instrument for the country's exploitation in the economic, military, and political interest of Moscow. By 1950 Pan-Slavism was hardly mentioned any more in the Soviet orbit. Moscow's policy toward Poland and Czechoslovakia differed as little from that toward Hungary or Rumania as its attitude toward the Ukraine differed from that toward its Mohammedan subject nationalities.

In June, 1951, a "decade" of Ukrainian art was celebrated in Moscow,

Kopecký stressed the point of supreme loyalty of all workers to the Soviet Union: "Wherever the question arises whether the working people prefer the land in which they live (but in which they are exposed to class exploitation, growing misery, and oppression) or the Soviet Union—they will always decide for the Soviet Union, even should they be exposed to the greatest terror of capitalist and pseudo-socialist patriots. The working masses of France, Italy, and other capitalist lands have already taken this decision. They declare that they will never bear arms against the Soviet Union and the people's democracies and that they will greet the Soviet army as liberator whenever it opposes the aggressor. Yes! The just character of such a war puts the seal of sacred patriotism on the effort of the peoples which lead it."
fifteen years after the 1936 "decade," which closed the terrible persecution of the Ukrainian peasantry and intelligentsia begun in 1929. The new decade, which culminated in a glorification of Stalin, of Soviet patriotism, and of the Pereyaslav Council of 1654 which decided on the union of the Ukraine with Moscow, coincided with a new attack on Ukrainian writers and on the Ukrainian Communist Party for "nationalist deviation." In 1944 Volodimir Sosyura, one of the most respected older working-class poets of the Ukraine, had written a poem, "Love the Ukraine," sentimental and patriotic as a thousand Russian poems were at that time:

... The Ukraine lives for us in the songs which we sing,
In the stars and in the willow trees along the rivers,
And in the beat of our heart.
How can one love other peoples,
If one does not love her, our Ukraine?
We are nothing without her, like dust of the fields or smoke,
Eternally driven away by the winds.

For seven years this poem was many times reprinted in the Ukraine, and it was even twice translated into Russian. Only in July, 1951, did Pravda discover the "nationalist deviation" in the poem and bitterly attack the author, as well as Alexander Prokofiev, whose translation had appeared in May, 1951, in the Leningrad literary magazine Zvezda. "It is the duty of Soviet writers," Pravda wrote, "to fight implacably against all forms of nationalism . . . and to sing in their works the heroic deeds of our great fatherland, which builds communism." Pravda did not say how to reconcile the implacable fight against all forms of nationalism with the glorification of the great and unique Russian people and its past, but its article opened a whole series of attacks on "Ukrainian nationalism." Alexander Korneichuk and Wanda Wassiliewska were even accused of having not sufficiently stressed the pro-Russian character of the Ukrainian struggle for liberation from Poland under Hetman Bohdan Khmelit-ski, in the libretto to an opera of that name composed by Konstantin Dankevych. And immediately after the appearance of the article in Pravda, a meeting of the Ukrainian Union of Soviet Writers in Kiev was called. This meeting recognized the great importance of the Pravda article for the development of Ukrainian literature, and all those present indulged in a "profound analysis" of their "mistakes." A Ukrainian literary critic, Leonid Novichenko, summed up the accusations against Sosyura; He had not "freed himself from the influence of hostile bourgeois nationalistic ideology, which finds a complete reflection in the corrupt poem 'Love the Ukraine.' . . . He represents the Ukraine as standing alone . . . without connection with the great Russian

27 See "Protiv ideologisheskih izvrashchenii v literaturu" ["Against Ideological Versions in Literature"], Pravda, July 2, 1951, and "Ob opere Bohdan Khmelit-sky" ["About the Opera Bohdan Khmelit-sky"], ibid., July 20, 1951. On July 10 Pravda printed an apology by Sosyura: "I think (your) criticism fully justified. I am deeply aware that the Soviet Ukraine is unthinkable detached from the powerful growth of our state of many nationalities; for the Ukraine achieved its happiness thanks to the fraternal help of the great Russian people and the other peoples of our motherland."
people and the other peoples of the Soviet Union. . . . He refuses to see that in the battle to free the Ukraine, the sons of all the peoples of the Soviet Union, and in the first instance the sons of great Russia, took part; about them he crudely and insultingly keeps quiet. . . . While praising a certain exclusiveness of the Ukrainian language, he considered it possible not even to mention the Russian language, which is to every Ukrainian as much a native language as is Ukrainian itself.”

Novichenko’s last sentence is revealing for the new trend. When Professor Alexander Vladimirovich Palladin, President of the Ukrainian Academy of Sciences and Ukrainian representative in the Soviet Pan-Slav Committee, returned from the International Congress of Physiology in England in 1947—one of the many international scholarly congresses which the aged scholar had attended—he reported in the Literaturnaya Gazeta how he had there scored a nationalist triumph. Though he knew French and English perfectly well, he refused to use either of these official languages. Instead, “We said we could not accept such a humiliating treatment of Soviet science and of the Russian language. This, we said, was the language of a great victorious nation, and of the nation which had created the greatest and most advanced form of state in the world, and this language must receive its legitimate place in the work of the congress. We scored our point. We read our papers in our own language.” What strikes one in this statement is not only the spirit of nationalist pride and intransigence shown at an international scientific gathering (“This episode, showed,” Professor Palladin continued, “how important it is never for a moment to yield on points affecting our national honor and dignity, nor must we ever tolerate any kind of toadying to the West”), but the fact that the President of the Ukrainian Academy of Sciences, an avowed nationalist, is not a Ukrainian nationalist. He is a Russian nationalist, who regards Russian as “our” language and reads his paper, in defiance of the rules of international courtesy, in Russian, not in Ukrainian.

A similar revaluation of their history and culture has been imposed by Moscow on the non-Slav Soviet peoples. Until recently Shamil, the famous fighter for the independence of the North Caucasus (1834 to 1859), and Kenesary Kasymov, who led the Kazakh revolt against Russian conquest (1837 to 1846), were recognized as heroes of liberty. Soviet Russian historians agreed with the new Kazakh and Daghestani communist intelligentsia in praising the “anti-colonial” and “progressive” character of these wars for independence. But in 1950 it was found out that these national heroes were no liberators; “objectively, Russia fills the role of liberator of the Caucasian peoples from the cruel and

28 Pravda Ukrainy, July 15, 1951. The same paper reported, on July 22, that the Ukrainian Society for the Dissemination of Political and Scientific Knowledge complained that “too few lectures are being given about the eternal friendship of the Russian and Ukrainian peoples and about the struggle against Ukrainian bourgeois nationalism and cosmopolitanism.”

29 See the report sent from Moscow to the Manchester Guardian by Alexander Werth, Oct. 26, 1947.
arbitrary oppression by the Iranian and Turkish bandits.” It was only natural that the new Soviet scholarship suddenly discovered that “the longing of progressive people in the Caucasus for union with Russia had reflected the feelings of the broad masses,” and that “Shamil was forced to overcome the stubborn resistance of the people. who expressed their sympathy for Russia, the savior of Daghestan from the eastern brutes.”

No lesser body than the “presidium” of the Academy of Sciences of the USSR adopted in November, 1950, a resolution blaming leading Russian historians, among them the academy member Anna Mikhailovna Pankratova, for having idealized and misrepresented the “war of liberation” of the Caucasian mountaineers under Shamil’s leadership.

Therein was seen a remnant of the “un-Marxist” school of Pokrovsky, who had not understood the importance of the Black Sea and the Caucasus for the security of (tsarist) Russia. The independence movements of the Mohammedan people against Russian control could not be considered progressive, for they allegedly played into the hands of Pan-Turanism and of British imperialism, the foes of mankind.

The new communist intelligentsia among the non-Russian peoples had been encouraged, at the beginning of the Soviet domination, to explore the past, and especially the folk songs and epic poems, of their own peoples. The various state publishing houses and academies of sciences of the national republics had published, and glorified, such epic poems and heroic songs as “Altamych” (Uzbek), “Dede-Korkut” (Azerbaijan), “Korkut-Ata” (Turkmenistan) and “Gesser Khan” (Buryat-Mongol). But while the Russians were exhorted, after 1934, to take pride in the unique beauty of the “Song of the Expedition of Igor” and of the byliny (oral popular poetry celebrating the exploits of the pre-Tartar Russian princes), the epic poems of the other peoples were unmasked as reactionary after 1949. In his Russian translation of the “Altamych,” M. Sheikhhsade had characterized it as the revelation of “the best traits of character of the working population in the past, of its unceasing longing for social justice, for happiness and for the good, a symbol of all the heroic and noble aspirations which lived among the working masses of Uzbekistan.” Now it was


“Ob antimarksistskoj otsenke dvizheniya myuridisma i Shamilya v trudakh nauchnykh sotrudnikov Akademii” (“About the Anti-Marxist Appreciation of Myuridism and of Shamil in the Works of the Scientific Collaborators of the Academy”), Vestnik Akademii Nauk SSSR, No. 11 (Nov., 1950); E. Adamov and L. Kutakov, “Iz istorii poznanov inostranny agentury vo vremya kavkazskikh voin” (“From the History of the Intrigues of Foreign Agents at the Time of the Caucasian Wars”), Voprosy istorii, No. 11 (Nov., 1950). The most criticized book was that by R. Magomedov, Borba gortsev za nezavisimost pod rukovedstvom Shamilya [The Struggle of the Mountainers for Their Independence under Shamil’s Leadership] (Makhach-Kala, 1939). The author was especially blamed for the “horrifying assertion” that this war of independence formed part of the international revolutionary movement.
condemned, as was the similar "Gesser Khan" epos.32 "The poem cultivates a hostile attitude towards the Russian people. The Buryat-Mongol people, which owes its freedom and happiness to the great Russian people, cannot tolerate that its sentiments for the fraternal Russian people be hurt. . . . Only under the protection of the Soviet power . . . could the culture of the Buryat-Mongol people . . . flower as never before. It forms an indissoluble part of the united and harmonious Soviet family of peoples and progresses towards communism, thanks to the support of the great Russian people under the leadership of the party of Lenin and Stalin."

Historians of the Mohammedan peoples who had pointed to the influence of Arab, Iranian, and Turkish civilizations, were accused of being "cosmopolitans." According to the new theory, the Uzbek, Kazakh, Tadjiks, and Turkmens developed independently until the nineteenth century, when they came under the benevolent influence, not of the Russian tsars, it is true, but of the Russian people and the Russian culture. Kazakh communist historians who had regarded the struggle of their people for independence from Russia as a school for the political education of the masseses, were censored because "they failed to recognize the deep progressive significance of the union of Kazakhstan with Russia. . . . The Kazakh working class had the greatest interest in this union. The activities of the Kassymovs (leaders of the independence movement) who wished to hinder the union, were in sharp opposition to the desires of the progressive part of Kazakh society."33

V

The future of Pan-Slavism is uncertain today. In 1930 it seemed a dead issue. World War II brought an unexpected revival, with an unprecedented breadth and intensity. There was for a time some hope of a Pan-Slavism based upon the equality and free development of the various Slav peoples; Dr. Beneš and Jan Masaryk apparently believed in its possibility. What emerged was a Pan-Russism of the kind preached by the extreme Pan-Slavs of the nineteenth century but never adopted by the tsarist Russian government and always combated by liberal and humanitarian trends among the Russians themselves, as well as by the nationalism of Ukrainians and Poles, Czechs, and Serbs. Now, however, a new dimension has been added, apparently as a permanent feature, to the exclusive and all-inclusive state religion of the Soviet Union. Before World War II, Soviet citizens had to worship the party of Lenin and Stalin and the great Stalin himself. Now a compulsory obsequious deference to the "great" Russian people has been imposed on all its "younger brothers" — a category


which all non-Russian peoples must enter. In this respect the Pan-Slav frame has been broadened and racial equality throughout the Soviet empire maintained: all its peoples, whether white or colored, Slav or Turk, Christian or Mohammedan, have equally and continually to pay their deep respect to the Russian people and even to the Russian past!

Yet there are signs—in Titoism, in the ever-repeated official accusations by Moscow against Polish, Ukrainian, Uzbek, and Caucasian writers and historians—that the non-Russian peoples, Slavs as well as non-Slavs, do not sufficiently appreciate being constantly reminded of the deep gratitude which they owe to the "great" Russian people and of their immutable dependence upon the leadership of the Russian people. It is not impossible that an enforced conformity and loyalty, driven to such length, may prove a weakening factor in the vast Moscow empire and may help one day to restore the principles of liberty, equality, and diversity on which the Pan-Slav movement insisted in 1848, when it rejected categorically Moscow's leadership and looked to the West for guidance and inspiration.