To judge from recent trends in scholarly as well as popular literature, three crucial questions can be seen to stand at the forefront of today’s preoccupations: the question of mothering, the question of the woman writer, and the question of autobiography. Although these questions and current discussions of them often appear unrelated to each other, it is my intention here to explore some ways in which the three questions are profoundly interrelated. To attempt to shed some new light on each by approaching it via the others, I shall base my remarks upon two twentieth-century theoretical studies—Nancy Friday’s My Mother/My Self and Dorothy Dinnerstein’s The Mermaid and the Minotaur—and one nineteenth-century gothic novel, Frankenstein; or, The Modern Prometheus, written by Mary Shelley, whose importance for literary history has until quite recently been considered to arise not from her own writings but from the fact that she was the second wife of poet Percy Bysshe Shelley and the daughter of the political philosopher William Godwin and the pioneering feminist Mary Wollstonecraft.

All three of these books, in strikingly diverse ways, offer a critique of the institution of parenthood. The Mermaid and the Minotaur is an analysis of the damaging effects of the fact that human infants are cared for almost exclusively by women. “What the book’s title as a whole is meant to connote,” writes Dinnerstein, “is both (a) our longstanding general awareness of our uneasy, ambiguous position in the animal kingdom, and (b) a more specific awareness: that until we grow strong enough to renounce the pernicious forms of collaboration between the sexes, both man and woman will remain semi-human, monstrous” (p. 5). Even as
Dinnerstein describes convincingly the types of imbalance and injustice the prevailing asymmetry in gender relations produces, she also analyzes the reasons for our refusal to abandon the very modes of monstrousness from which we suffer most. Nancy Friday’s book, which is subtitled “The Daughter’s Search for Identity,” argues that the mother’s repression of herself necessitated by the myth of maternal love creates a heritage of self-rejection, anger, and duplicity that makes it difficult for the daughter to seek any emotional satisfaction other than the state of idealized symbiosis that both mother and daughter continue to punish themselves for never having been able to achieve. Mary Shelley’s *Frankenstein* is an even more elaborate and unsettling formulation of the relation between parenthood and monstrousness. It is the story of two antithetical modes of parenting that give rise to two increasingly parallel lives—the life of Victor Frankenstein, who is the beloved child of two doting parents, and the life of the monster he single-handedly creates but immediately spurns and abandons. The fact that in the end both characters reach an equal degree of alienation and self-torture and indeed become indistinguishable as they pursue each other across the frozen polar wastes indicates that the novel is, among other things, a study of the impossibility of finding an adequate model for what a parent should be.

All three books agree, then, that in the existing state of things there is something inherently monstrous about the prevailing parental arrangements. While Friday and Dinnerstein, whose analyses directly address the problem of sexual difference, suggest that this monstrousness is curable, Mary Shelley, who does not explicitly locate the self’s monstrousness in its gender arrangements, appears to dramatize divisions within the human being that are so much a part of being human that no escape from monstrousness seems possible.

What I will try to do here is to read these three books not as mere studies of the monstrousness of selfhood, not as mere accounts of human monsterdom in general, but as autobiographies in their own right, as textual dramatizations of the very problems with which they deal. None of the three books, of course, presents itself explicitly as autobiography. Yet each includes clear instances of the autobiographical—not the purely authorial—first-person pronoun. In each case the autobiographical reflex is triggered by the resistance and ambivalence involved in the act of writing the book. What I shall argue here is that what is specifically feminist in each book is directly related to this struggle for female authorship.
The notion that *Frankenstein* can somehow be read as the autobiography of a woman would certainly appear at first sight to be ludicrous. The novel, indeed, presents not one but three autobiographies of men. Robert Walton, an arctic explorer on his way to the North Pole, writes home to his sister of his encounter with Victor Frankenstein, who tells Walton the story of his painstaking creation and unexplained abandonment of a nameless monster who suffers excruciating and fiendish loneliness, and who tells Frankenstein *his* life story in the middle pages of the book. The three male autobiographies motivate themselves as follows:

[Walton, to his sister:] “You will rejoice to hear that no disaster has accompanied the commencement of an enterprise which you have regarded with such evil forebodings. I arrived here yesterday, and my first task is to assure my dear sister of my welfare.” (p. 15)

[Frankenstein, with his hands covering his face, to Walton, who has been speaking of his scientific ambition:] “Unhappy man! Do you share my madness? Have you drunk also of the intoxicating draught? Hear me; let me reveal my tale, and you will dash the cup from your lips!” (p. 26)

[Monster, to Frankenstein:] “I entreat you to hear me before you give vent to your hatred on my devoted head.” [Frankenstein:] “Begone! I will not hear you. There can be no community between you and me.” [Monster places his hands before Frankenstein’s eyes:] “Thus I take from thee a sight which you abhor. Still thou canst listen to me and grant me thy compassion. . . . God, in pity, made man beautiful and alluring, after his own image; but my form is a filthy type of yours, more horrid even from the very resemblance.” (pp. 95, 96, 97, 125)

All three autobiographies here are clearly attempts at persuasion rather than simple accounts of facts. They all depend on a presupposition of resemblance between teller and addressee: Walton assures his sister that he has not really left the path she would wish for him, that he still resembles *her*. Frankenstein recognizes in Walton an image of himself and rejects in the monster a resemblance he does not wish to acknowledge. The teller is in each case speaking into a mirror of his own transgression. The tale is designed to reinforce the resemblance between teller and listener so that somehow transgression can be eliminated. Yet the desire for resemblance, the desire to create a being like oneself—which is the autobiographical desire par excellence—is also the central transgression in Mary Shelley’s novel. What is at stake in Frankenstein’s workshop of filthy
creation is precisely the possibility of shaping a life in one’s own image: Frankenstein’s monster can thus be seen as a figure for autobiography as such. Victor Frankenstein, then, has twice obeyed the impulse to construct an image of himself: on the first occasion he creates a monster, and on the second he tries to explain to Walton the causes and consequences of the first. *Frankenstein* can be read as the story of autobiography as the attempt to neutralize the monstrousity of autobiography. Simultaneously a revelation and a cover-up, autobiography would appear to constitute itself as in some way a repression of autobiography.

These three fictive male autobiographies are embedded within a thin introductory frame, added in 1831, in which Mary Shelley herself makes the repression of her own autobiographical impulse explicit:

> The publishers of the standard novels, in selecting *Frankenstein* for one of their series, expressed a wish that I should furnish them with some account of the origin of the story. . . . It is true that I am very averse to bringing myself forward in print, but as my account will only appear as an appendage to a former production, and as it will be confined to such topics as have connection with my authorship alone, I can scarcely accuse myself of a personal intrusion. (p. vii)

Mary Shelley, here, rather than speaking into a mirror, is speaking as an appendage to a text. It might perhaps be instructive to ask whether this change of status has anything to do with the problem of specifically feminine autobiography. In a humanistic tradition in which *man* is the measure of all things, how does an appendage go about telling the story of her life?

Before pursuing this question further, I would like to turn to a more explicit version of surreptitious feminine autobiography. Of the three books under discussion, Nancy Friday’s account of the mother/daughter relationship relies the most heavily on the facts of the author’s life in order to demonstrate its thesis. Since the author grew up without a father, she shares with Frankenstein’s monster some of the problems of coming from a single-parent household. The book begins with a chapter entitled “Mother Love,” of which the first two sentences are “I have always lied to my mother. And she to me” (p. 19). Interestingly, the book carries the following dedication: “When I stopped seeing my mother with the eyes of a child, I saw the woman who helped me give birth to myself. This book is for Jane Colbert Friday Scott.” How then, can we be sure that this huge book is not itself another lie to the mother it is dedicated to? Is
autobiography somehow always in the process of symbolically killing the mother off by telling her the lie that we have given birth to ourselves? On page 460, Nancy Friday is still not sure what kind of lie she has told. She writes: “I am suddenly afraid that the mother I have depicted throughout this book is false.” Whose life is this, anyway? This question cannot be resolved by a book that sees the “daughter’s search for identity” as the necessity of choosing between symbiosis and separation, between the mother and the autonomous self. As long as this polarity remains unquestioned, the autobiography of Nancy Friday becomes the drawing and redrawing of the portrait of Jane Colbert Friday Scott. The most truly autobiographical moments occur not in expressions of triumphant separation but in descriptions of the way the book itself attempts to resist its own writing.

At the end of the chapter on loss of virginity, Nancy Friday writes:

It took me twenty-one years to give up my virginity. In some similar manner I am unable to let go of this chapter. . . .

It is no accident that wrestling with ideas of loss of virginity immediately bring me to a dream of losing my mother. This chapter has revealed a split in me. Intellectually, I think of myself as a sexual person, just as I had intellectually been able to put my ideas for this chapter down on paper. Subjectively, I don’t want to face what I have written: that the declaration of full sexual independence is the declaration of separation from my mother. As long as I don’t finish this chapter, as long as I don’t let myself understand the implication of what I’ve written, I can maintain the illusion, at least, that I can be sexual and have my mother’s love and approval too. (pp. 331–333)

As long as sexual identity and mother’s judgment are linked as antithetical and exclusive poles of the daughter’s problem, the “split” she describes will prevent her from ever completing her declaration of sexual independence. “Full sexual independence” is shown by the book’s own resistance to be as illusory and as mystifying an ideal as the notion of “mother love” that Friday so lucidly rejects.

Dinnerstein’s autobiographical remarks are more muted, although her way of letting the reader know that the book was written partly in mourning for her husband subtly underlies its persuasive seriousness. In her gesture of rejecting more traditional forms of scholarship, she pleads not for the validity but for the urgency of her message:

Right now, what I think is that the kind of work of which this is an example is centrally necessary work. Whether our understanding makes a difference or
not, we must try to understand what is threatening to kill us off as fully and clearly as we can. . . . What [this book] is, then, is not a scholarly book: it makes no effort to survey the relevant literature. Not only would that task be (for me) unmanageably huge. It would also be against my principles. I believe in reading unsystematically and taking notes erratically. Any effort to form a rational policy about what to take in, out of the inhuman flood of printed human utterance that pours over us daily, feels to me like a self-deluded exercise in pseudomastery. (pp. viii–ix)

The typographical form of this book bears out this belief in renouncing the appearance of mastery: there are two kinds of notes, some at the foot of the page and some at the back of the book; there are sections between chapters with unaligned right-hand margins which are called “Notes toward the next chapter.” And there are boldface inserts which carry on a dialogue with the controversial points in the main exposition. Clearly, great pains have been taken to let as many seams as possible show in the fabric of the argument. The preface goes on:

I mention these limitations in a spirit not of apology but of warning. To the extent that it succeeds in communicating its point at all, this book will necessarily enrage the reader. What it says is emotionally threatening, (Part of why it has taken me so long to finish it is that I am threatened by it myself.) (p. ix; emphasis mine)

My book is roughly sutured, says Dinnerstein, and it is threatening. This description sounds uncannily like a description of Victor Frankenstein’s monster. Indeed, Dinnerstein goes on to warn the reader not to be tempted to avoid the threatening message by pointing to superficial flaws in its physical makeup. The reader of *Frankenstein*, too, would be well advised to look beyond the monster’s physical deformity, both for his fearsome power and for his beauty. There are indeed numerous ways in which *The Mermaid and the Minotaur* can be seen as a modern rewriting of *Frankenstein*.

Dinnerstein’s book situates its plea for two-sex parenting firmly in an apparently twentieth-century double bind: the realization that the very technological advances that make it possible to change the structure of parenthood also threaten to extinguish earthly life altogether. But it is startling to note that this seemingly contemporary pairing of the question of parenthood with a love-hate relation to technology is already at work in Mary Shelley’s novel, where the spectacular scientific discovery
of the secrets of animation produces a terrifyingly vengeful creature who attributes his evil impulses to his inability to find or to become a parent. Subtitled “The Modern Prometheus,” Frankenstein itself indeed refers back to a myth that already links scientific ambivalence with the origin of mankind. Prometheus, the fire bringer, the giver of both creation and destruction, is also said by some accounts to be the father of the human race. Ambivalence toward technology can thus be seen as a displaced version of the love-hate relation we have toward our own children.

It is only recently that critics have begun to see Victor Frankenstein’s disgust at the sight of his creation as a study of postpartum depression, as a representation of maternal rejection of a newborn infant, and to relate the entire novel to Mary Shelley’s mixed feelings about motherhood.² Having lived through an unwanted pregnancy from a man married to someone else only to see that baby die, followed by a second baby named William—which is the name of the monster’s first murder victim—Mary Shelley, at the age of only eighteen, must have had excruciatingly divided emotions. Her own mother, indeed, had died upon giving birth to her. The idea that a mother can loathe, fear, and reject her baby has until recently been one of the most repressed of psychoanalytical insights, although it is of course already implicit in the story of Oedipus, whose parents cast him out to die. What is threatening about each of these books is the way in which its critique of the role of the mother touches on primitive terrors of the mother’s rejection of the child. Each of these women writers does in her way reject the child as part of her coming to grips with the untenable nature of mother love: Nancy Friday decides not to have children, Dorothy Dinnerstein argues that men as well as women should do the mothering, and Mary Shelley describes a parent who flees in disgust from the repulsive being to whom he has just given birth.

Yet it is not merely in its depiction of the ambivalence of motherhood that Mary Shelley’s novel can be read as autobiographical. In the introductory note added in 1831, she writes:

The publishers of the standard novels, in selecting Frankenstein for one of their series, expressed a wish that I should furnish them with some account of the origin of the story. I am the more willing to comply because I shall thus give a general answer to the question so very frequently asked me—how I, then a young girl, came to think of and to dilate upon so very hideous an idea. (p. vii; emphasis mine)
As this passage makes clear, readers of Mary Shelley’s novel had frequently expressed the feeling that a young girl’s fascination with the idea of monstrousness was somehow monstrous in itself. When Mary ends her introduction to the reedition of her novel with the words, “And now, once again, I bid my hideous progeny go forth and prosper,” the reader begins to suspect that there may perhaps be meaningful parallels between Victor’s creation of his monster and Mary’s creation of her book.

Such parallels are indeed unexpectedly pervasive. The impulse to write the book and the desire to search for the secret of animation both arise under the same seemingly trivial circumstances: the necessity of finding something to read on a rainy day. During inclement weather on a family vacation, Victor Frankenstein happens upon the writings of Cornelius Agrippa and is immediately fired with the longing to penetrate the secrets of life and death. Similarly, it was during a wet, ungenial summer in Switzerland that Mary, Shelley, Byron, and several others picked up a volume of ghost stories and decided to write a collection of spine-tingling tales of their own. Moreover, Mary’s discovery of the subject she would write about is described in almost exactly the same words as Frankenstein’s discovery of the principle of life: “Swift as light and as cheering was the idea that broke in upon me” (p. xi), writes Mary in her introduction, while Frankenstein says: “From the midst of this darkness a sudden light broke in upon me” (p. 51). In both cases the sudden flash of inspiration must be supported by the meticulous gathering of heterogeneous, ready-made materials: Frankenstein collects bones and organs; Mary records overheard discussions of scientific questions that lead her to the sudden vision of monstrous creation. “Invention,” she writes of the process of writing, but her words apply equally well to Frankenstein’s labors, “Invention . . . does not consist in creating out of the void, but out of chaos; the materials must, in the first place, be afforded: it can give form to dark, shapeless substances but cannot bring into being the substance itself” (p. x). Perhaps the most revealing indication of Mary’s identification of Frankenstein’s activity with her own is to be found in her use of the word “artist” on two different occasions to qualify the “pale student of unhallowed arts”: “His success would terrify the artist” (p. xi), she writes of the catastrophic moment of creation, while Frankenstein
confesses to Walton: “I appeared rather like one doomed by slavery to toil in the mines, or any other unwholesome trade than an artist occupied by his favorite employment” (p. 55).

Frankenstein, in other words, can be read as the story of the experience of writing Frankenstein. What is at stake in Mary’s introduction as well as in the novel is the description of a primal scene of creation. Frankenstein combines a monstrous answer to two of the most fundamental questions one can ask: Where do babies come from? and Where do stories come from? In both cases, the scene of creation is described, but the answer to these questions is still withheld.

But what can Victor Frankenstein’s workshop of filthy creation teach us about the specificity of female authorship? At first sight, it would seem that Frankenstein is much more striking for its avoidance of the question of femininity than for its insight into it. All the interesting, complex characters in the book are male, and their deepest attachments are to other males. The females, on the other hand, are beautiful, gentle, selfless, boring nurturers and victims who never experience inner conflict or true desire. Monstrousness is so incompatible with femininity that Frankenstein cannot even complete the female companion that his creature so eagerly awaits.

On the other hand, the story of Frankenstein is, after all, the story of a man who usurps the female role by physically giving birth to a child. It would be tempting, therefore, to conclude that Mary Shelley, surrounded as she then was by the male poets Byron and Shelley, and mortified for days by her inability to think of a story to contribute to their ghost-story contest, should have fictively transposed her own frustrated female pen envy into a tale of catastrophic male womb envy. In this perspective, Mary’s book would suggest that a woman’s desire to write and a man’s desire to give birth would both be capable only of producing monsters.

Yet clearly things cannot be so simple. As the daughter of a famous feminist whose A Vindication of the Rights of Woman she was in the process of rereading during the time she was writing Frankenstein, Mary Shelley would have no conscious reason to believe that writing was not proper for a woman. Indeed, as she says in her introduction, Mary was practically born with ink flowing through her veins. “It is not singular that, as the daughter of two persons of distinguished literary celebrity, I should very early in life have thought of writing. . . . My husband . . . was from the first very anxious that I should prove myself worthy of my parentage and enroll myself on the page of fame” (pp. vii–viii). In order
to prove herself worthy of her parentage, Mary, paradoxically enough, must thus usurp the parental role and succeed in giving birth to herself on paper. Her declaration of existence as a writer must therefore figuratively repeat the matricide that her physical birth all too literally entailed. The connection between literary creation and the death of a parent is in fact suggested in the novel by the fact that, immediately after the monster’s animation, Victor Frankenstein dreams that he holds the corpse of his dead mother in his arms. It is also suggested by the juxtaposition of two seemingly unrelated uses of italics in the novel: Mary’s statement that she had “thought of a story” (which she inexplicably italicizes twice) and the monster’s promise to Frankenstein, “I will be with you on your wedding night,” which is repeatedly italicized. Both are eliminations of the mother, since the story Mary writes is a tale of motherless birth, and the wedding night marks the death of Frankenstein’s bride, Elizabeth. Indeed, Mary herself was in fact the unwitting murderous intruder present on her own parents’ wedding night: their decision to marry was due to the fact that Mary Wollstonecraft was already carrying the child that was to kill her. When Mary, describing her waking vision of catastrophic creation, affirms that “his success would terrify the artist,” she is not giving vent to any ordinary fear-of-success syndrome. Rather, what her book suggests is that what is at stake behind what is currently being banalized under the name of female fear of success is nothing less than the fear of somehow effecting the death of one’s own parents.

It is not, however, the necessary murderousness of any declaration of female subjectivity that Mary Shelley’s novel is proposing as its most troubling message of monsterdom. For, in a strikingly contemporary sort of predicament, Mary had not one but two mothers, each of whom consisted in the knowledge of the unviability of the other. After the death of Mary Wollstonecraft, Mary’s father, William Godwin, married a woman as opposite in character and outlook as possible, a staunch, housewifely mother of two who clearly preferred her own children to Godwin’s. Between the courageous, passionate, intelligent, and suicidal mother Mary knew only through her writings and the vulgar, repressive “pustule of vanity” whose dislike she resented and returned, Mary must have known at first hand a whole gamut of feminine contradictions, impasses, and options. For the complexities of the demands, desires, and sufferings of Mary’s life as a woman were staggering. Her father, who had once been a vehement opponent of the institution of marriage, nearly disowned his daughter
for running away with Shelley, an already married disciple of Godwin’s own former views. Shelley himself, who believed in multiple love objects, amicably fostered an erotic correspondence between Mary and his friend Thomas Jefferson Hogg, among others. For years, Mary and Shelley were accompanied everywhere by Mary’s stepsister Claire, whom Mary did not particularly like, who had a child by Byron, and who maintained an ambiguous relation with Shelley. During the writing of *Frankenstein*, Mary learned of the suicide of her half-sister Fanny Imlay, her mother’s illegitimate child by an American lover, and the suicide of Shelley’s wife Harriet, who was pregnant by a man other than Shelley. By the time she and Shelley married, Mary had had two children; she would have two more by the time of Shelley’s death and watch as all but one of the children died in infancy. Widowed at age twenty-four, she never remarried. It is thus indeed perhaps the very hiddenness of the question of femininity in *Frankenstein* that somehow proclaims the painful message not of female monstrousness but of female contradictions. For it is the fact of self-contradiction that is so vigorously repressed in women. While the story of a man who is haunted by his own contradictions is representable as an allegory of monstrous doubles, how indeed would it have been possible for Mary to represent feminine contradiction *from the point of view of its repression* otherwise than precisely in the gap between angels of domesticity and an uncompleted monsteress, between the murdered Elizabeth and the dismembered Eve?

It is perhaps because the novel does succeed in conveying the unresolvable contradictions inherent in being female that Percy Shelley himself felt compelled to write a prefatory disclaimer in Mary’s name before he could let loose his wife’s hideous progeny upon the world. In a series of denials jarringly at odds with the daring negativity of the novel, Shelley places the following words in Mary’s mouth:

> I am by no means indifferent to the manner in which whatever moral tendencies exist in the sentiments or characters it contains shall affect the reader; yet my chief concern in this respect has been limited to . . . the exhibition of the amiableness of domestic affection, and the excellence of universal virtue. The opinions which naturally spring from the character and situation of the hero are by no means to be conceived as existing always in my own conviction; nor is any inference justly to be drawn from the following pages as prejudicing any philosophical doctrine of whatever kind. (pp. xiii–xiv)
How is this to be read except as a gesture of repression of the very specificity of the power of feminine contradiction, a gesture reminiscent of Frankenstein’s destruction of his nearly completed female monster? What is being repressed here is the possibility that a woman can write anything that would not exhibit “the amiableness of domestic affection,” the possibility that for women as well as for men the home can be the very site of the unheimlich.

It can thus be seen in all three of the books we have discussed that the monstrousness of selfhood is intimately embedded within the question of female autobiography. Yet how could it be otherwise, since the very notion of a self, the very shape of human life stories, has always, from Saint Augustine to Freud, been modeled on the man? Rousseau’s—or any man’s—autobiography consists in the story of the difficulty of conforming to the standard of what a man should be. The problem for the female autobiographer is, on the one hand, to resist the pressure of masculine autobiography as the only literary genre available for her enterprise, and, on the other, to describe a difficulty in conforming to a female ideal which is largely a fantasy of the masculine, not the feminine, imagination. The fact that these three books deploy a theory of autobiography as monstrosity within the framework of a less overtly avowed struggle with the raw materials of the authors’ own lives and writing is perhaps, in the final analysis, what is most autobiographically fertile and telling about them.

_The Last Man_


_My Monster/My Self_

1. Nancy Friday, _My Mother/My Self_ (New York: Dell, 1977); Dorothy Dinnerstein, _The Mermaid and the Minotaur_ (New York: Harper Colophon, 1976); Mary Shelley, _Frankenstein; or, The Modern Prometheus_ (New York: Signet, 1965). Ed.—As is narrated both in the general Introduction to this volume and in Felman’s Afterword (to Part Two), Johnson’s initial teaching and lecturing on Mary Shelley’s _Frankenstein_ (a teaching which will soon give birth to the splendid “My Monster/My Self”) takes place in a Yale course on narrative (1980), in which the assigned classroom text of _Frankenstein_ (determined in advance by the course’s team of teachers) is the 1965 Signet edition, from which Johnson will cite Frankenstein in this and other essays. Johnson remains attached to this first object of her teaching—and all her subsequent citations of _Frankenstein_, both in her early essays (in Part One) and in her last book, _Mary Shelley and Her Circle_ (in Part Two)—are to this Signet Classics 1965 edition, which reproduces _Frankenstein_ in its third (1831) historical edition.

Shelley was seventeen when she completed her writing of the novel in May 1817, and _Frankenstein_ was first published in January 1818 by a small London publishing house. This original edition was issued anonymously, with a preface written for Mary by Percy Bysshe Shelley (but without signature), and with
a dedication to philosopher William Godwin—her father. The second edition of Frankenstein was published in two volumes in France in 1823, and credited Mary Shelley as the author. In October 1831, the first “popular” edition in one volume appeared. This edition was heavily revised by Mary Shelley, partially because of pressure to make the story more conservative. It importantly included a second, longer preface, an author’s introduction, in which Mary for the first time claims authorship in her distinct (and distinctly public) voice. In contradiction to the edition used by Johnson, the editors elected to cite the original 1818 edition in their Afterwords, using for this purpose the Norton Critical Edition, Second Edition (2012). As mentioned above, there are differences between the text of the original edition of Frankenstein, and the text of the third edition, but these differences are not relevant to Johnson’s arguments and insights, with the exception of the third edition’s duplication of the Prefaces, which Johnson analyzes, an analysis which grounds her pathbreaking, innovative points here.


Gender Theory and the Yale School

1. This chapter, as the text makes clear, is very much a cry of its occasion: a conference entitled “Genre Theory and the Yale School” held May 31–June 1, 1984, at the University of Oklahoma at Norman.


7. The story of Jael is found in Judges 4. Jael invites Sisera, the commander of the Canaanite army, into her tent, gives him a drink of milk, and then, when he has fallen asleep, drives a tent peg through his head and kills him. Sima Godfrey suggested this pun.