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Editor
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Bodily Miracles and the Resurrection of the Body in the High Middle Ages

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“The body” has been a popular topic recently for historians of Western European culture, especially for what we might call the Berkeley-Princeton school of Peter Brown, Robert Darnton, Natalie Davis, Stephen Greenblatt, Lynn Hunt, Tom Laqueur, and Elaine Pagels, to name a few.¹ Representing the Annales school in this country and deeply influenced by Michel Foucault and Clifford Geertz, these historians have meant by “body” the sexual and gendered body, not a raw biological fact but a cultural construct. They have understood this body, constructed by society, as expressing society’s understanding of itself; and they have therefore focused on the history of sexual behavior (both of sexual expressiveness and of its renunciation) and on the ways in which conceptions of the individual as body and of society as body mirror each other so intimately as almost to be the same thing.²

In the wake of the appearance of a genuinely new historical topic, self-proclaimed avant-garde journals starting up around the country—for example, Representations and Zone—have rushed to offer special issues on “the body.”³ The German historian Barbara Duden has begun to compile a bibliography of body history.⁴ And the literary critic Francis Barker has offered a stunning and deeply problematical interpretation of Western culture periodized by shifts in the concept of body.⁵ Displaying her characteristic wit and insight, Natalie Davis played with—and up to—the current trend by entitling her presidential address to the American Historical Association in December 1987: “History’s Two Bodies.”⁶ Medievalists too have flocked eagerly to the new topic. The best of them (such as Peter Brown, James Brundage, Joan Cadden, and Joyce Salisbury) have understood how deeply imbedded in the history of medicine and theology the subject should be.⁷ But some medievalists (like many modern historians) have reduced the history of the body to the history of sexuality or misogyny and have taken the opportunity to giggle pruriently or gasp with horror at the unenlightened centuries before the modern ones.⁸

Although clearly identified with the new topic, this essay is nonetheless intended to argue that there is a different vantage point and a very different kind of material available for writing the history of the body. Medieval stories and sermons did articulate misogyny, to be sure; doctors, lawyers, and theologians did discuss the use and abuse of sex.⁹ But for every reference in medieval treatises to the immorality of contraception or to the inappropriateness of certain sexual positions or to the female body as temptation, there are dozens of discussions both of body (especially female body) as manifestation of the divine or demonic and of technical questions generated by the doctrine of the body’s resurrection. If we really care about how medieval people experienced incarnation or embodiment, we must look beyond the history of sexuality and explore as well the mass of texts in which they spoke directly about the place of physicality in human nature and in the divine economy. I shall begin such exploration by describing, first, the flowering of somatic miracles in Western Europe in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries and, second, the lively consideration during this same period in theological circles of the doctrine of bodily resurrection.

At least since Huizinga, historians have been aware of the somatic quality of late medieval piety; and recently Ronald Finucane, Benedicta Ward, Giles Constable, Rudolph Bell and Richard Kieckhefer have explored and explicated it for us in various ways.¹⁰ We encounter this bodily quality most strikingly in certain new miracles, never before reported in the sources, which begin to appear in saints’ lives and chronicles in the years around 1200.¹¹ These miracles, all of which involve bodily transformation in response to religious ecstasy or devotion, include miraculous lactation, mystical pregnancy, and other unusual elongations or swellings of the body. Preeminent among them, of course, are stigmata: the wounds of Christ’s passion appearing in the believer and, in female adherents although not in male, bleeding periodically at the day or hour of the crucifixion.¹² Moreover, other bodily expressions of religious enthusiasm which were known earlier in Europe seem to have increased markedly in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries, either in incidence or in reporting or (most probably) in both: for example, outbursts of uncontrollable weeping, ecstatic nosebleeds, levitations and catatonic trances, and miraculous fasting.¹³
Both dead and living bodies took on new significance, in ways modern scholars have not always found sympathetic. The cult of relics (that is, the venerating of pieces of dead holy people) flourished. Relics were stolen, fought over, displayed, translated, and divided into smaller and smaller bits. The form of reliquaries came increasingly to underlie the fact that body parts—that is, arms, fingers, skulls, etc.—were contained within. Exudings of oil or other liquids, or even of manna, from corpses, as well as exhalations of sweet smells (literally, the odor of sanctity) were increasingly reported. Pictures were discovered etched on hearts when holy bodies were prepared for burial. By the early modern period, incorruptibility of the whole cadaver or of a part (that is, remaining lifelike, supple, and without decay for decades after burial) was reported for almost every woman proposed for canonization and for a number of men as well.

The graphic physiological processes of living people were also revered. Holy people spit or blew into the mouths of others to effect cures or convey grace. The ill clamored for the bathwater of would-be saints to drink or bathe in and preferred it if these would-be saints washed seldom and therefore left skin and lice floating in the water. Following Francis of Assisi, several Italian saints kissed lepers' sores; Angela of Foligno, Catherine of Siena, and Catherine of Genoa actually ate pus or lice in an effort to incorporate into themselves the misfortune of those whom society defined as the dead—even indeed the putting of their heads into the mouths of others to effect cures—among the living.

The new somatic quality of piety extended even to the body of God. Although patristic hymns celebrate the Eucharist as comforting food and inebriating drink, scholars agree that there is, in the church of the first six centuries, no evidence of claims to receive Christ sensually. The years around 1200, however, saw a proliferation of miracles in which the consecrated wafer or the contents of the communion chalice were transformed into bleeding flesh or into blood. In the early fifteenth century Colette of Corbie supposedly nursed the Christchild as chopped meat on a platter. A number of thirteenth- and fourteenth-century nuns report choking on the wafer when it became honeycomb or flesh in their throats.

Several characteristics of these miraculous events are worth underlining. The first is simply the somatic quality itself. However problematic body was to late medieval Christians, however clearly a locus of temptation and of pain, it was also the place where divine power was met. The second characteristic of such events—which is in fact another way of making the same point—is their disproportionate incidence in women's lives. Since exegetical, philosophical, scientific, and folk traditions hundreds of years old associated the female with the bodily, the fleshly, the uniformed, and the male with the spiritual or rational, formal or structural, it is hardly surprising that women were the most extravagant (although not by any means the sole) practitioners of and participants in somatic religiosity.

Third, one should underline the extent to which these miracles and events have to do with extraordinary breaches or exudings and extraordinary closures. Holy women who did not eat also did not menstruate or excrete, or even (according to one early seventeenth-century account) exude sweat or dandruff. After death many saintly bodies did not putrefy or fragment or give off an ordinary odor of corruption. Yet holy bodies, especially female bodies, flowed outwards—that is, breached body boundaries—in extraordinary effluvia: ecstatic nosebleeds and weepings, periodic stigmatic bleedings, mystical lactations, exudings of sweet smells and curative fluids after death. Related to this is a fourth characteristic. The holy bodies so central in late medieval piety are, exactly in their peculiar conjunction of exuding and closure, liminal (that is, transitional) between life and death. Women who live without eating or excreting display death in life; corpses that exude sweet odors or fresh red blood (instead of the sweat of putrefaction), that return to youthful beauty in the grave and remain unfragmented despite the assault of worms, evidence life in death. What both the living (that is, incorruptible) dead and the unchanging (that is, undecaying) living avoid is corruption. I will need to return to these characteristics in a moment. But now I shall turn to another context within which medieval theorists discussed the embodiment of the human person: the doctrine of the resurrection.

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and blessed alike? third, the *dona* or gifts (dowries) of the glorified body—that is, what special benefits will the risen bodies of the saved alone receive?

Some of the problems raised in connection with these topics have struck modern scholars as extraordinarily odd. In the early eleventh century, for example, teachers at the school of Laon debated whether food taken in by the body during its lifetime would become part of the body and rise at the end. The problem was that if food did not become part of human nature and rise, we would be limited to the very tiny bodies passed on from Adam; if food did join the body and rise, the resurrection would be, they said, of *boves et oves* (cows and sheep) rather than of man. Or, to give a second example: theologians throughout the period, among them Simon of Tournai, Peter of Capua, and Thomas Aquinas, debated whether Christ's foreskin and blood rose with him—a problem made pertinent by the presence in Europe of several shrines claiming to possess the holy foreskin and more than several claiming vials of Christ's blood.

Another widely discussed issue, which has proven particularly offensive to modern sensibilities, was the problem of eaten embryos—a special case of the problem of cannibalism. If a person ate another person (so the argument went, at least by the mid-thirteenth century when most theologians had decided that digested food does become "of the substance of human nature"), the common matter would rise in the one to whom it first belonged. The missing matter would be made up in the second person from what he or she had eaten that was nonhuman. But what (asked Aquinas, pushing the issue) about the case of a man who ate only human embryos who generated a child who ate only human embryos? If eaten matter rises in the one who had it first, this child would, said Aquinas, not rise at all. All its matter would rise elsewhere: either in the embryos its father ate (from which its core of human nature, passed on in the semen, was formed) or in the embryos it ate. And this conclusion, said Aquinas, violates the doctrine of the resurrection; thus a new position must be formulated on where the common matter will rise.

Yet other questions, focusing this time on the nature of the resurrected body, included: Can we open and close our eyes in the resurrected body? What age and height will we have in that body? Will bodies—even mutilated and deformed bodies—rise with all their parts? Will fat and thin people rise with their characteristic shapes? Will giants rise as giants, dwarves as dwarves? In which sex will a hermaphrodite be resurrected? Answers to these questions sometimes merely cautioned against prying into the inscrutable. But they sometimes sketched a sophisticated distinction between, on the one hand, personal characteristics such as body shape or sex, which would be preserved for eternity, and, on the other hand, defects of nature such as dwarfism or hermaphroditism, which would be repaired.

In still other controversies, theologians and preachers explored the nature of the glorified bodies of the blessed. Is Christ's resurrected flesh the paradigm for our resurrection? they asked. If so, did Christ's risen body really eat the boiled fish and honeycomb Luke says he shared with his disciples (Luke 24:42-43)? Should we therefore conclude that we, made like him, will eat in heaven? Surely not, they reasoned; for in what sense then would we, subjected to the indignities of digestion, possess the dowry of impassibility?

Or—to give a final example that brings smiles rather than shudders to modern readers—theologians debated whether the gift of *subtilitas* (which some of them understood as *penetrabilias*) meant that the glorified body could be in the same place at the same time as another body. The conclusion that it could be was, of course, suggested by gospel stories of Christ passing through closed doors after his resurrection. Answers to the question differed, but all took the physics of the issue seriously. Some, such as Bonaventure and Peter of Trabibus, said a glorified body could penetrate a nonglorified body but not a glorified one. Others, such as Augustinus Triumphus, held that even ordinary bodies could be penetrated by glorified ones only by a miracle.

Serious theological consideration of the resurrection of foreskins and fingernails has seemed almost as bizarre and disconcerting to modern scholars as the sort of miracles I discussed above. Thus historians of philosophy and theology have paid little attention to this aspect of medieval eschatology, preferring to study scholastic discussions of the immortality of the soul. Nonetheless, the little-studied theology of resurrection is useful for understanding medieval conceptions of body, for it reflects the same assumptions that come alive in somatic miracles. In the theology of the resurrection as in miracles of bodily transformation, the person is not (as earlier Platonic definition held) a soul using a body and anxious to escape therefrom; rather the person is an entity in which body and soul are tied together so closely that each expresses the condition of the other. As Aquinas said: "... soul and body are one being. So when body is disturbed by some corporeal suffering, soul is of necessity disturbed indirectly as a result [per accidens]..."
We are all familiar—through the classic accounts of medieval philosophy by Etienne Gilson and Frederick Copleston—with Aquinas’s use of the Aristotelian form/matter dichotomy as a way of explaining that bodily resurrection after the Last Judgment is philosophically necessary. According to Aquinas, the soul as substantial form survives the death of the body but the full person does not exist until body (matter) is restored to its form at the end of time. “Anima . . . non est totus homo et anima mea non est ego.” What historians of philosophy have not fully realized, however, is that Aquinas’s position was deeply problematic. Thus, in rejecting it, his conservative opponents also insisted that body was crucial to person. Thomas’s position did make body philosophically necessary, to be sure; but in some sense it telescoped body into form by holding both that soul is enough to account for individual continuity and that soul is the *forma corporeitatis*. In other words, to Aquinas, it is soul that accounts for the “what-ness” of body. Thus any matter which soul informs at the end of time will be its body. Logically such a position leads to the conclusion, which Durandus of Saint Poucaïn actually voiced in the early fourteenth century, that—although body is necessary for personhood—material continuity is not necessary for resurrection. Durandus argued that God can make the body of Peter out of dust that was once the body of Paul. Those who opposed Thomas, following an older Platonic or Augustinian tradition, can therefore also be seen (although historians have usually not done so) as giving positive significance to body. Indeed, positing a separate *forma corporeitatis* and assuming material continuity in the resurrection, they struggled to give body a greater substantial reality than did Thomas. Henry of Ghent, for example, held to the theory of a separate *forma corporeitatis* so that the gifts of the glorified body could be understood as real changes of that body, not merely as a consequence of change in the soul. Bonaventure wrote, in a sermon on the Assumption of the Virgin Mary:

> Her happiness would not be complete unless she [Mary] were there personally [i.e., bodily assumed into heaven]. The person is not the soul; it is a composite. Thus it is established that she must be there as a composite, that is, of soul and body. Otherwise she would not be there [in heaven] in perfect joy; for (as Augustine says) the minds of the saints [before their resurrections] are hindered, because of their natural inclination for their bodies, from being totally borne into God.

Richard of Middleton and Bonaventure even treated the yearning of soul for body after death as a motive for the saints in heaven: the blessed supposedly pray all the harder for us sinners because they will regain their own deeply desired bodies only when the number of the elect is filled up and the Judgment comes. Proposition 17, condemned at Paris in 1277 (“*Quod non contingit corpus corruptum redire idem numero, nec idem numero ressurget*”), states that a resurrected body cannot be numerically the same as a previously decayed one; the formulation of the condemned position makes clear the conviction of conservative theologians such as Tempier that material continuity is necessary for numerical identity and therefore for resurrection.

In fact one can argue that the condemnation in England of the Thomistic theory of the unicity of form, which implies that continuity of soul (form) is enough to account for personal survival, was owing in part to the threat it posed to the importance of body. Critics of Thomas’s position saw that unicity of form implied that a cadaver is not the body and, if this is so, then Christ’s body did not lie in the tomb in the *tri­duum*. With this specific controversy in mind, ecclesiastical authorities at Oxford in 1277 condemned explicitly the argument that a dead body is just a body equivocally (that is, that the word “body” in the two phrases “dead body” and “living body” is merely a homonym). Commitment to a material component in survival seems indeed to have pulled as a counterweight in the development of the philosophical theory that form accounts for identity. Aquinas, Giles of Rome, and Eustachius of Arras, all of whom articulated a formal theory of identity with varying degrees of explicitness, did not themselves use it in their specific discussions of resurrection. Eustachius stated that God created the glorified body from the same dust it contained earlier. Eustachius argued that the resurrection of eaten food and flesh-matters in which he would philosophically necessary, to be sure; but in some sense it telescoped body into form by holding both that soul is enough to account for individual continuity and that soul is the *forma corporeitatis*.

Aquinas’s assumed continuity of formed matter (i.e., of body), as his discussion of eaten embryos shows. Displaying both the new identity theory and the assumption that matter does in fact continue, Aquinas said, concerning relics: “The dead body of a saint is not identical to that which the saint held during life, on account of its difference of form—viz., the soul; but it is the same by identity of matter, which is destined to be reunited to its form.” So, to Aquinas,
the body of Saint Peter in the altar is not really the saint because it has the form not of Peter but of Peter's cadaver; but the dust that lies there will—because it is Peter's cadaver—be reassembled to be reformed by Peter's soul at the end of time. There is still, in fact, material continuity in the resurrection.61

Thus the crucial question to which scholastic discussion of the resurrected body returned again and again was not: Is body necessary to personhood? Theologians were so certain it was they sometimes wondered whether resurrection might not be "natural." Peter of Capua, for example, suggested that it was a consequence not of divine grace but of the structure of human nature that body returned to soul after the Last Judgment.62 The crucial theological question was rather: What accounts for the identity of earthly and risen body? what of "me" must rise in order for the risen body to be "me"?

In their answers, theologians discussed resurrection of foreskins, fingernails, and umbilical cords—issues which have seemed jejune, even preposterous, to modern commentators. Nonetheless, if we take such debates seriously, we find that a profound conception of body is adumbrated here—one in which both innate and acquired physical characteristics, including biological sex and even the marks of human suffering, are the person. Theologians agreed that human beings rise in two sexes and with the traces not only of martyrdom but of other particularities as well.63 Although defects will be repaired in glory and woman's sex can, in Aristotelian terms, be seen as a defect, theologians nonetheless asserted that, for reasons they could not fully understand, God's creation was more perfect in two sexes than in one.64 Women will rise as women. The short will be reassembled with their own stature. Martyrs (and presumably stigmatics) will return with their wounds as shining scars, all suffering gone and all lack made up but the marks of their experience present for all eternity. What is temporary or temporal, according to this view, is not physical distinctiveness or sex but the change we call corruption (or decay or dissolution) of material being.65 The bodies of the blessed, endowed with the dowries of agilitas, claritas (or beauty), subtilitas, and impasibiltas (freedom from suffering), will lack exactly that potency, that capacity for change, that to Aristotle characterizes matter.66

In the quodlibetal debates of the thirteenth-century schools as in the period's startling new miracles, we thus find three basic assumptions at work. First, body is integral to person and expressive of person, so much so that soul without body is not a person at all. Second (and despite the technical development of a formal theory of identity), material continuity is crucial. Down to the end of the thirteenth century, the majority of scholastic philosophers continue to speak as if persons do not survive unless their same material bodies survive. Third, the fundamental religious and cultural problem is decay. Since material continuity is essential for survival, the crucial threat is not separation of body and soul but rather destruction of body. And if corruption or fragmentation or division of body (the transition from whole to part) is the central threat, resurrection (the reassembly of parts into whole) is the central victory. Small wonder then that closure and exuding, wholeness and division, incorruption and decay are the basic poles around which somatic miracles revolve. If God after the final trumpet will reassemble the person so completely that, as the Gospel promises, "not a hair of your head shall perish" (Luke 21:18), we should not be surprised to find society's saintly heroes and heroines fragmenting and reassembling in this life in extraordinary ways.

My suggestion that the same basic assumptions underlie theological discussion of resurrection and pious veneration of somatic miracle is not merely my interpretation of two aspects of medieval culture. Medieval texts themselves make the connection. For example, Guibert of Nogent's treatise on relics from the early twelfth century, Thomas of Cantimpré's "Life of Christina the Astonishing" from the early thirteenth, and James of Vaugine's Golden Legend from the 1250s or 60s all indulge in extravaganza and sometimes gory descriptions of somatic miracles. All three texts interpret such bodily events in the context of resurrection. Guibert of Nogent's De pignoribus sanctorum has usually been lauded by historians as the beginning of scientific hagiography, a sort of precursor of Valla or Erasmus or Mabillon.67 And it is true that Guibert criticizes credulous veneration of remains simply because miracles happen there. He does insist that relics be properly documented and that miracles be approved by church authorities. But such arguments are far from Guibert's central concern. What disturbs him most deeply is the practice of moving or dividing the bodies of the saints.68 Fragmentation is, to Guibert, the ultimate insult and scandal; aiding and abetting it by translating and mutilating holy cadavers strikes him as obscene.69

Thus the late John Benton was closer to an accurate interpretation of Guibert's De pignoribus when he wrote of its author's castration complex.70 What Benton did not see, however, was that the fear of decay...
and fragmentation was in no way peculiar to Guibert and had indeed profound theological roots.

The occasion for Guibert's De pignoribus was the claim of the monks of Saint Médard to possess the tooth of Christ. Against this claim, Guibert's fundamental argument was theological. He expressed horror and outrage at the notion that any part of Christ (tooth, or umbilical cord, or foreskin) could be left behind on earth to suffer decay. Christ's resurrected body is the paradigm for ours, wrote Guibert; if so much as a drop of his blood or a hair of his head is left behind, how shall we believe that we will rise at the sound of the trumpet? The martyrs bear up under excruciating tortures—and Guibert detailed with fascinated horror splittings of fingernails, hangings by genitals, and other unspeakable persecutions—because they know every particle will return at the end. The eucharistic host, fragmented by human teeth and digestive processes yet in every minute crumb the whole body of Christ, is, argued Guibert, the guarantee that wholeness (that is, nonpartibility and nonpassibility) is God's ultimate promise to humankind. So crucial to salvation was wholeness for Guibert that he argued (in an interesting use of rhetorical theory) that synecdoche, pari pro toto, must for Christ be true in a way that went beyond ordinary metaphorical usage.

Thomas of Cantimpré's "Life of Christina the Astonishing" is similarly concerned with remarkable bodily events. Not only does his heroine engage in prodigious austerities, for example, jumping into ovens and icy ponds; she also practices a whole range of holy exuding (both stigmata and miraculous lactations) which have curative effects. And Thomas situates these events in a theology of the resurrection. He reports that another Thomas, abbot of Saint Trond, witnessed Christina take up her feet and kiss their bare soles and say to her body (in language clearly drawn from a popular medieval genre, the "debate between body and soul"): O most beloved body! Why have I beaten you? Why have I reviled you? Did you not obey me in every good deed I undertook to do with God's help? You have endured the torment and hardships most generously and most patiently which the spirit placed on you... Now, a best and sweetest body, ... is an end of your hardship, now you will rest in the dust and will sleep for a little and then, at last, when the trumpet blows, you will rise again purified of all corruptibility and you will be joined in eternal happiness with the soul you have had as a companion in the present sadness.

Themes of bodily division and reassembly, clearly located within a theology of the resurrection, are also found in James of Voragine's Golden Legend, by far the most popular compendium in the later Middle Ages for preachers who wished to reach their audiences with racy yet moral tales. Recent studies of the work have underlined the brutality of its accounts and its archaic obsession with martyrdom, especially with torture and bodily division. The tale of Saint James the Dismembered, who was cut apart finger by finger and toe by toe, is characteristic. But what strikes me about the Golden Legend is not so much the sadism as the denial of exactly the dismemberment in which the book simultaneously wallows. Of the 153 chapters devoted to saints, at least 75 have dismemberment as a central motif; but there are only one or two references in all the accounts of the martyrs to the fact that being cut apart might hurt. What is underlined repeatedly is the reassembling of the fragmented body for burial or (particularly in the case of virgin women) the victory of intactness over fragmentation. Although sundered limb from limb, female saints are said to be "whole" because they avoid sexual violation; despite frightful methods of execution, the bodies of both male and female martyrs triumph miraculously over disintegration. For example, the story of Saint Margaret, bound on the rack, beaten with sharp instruments until her bones were laid bare, burned with torches, and plunged into water, describes her body as remaining "unscathed.""Burned on the pyre, Saint Theodore renders up his soul, but his body is "unharmed by the fire" (ab igne ilaesum) and perfumes the air with sweet odor; the wife of Saint Adrian journeys a long distance to join her husband's severed hand with his other remains, which have been preserved from burning by a miraculous rainfall; left by the emperor Diocletian to wolves and dogs, the bodies of two martyrs survive intact until the faithful can collect them for burial; and the emperor Diocletian to wolves and dogs, the bodies of two martyrs survive intact until the faithful can collect them for burial.

Whether or not fragmentation or diminution is characterized as significant (or even in fact as occurring) depends not on what happens to the body physically but on the moral standing of the person to whom the bodily events pertain. Indeed the fact of bodily division is often denied by exactly the account that chronicles it. The words attributed to James the Dismembered...
bored, as he loses his toes, are typical: "Go, third toe, to thy companions, and as the grain of wheat bears much fruit, so shalt thou rest with thy fellows unto the last day. . . . Be comforted, little toe, because great and small shall have the same resurrection. A hair of the head shall not perish, and how much less shalt thou, the least of all, be separated from thy fellows?"28 The message, with its explicit echoes of Luke 21:18 and of the seed metaphor from 1 Corinthians 15:42–44, is clear.29 Dismemberment is horrible, to be sure; and even more horrifying is rottenness or decay. But in the end none of this is horrible at all. Beheaded and mutilated saints are "whole" and "unharm." Severed toes are the seeds from which glorified bodies will spring. God's promise is that division shall finally be overcome, that ultimately there is no scattering.84 As one of the more conservative contemporary theologians might have said: material continuity is identity; for us, as for Christ, the whole will rise and every part is in a sense the whole.85 Anthropologists tell us that all cultures deal, in ritual and symbol, with putrefaction; all cultures strain to mask and deny the horror of the period between "first death" (the departure of breath or life) and "second death" or mineralization (the reduction of the cadaver to the hard remains—that is, teeth and bones).86 And certainly we can see such an effort to give meaning to the process of decay in medieval miracles of effluvia and closure. Miracles of exuding make oil, milk, and blood, whether from cadavers or from the living, curative and therefore generative of life; miracles of inedia in life and incorruptibility in the grave assert living bodies to be changeless and cadavers to be without decay. Moreover, theological debate about the survival of hair and fingernails in the resurrection grapples directly with the fragmentation and change we fear in the tomb. But I think we can look beyond sweeping cultural constants for the peculiar attention paid in medieval piety and doctrine to the problem of decay and material fragmentation. The thirteenth century saw an intense anxiety over the partition of bodies—an anxiety that reached a climax in the papal bull De stan des feriatis of 1299. Historians have long been aware of the background to this anxiety: the frenzy for relics that characterized Western Europe from the ninth century on. They have also stressed the growing practice of dividing bodies—a practice which was prohibited until the ninth century, although the prohibition was not always observed.87 By the thirteenth century it was common for the privileged to own small bits of saints (fingers or bone chips) to wear as talismans and common also for members of royalty or the high nobility to have their own by-no-means-holy bodies divided in death in order to be buried close to several different saints. What has been less emphasized, however, is the continuing ambivalence with which such practices were fraught.

Two generalizations commonly made about the medieval relic cult are misleading: first, that in popular religion people assumed the relic to be the saint88 and, second, that popular and elite attitudes toward the saints can be clearly distinguished.89 It is true that Patrick Geary and Lester Little have discovered rituals in which saints are punished or coerced by humiliating their remains.90 Nonetheless, popular accounts of apparitions as well as theological discussions of relics make it clear that the saints were understood to be resided in heaven, or—if hovering around their earthly remains—in no way coterminous with them. Holy remains were venerated or castigated not because they were the saint but because they were the saints' bodies, pregnant already with the glory they would receive fully only at the resurrection. The twelfth-century abbot Peter the Venerable explained the point thus: "... you ought not to feel contempt for the bones of the present martyrs as if they were dry bones but should honor them now full of life as if they were in their future incorruption."91

As Peter Brown has argued in another context, the full ambivalence of medieval attitudes toward relics is present at every level of culture.92 Throughout the Middle Ages, ecclesiastical authorities sought both to encourage and to tame veneration of body parts. The Fourth Lateran Council legislated against "naked" display of relics for money, and historians have debated whether the disapproval was directed primarily toward relic cult, or toward unprotected display, or toward economic motivation.93 Canonists and theologians in the same period debated (but did not agree about) whether there could be private property in relics and whether wearing of them by private individuals was acceptable devout.94 When, in 1299, Boniface VIII legislated against the nobility's practice of dividing bodies for burial ad sanctos, he included a prohibition of embalming and boiling bodies and in certain circumstances moving and reburying them. But Boniface's De stan des feriatis was not reproduced in the next collection of decretals nor was it enforced in the fourteenth century.95 And the theological discussion that it occasioned in the schools of Paris echoed a contradiction as old as the church fathers. Those who discussed the bull asserted both that bodily division did not matter because God can reassemble fragments from anywhere and that partition of bodies was an "atrocious and inhuman" practice. The Parisian theologian Gervase of Mount-Saint-Eloi, for ex-
ample, insisted that, although God could reassemble anything, it was better to bury bodies intact so that they were ready for the resurrection. Roger Bacon, whose work on postponing old age had much influence at the papal court, was aware that death had to intervene between this life and the Last Judgment; but he urged that persons here below should prepare their bodies for resurrection by striving for physical as well as moral equilibrium.

Such inconsistent concerns had characterized the theologians of the first centuries C.E. as well. The fourth-century church historian Eusebius reported that the Romans burned and scattered the bodies of the martyrs of Lyons in order to dash Christian hopes of resurrection. Christian apologists such as Minucius Felix delighted in claiming such repressive measures to be useless because divine power can renew even pulverized dust. The early martyr Ignatius of Antioch hurled in the teeth of his persecutors and even of favoring Christians his confidence that Jesus could overcome the dismemberment and physical destruction of his followers.

> [Let me] become [the prey of] the beasts, that by their means I may be accounted worthy of God. I am the wheat of God, and by the teeth of the beasts I shall be ground, that I may be found the pure bread of God. Provoke ye greatly the wild beasts that they may be for me a grave, and may leave nothing of my body, in order that, when I have fallen asleep, I may not be a burden upon anyone. . . . Fire, and the cross, and the beasts that are prepared, cutting off of the limbs, and scattering of the bones, and crushing of the whole body, harsh torments of the devil—let these come upon me, but only let me be accounted worthy of Jesus Christ.

Nevertheless pious Christians took substantial risks in order to collect the martyrs' bones for reassembly as well as burial; and Eusebius reports that they grieved when they could not return the mutilated pieces of their heroes and heroines to the earth. At the level of exempla and pious story, we find a similar paradox. Caesarius of Heisterbach, in his collection of miracles, tells of visions in which the pious are invited to take bones from tombs; but he also includes a number of cases of relics that protest their division by bleeding or giving off intense heat. Saints' lives from the early thirteenth century imply much hesitation about bodily partition. James of Vitry, hagiographer of Mary of Oignies (d. 1213), promoted Mary's reputation partly in the hope of improving the value of her finger, which he received as a relic at her death. Thomas of Cantimpré, author of the Supplement to Mary's Vita (as of the "Life of Christina the Astonishing" discussed above), delighted in recounting miracles performed by parts of female bodies. But Thomas's account of Mary's life shows a woman who resisted as well as participated in fragmentation. Mary in a sense partitioned herself during her lifetime by pulling out a large hunk of her hair to use as a device to cure the sick; she, however, castigated the prior of Oignies for "cruelly" extracting the teeth of a holy cadaver. After her death she supposedly clenched her own teeth when the same prior tried to extract them as relics. But when he humbly begged her pardon, she shook out a few teeth from her jaw for his use. An old French Life of Saint Barbara tells the story of a decapitated head which asks a priest for communion; Saint Barbara, by her power, then reunites the head with its body, although both parts remain lifeless. Such a story clearly suggests that, death aside, fragmentation itself is an evil to be overcome.

Indeed, not only did preachers and ecclesiastical authorities express reservations about the fragmentation of bodies; popular practice moved symbolically to deny that division actually divided. As partition became ever more common, do claims that holy bodies do not decay and especially claims that parts of holy bodies are whole or incorrupt. Such emphasis on body parts as whole, on severed flesh as intact, is an extravagant and extremely literal use of synecdoche and paradox, as I suggested in discussing the Golden Legend; yet we find such extravagance over and over again in thirteenth- and fourteenth-century hagiography. Stories proliferate in which parts of bodies remain incorrupt after burial because of their holy possessor's specific deeds or characteristics. Caesarius of Heisterbach, for example, told of a scribe whose hand remained with-out decay after death; hagiographers made similar claims for Thomas Aquinas. Incorruption of miraculous reassembly (sometimes seen in the early Middle Ages as a mark of sinfulness) even came to be taken, by the populace and by some ecclesiastical authorities, as itself a sign of holiness. Caesarius described a robber who had done no good thing during his life except fast but who came to be revered as a martyr after death because five matrons appeared at night, fitted his head back on his shoulders, and laid him out whole on a sumptuous bier.

The years around 1300 were not only years of debate at the papal court about the practice of partitioning corpses and decades of contro-
versy in the schools of Paris and Oxford about how to explain the con-
tinuity and identity of body; they were also years in which the division
and decay of the human body was an acute issue in other areas of me-
dieval life. Both north and south of the Alps the first dissections were
conducted on cadavers, for forensic as well as for teaching pur-
poses. M.-C. Pouchelle has brilliantly demonstrated that they were char-
acterized by an extraordinary sense of the mystery of the closed body
and of the audacity required to open it.112 Recent work in the history
of medicine has shown the emergence in the thirteenth century of the
notion that the task of physicians is to preserve the body from decay.
In some circles, learned medicine (or physic) became centered not on
the effort to cure disease but on schemes to return the body (prefer-
ably through alchemical manipulation) to its incorrupt state before the
Fall.113

As Ed Peters has recently reminded us, the same period saw the
revival of torture as a judicial procedure. Torturers were, however, al-
lowed only to twist and stretch the body; they were prohibited from main-
ing or killing it, and thus from breaching or dividing.114 Indeed so fraught
with significance was actual partition that we can often tell, from the
kind of bodily division inflicted in the execution, the social class and
gender of those executed and the adjudged seriousness of their crimes.115
The more hideous the offense and the lower the social status of the
criminal the more mutilating the punishment: for example, drawing and
quartering, or burning (which reduces the body to the tiniest fragments,
dust). Moreover, as R. I. Moore and Saul Brody have suggested, the
scapegoating of lepers about 1300 was owing not only to increased in-
cidence of the disease but also to conceptualizing of it as living decay
and fragmentation. It was because parts broke off the leper’s body, be-
cause it fragmented and putrefied and became insensate while alive, in
other words because it was living death, that it was used as a common
metaphor for sin.116

Theological debates about resurrection, canonical legislation con-
cerning burial, and hagiographical reports of miracles are not usually
related to each other as I have done in this essay. And each has of course
its own specific history and context. Debates over the unicity of form
and over Christ’s body in the triduum are related (as the older histori-
ography argues) to the reception of Aristotle in the West. Boniface’s bull
Detestande feritatis must (as new research shows) be placed in the con-
text of ecclesiastical squabbles over rights to bury the French kings as
well as in the context of scientific, specifically Baconian, ideas circulat-
ing at the papal court.117 James of Vitry’s and Thomas of Cantimpré’s
accounts of the startling somatic miracles of Mary of Oignies and Chris-
tina the Astonishing reflect the specific nature of women’s piety in the
area of Liége, the ecclesiastical ambitions of the two male hagiographers,
and their considerable concern to counter the appeal of Cathar dualism.118
Nonetheless, if we look only at particular contexts, we run the risk of
forgetting the larger configurations which, whether we find them threaten-
ing or attractive or merely bizarre, probably first sparked our interest
in the Middle Ages. This essay suggests, without in any way denying
other historical contexts, that a specific conception of person underlay
the new somatic miracles of the thirteenth century, the theological dis-
cussion of resurrection, and the practice of and controversy over bodily
partition. That conception of person included three assumptions: first,
that the human person is a body-soul unity, second, that material con-
tinuity is necessary for survival of body and therefore of person, and,
third, that the ultimate threat is putrefaction, the ultimate victory not
the immortality of the soul but the exact reassembly of body parts.119
Thus “body” was a central problem for pious Christians and schol-
astic theorists. The current scholarly interest it arouses is entirely ap-
propriate to the medieval evidence. But the problem that body presented
most urgently to medieval men and women was not the problem of sex-
uality or gender, pressing as these issues were. The ultimate problem
was death and decay. However odd we may find some of the medieval
efforts at solution, it is hard, I think, to claim that they got the problem
wrong.

NOTES

The first version of this essay was delivered as a plenary address for the
International Conference on Medieval Studies at Kalamazoo, Michigan, in May
1988. It was written while I was a Senior Scholar at the Getty Center for the
History of Art and the Humanities in Santa Monica, California. I am grateful
to the support staff at the Getty for their help, and especially to Steven Wight,
my research assistant, who provided me with ideas as well as references. I would
also like to thank Guenther Roth and Stephen D. White for their suggestions.
1. See, for example, Catherine Gallagher and Thomas Laqueur, eds.,
The Making of the Modern Body: Sexuality and Society in the Nineteenth
Century (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1987); Peter Brown, The Body
and Society: Men, Women and Sexual Renunciation in Early Christianity (New
York: Columbia University Press, 1988); Representations 20: Misogyny, Misand-
dry, and Misanthropy (Fall 1987), especially the articles by Carol Clover and


7. This is the viewpoint often found in surveys of women's history. Even so good a literary critic as R. Howard Bloch seems to me to fall into the trap in his "Medieval Misogyny," Representations 20 (Fall 1987): 1-24. For other recent work that stresses the negative view of body and of women's bodies in particular, see Jacques Le Goff, "Corps et idéologie dans l'Occident médiéva-"l et Renaissance," in Corps et civilization: Etudes (Paris: Gallimard, 1985), pp. 123-27; and Michel Set, "Mépris du monde et résistance des corps aux XIVe et XVe siècles," and Jacques Dalarun, "Eve, Marie ou Madeleine? La dignité du corps féminin dans hagiographie médiévale," in Médiévales 8 (1985): Le Souci du corps, pp. 6-32. Some recent work has argued, in con-
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223–24. For the argument that German attitudes toward relics differed in important ways from the Western European relic cult, see Lionel Rothkrug, "German Holiness and Western Sanctity in Medieval and Modern History," Historical Reflections/Réflexions historiques 15.1 (1988): 161–249.


17. Thurston, *PP*, pp. 233–82, esp. pp. 246–52. Of the 42 saints living between 1400 and 1900 whose feasts are kept by the universal church, there are claims of incorruption in 22 cases and in seven more there are reports of odd phenomena which imply non-decay. Seventeen of the incorrupt are male, but of the six females among the 42 five are incorrupt and for the sixth (Jane Frances de Chantal), who was embalmed, there appears to be a claim for exoungation. See, for example, the case of Lukardis, *Hynes*, pp. 233–82, esp. pp. 193-221; *João de Piné-Cabral, Sons of Adam, Daughters of Eve: The Peasant World of the Alto Minho* (Oxford: at the Clarendon Press, 1986), pp. 230–38; and Caroline Bynum, *Holy Anorexia*; *DTC*, pp. 3–15; and Giulia Barone, "Probleme um Klara von Montefalco", in *Religionskreuzung und mystische Voraussetzung im Mittelalter*, ed. P. Dinzelbacher and D. Bauer (Cologne and Vizenz: Böhlau, 1988), p. 219. Three precious stones, with images of the Holy Family on them, were supposedly found in the heart of Margaret of Città del Castello; see *Life of Margaret*, ch. 8, *Anecdota Bollandiana* 19 (1900): 27–28. On mystical espousal rings and miraculous bodily exonugation, see *Thurston, PP*, pp. 139 and 200.


19. Thurston, *PP*, pp. 233–82, esp. pp. 246–52. Of the 42 saints living between 1400 and 1900 whose feasts are kept by the universal church, there are claims of incorruption in 22 cases and in seven more there are reports of odd phenomena which imply non-decay. Seventeen of the incorrupt are male, but of the six females among the 42 five are incorrupt and for the sixth (Jane Frances de Chantal), who was embalmed, there appears to be a claim for exoungation. See, for example, the case of Lukardis, *Hynes*, pp. 233–82, esp. pp. 193-221; *João de Piné-Cabral, Sons of Adam, Daughters of Eve: The Peasant World of the Alto Minho* (Oxford: at the Clarendon Press, 1986), pp. 230–38; and Caroline Bynum, *Holy Anorexia*; *DTC*, pp. 3–15; and Giulia Barone, "Probleme um Klara von Montefalco", in *Religionskreuzung und mystische Voraussetzung im Mittelalter*, ed. P. Dinzelbacher and D. Bauer (Cologne and Vizenz: Böhlau, 1988), p. 219. Three precious stones, with images of the Holy Family on them, were supposedly found in the heart of Margaret of Città del Castello; see *Life of Margaret*, ch. 8, *Anecdota Bollandiana* 19 (1900): 27–28. On mystical espousal rings and miraculous bodily exonugation, see *Thurston, PP*, pp. 139 and 200.


22. Browe, *Die eucharistischen Wunder*.


25. Bynum, *Female Body and Religious Practice.* See also the essays in P. Dinzelbacher and D. Bauer, ed., *Religiose Frauenbewegung und mystische Frömmigkeit*, which make quite clear the somatic and charismatic quality of female piety, although Dinzelbacher, in a somewhat perverse introduction, seems to deny that there is anything particularly female or worthy of explanation about this. The splendid article by Karen Glenn, “Mystikerkonverznun aus männlicher und weiblicher Sicht . . . ,” in ibid., suggests that the bodily quality of women's piety is in part a matter of male perception and construction of it.


27. For this interpretation, I have been influenced by Pina-Cabral, *Sons of Adam.*


For a thirteenth-century treatment, see Albertus Magnus, *De resurrectione*, tract. 1, q. 6, art. 9–11, ed. W. Kübel, in *Opera Omnia*, ed. Institutum Alberti Magni Coloniensis, vol. 26 (Münster: Aschendorff, 1958), pp. 254–57. Whether or not eaten food became flesh was a serious problem for twelfth-century theologians and a favorite locus for discussing the generally vexing problem of change. For a good summary of the issue, see Kieran Nolan, *The Immortality of the Soul and the Resurrection of the Body According to Giles of Rome*: *A Historical Study of a Thirteenth Century Theological Problem*, Studia Ephemerides *Augustinianum* 1 (Rome: Studium Theologicum Augustinianum, 1967), pp. 117–21. The close relationship perceived between eating and corruption is undoubtedly connected to the proliferation of miracles of living without eating in this period, although scholars interested in miracles have not noticed this.


39. Ibid., p. 397.

40. Thomas Aquinas held that risen bodies will have the capacity for touch; see *Summa contra Gentiles*, bk. 4, ch. 84, in *Sancti Thomae Aquinatis Opera Omnia*, ... vol. 13–15 (Rome: Apud Sedem Commissionis Leoninarum, 1918–30) (hereafter ST), vol. 15, pp. 268–69. Risen bodies will not, however, eat: see ST, bk. 4, ch. 83, vol. 15, pp. 262–66. In *Quaestiones disputatae de potentia*, q. 6, art. 8, in *Sancti Thomae Aquinatis Opera omnia*, ed. E. S. Frette, vol. 13 (Paris: Vives, 1875), p. 205, Aquinas argues that Christ willed to eat after the resurrection in order to show the reality of his body; see also ST 3a, q. 55, art. 6, vol. 55, pp. 56–65. Albert the Great (*De resurrectione*, tract. 2, q. 8, art. 5, p. 278) argues that, in order to demonstrate his resurrected body, the resurrected Christ ate without the food becoming part of his substance; we too could eat that way in the glorified body but have no need to, since we need not demonstrate the resurrection. Weber, *Aufstehung*, pp. 259–60, shows how thirteenth-century theologians vacillated in their treatments of whether there is tasting in heaven. Basic principles conflicted: on the one hand, vegetative functions were seen as eliminated in heaven; on the other hand, as Albert said, "Nulla postea nobili destitutur.

41. See, for example, Albert the Great, *De resurrectione*, tract. 2, q. 8, art. 2–4, pp. 271–78, and tract. 4, q. 1, art. 15, pp. 337–38. Albert changed his mind on the issue between his treatise on the resurrection and his *Sententiae* commentary; see Weber, *Aufstehung*, p. 331, nn. 329–30.

42. Weber, *Aufstehung*, pp. 331–32. On the does generally, see Niko-
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48. SG, bk. 4, chs. 80-81, Thomas holds that risen body will be reconstituted out of all of the former matter of body, but it is not impossible for it to be reconstituted out of some other matter. Interpretation of this passage has been controversial. See Weber, Aufführung, p. 229, and E. Hugueny, "Résurrection et identité corporelle selon les philosophies de l’individuation," Revue des sciences philosophiques et théologiques 23 (1934): 94-106. Hugueny argues that Thomas’s thought developed away from the idea of material continuity and toward formal identity.

49. SG, bk. 4, ch. 81, rol. 15, pp. 252-53: "Corporality, however, can be taken in two ways. In one way, it can be taken as the substantial form of a body. . . . Therefore, corporality, as the substantial form in man, cannot be other than the rational soul. . . ." See Bazan, "La corporalidad según saint Thomas," pp. 407-8. Bazan says that according to Thomas, "Nette corporalité est telle pensée de spiritualité, car sa source est l’âme rationnelle."

50. Durandus of Saint Pouyan, In Sententias theologicas Petri Lombardi commentarium libri quattuor (Lyon: Apud Gasparem, 1556), dist. 44, q. 1, fol. 340v-341r: Utrum ad hoc quod idem homo numero resurgat, requiritur quod formetur corpus eius idemdem pulchrior in quo fuit resolutum. (The printed edition of the commentary is the third and last redaction, moderate in comparison to earlier ones; see Gilson, History, p. 774 n. 81.)

51. In answer to the question whether the soul of Peter can be in the body of Paul (which he says is misformulated), Durandus argues (In Sententias, dist. 44, q. 1, pars. 4 and 5, fol. 341r): " . . . quaecumque implicat contraelectionem: quia corpus Petri non potest esse nisi compositum ex materia et anima Petri . . . ergo anima Petri non potest esse in corpore Pauli nec conuerso, nisi anima Petri fiet anima Pauli . . . Reser ergo quod alio modo formetur quae . . . supposito quod anima Petri fiet in materia quae fuit in
corps Pauli, utrum esset idem Petrus qui prius esset..." He concludes (ibid., par. 6, fol. 34v): "... saepeque materiam variavit anima Petri in resurrectione, ut esset eadem forma secundum numerum; per consequens erit idem Petrus secundum numerum." For the background to Durandus's position, see Weber, *Auferstehung*, pp. 217–53 and 76–78. Weber's basic argument is that there were a number of precursors to Durandus's position, the originality of which has been overstated.

52. A perceptual exception to the ignoring of positive conceptions of the body among earlier Platonists is John Sommersfeldt, "The Body in Bernard of Clairvaux's Anthropology," paper delivered at the Kalamazoo Medieval Studies conference, May 1988.

53. Weber, *Auferstehung*, pp. 326–27. The doctrine of the plurality of forms seems to lurk behind much of Franciscan teaching on the gifts (dotes) of the glorified body, for thinkers such as Bonaventure and Richard of Middleton hold that body is in some way predisposed for the flowing over of glory into it before it receives the dotes, see ibid., pp. 314ff. Such a position tends to give substantial reality to body.

54. Bonaventure, De assumptione B. Virginis Mariae, sermon 1, section 2, in S. Bonaventurae Opera omnia, ed. Collegium S. Bonaventurae, vol. 9 (Quarrachi: Collegium S. Bonaventurae, 1901), p. 690. See also Aquinas, SCQ, bk. 4, ch. 79, vol. 15, p. 249, and Aquinas, De potentia, q. 5, art. 10, pp. 176–77, which says explicitly that Porphyry's idea that the soul is happiest without the body, and Plato's idea that the body is a tool of the soul, are wrong; the soul is more like God when it is united to the body than when it is separated, because it is then more perfect.

55. Weber, *Auferstehung*, p. 304 n. 197; and see ibid., pp. 266 and 135–36. The Augustinian idea that the soul desires the body so greatly that it is held back from vision of God when it is without the body is also found in Giles of Rome; see Nolan, *Giles of Rome*, pp. 46 and 78.

56. There appears to have been concern generally in the 1270s that the teachings of Aristotle as interpreted by the Arab commentators might lead not only to denial of the immortality of the soul but also to denial of the resurrection of the body. Others among the propositions condemned in 1277 also reflect a concern with the issue of bodily identity, for example, numbers 25 ("Quod Deus non potest dare perpetuam rem transmutabili et corruptibili"), 148 ("Quod homo per nutritionem potest fieri alias numeris et individualitatibus"), 155 ("Quod non est curandum de sepulchro"), and 178 ("Quod finis terrabilium est mortis"). See Chartularium universitatis Parisiensi, ed. H. Denifle and A. Chasteland, vol. 1 (Paris: Delalain, 1889), pp. 544–55, and Roland Hissette, *Enquête sur les 219 articles condamnés à Paris le 7 Mars 1277*, Philosophes médiévaux 22 (Louvain and Paris: Publications universitaires de Louvain and Vander-Oyez, 1977), pp. 187, 294, and 307–8. Already in 1270 denial of the resurrection of the body had been condemned; proposition 13 stated "Quod

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Deus non potest dare immortalitatem vel incorruptibilitatem vel mortalem;" See *Chartularium universitatis Parisiensi, Paris*, vol. 1, p. 487.

57. Debate over whether Christ in the three days was a man went back into the twelfth century. By the mid-thirteenth century, theologians generally agreed that living union was necessary for humanness (i.e., for being a man). Thomas's theory, however, raised the question whether Christ's body on the cross and in the grave were the same body. Giles of Lessines in 1278 raised the issue in a treatise on the unicity of form which he sent to Albert the Great. (Indeed he added the thesis of the equivocality of body to the list of those condemned in 1270, but it is not clear that it was in fact condemned.) Perhaps because of Albert's defense, the unicity of form was not condemned in 1277 in Paris, but in 1277 in Oxford the position was condemned that: "... corpus vivum et mortuum est equo corpore..." Weber, *Auferstehung*, pp. 76–78 and 150–51. John Quidor (John of Paris) also got into trouble for the implications of his teaching on identity for the body of Christ; see ibid., p. 239. On the condemnation of the doctrine of the unicity of form in England, see *Chartularium universitatis Parisiensi, Paris*, vol. 1, pp. 558–59; Capleston, *History*, vol. 2, p. 2, pp. 153–54; and M. Anthony Hewson, *Giles of Rome and the Medieval Theory of Conception: A Study of the De formatione zytorum humani in utero* (London: University of London, The Athlone Press, 1975), pp. 6–11. According to Weber, *Auferstehung*, p. 151, both John of Paris and Archbishop Peckham were aware of the implications of these theoretical discussions for the cult of relics.


59. Giles of Rome's Sentence commentary never reaches book 4. His major statement on the resurrection, in the *Quaestiones de resurrectione mortuorum et de poena damnatorum*, has been edited by Nolan, *Giles of Rome*, pp. 69–75, 90–96, 105–13, and 124–30. Giles's position clearly foreshadows Durandus'; see *Quaestiones in Nolan, Giles*, pp. 73–74, and Nolan's discussion, pp. 88 and 120. What guarantees the identity of earthly body and risen body (and therefore the identity of person) is not matter but form. As Weber points out, however ( *Auferstehung*, pp. 234–36), Giles does not go all the way to Durandus's position. When Giles discusses Christ's body in the *triduum* he makes it clear that, although the body is not man, the material cadaver continues and is Christ's body; Nolan, *Giles*, p. 60. Moreover, like Thomas, Giles devotes much attention to the question of whether the body rises in a body into which food was converted and to related questions about the resurrection of eaten flesh; see Nolan, *Giles*, pp. 114–23. In his embryological theory, Giles uses the notion of separation of form (or principle of identity; see Hewson, *Giles of Rome and Conception*, pp. 90–96; 153–54; and 77–80, which has been overestimated.

60. ST 3a, q. 25, art. 6, vol. 50, pp. 202–5.

61. As Weber points out ( *Auferstehung*, p. 244), the new identity theory of Durandus, although not condemned, was never fully adopted into theological discourse. More research will be necessary before we know why this is so;
but the argument of my essay suggests that one reason may be the deep roots in pious practice of the assumption of material continuity. I should also point out, however, that attention to the resurrection of the body was lessened once the papacy declared (in the bull *Benedictus Deus* in 1336) that the soul can receive the beatific vision before the resurrection of the body.


63. See, for example, the early twelfth-century text edited by Lotuin, in *Psychologie et morale*, vol. 5, p. 396, which says: "... omnes integro corpore resurget. Cicatricies vero matriarum quas pro Deo passi sunt ibi glorificati ad augmentum glorie ipsorum apparet, quemadmodum cicatrices ipsius Christi remanentae ad maiorem penitentiam et gratiam honorum, sed non deformant corpora ipsorum quemadmodum in presenti quantitatis uidemus dedentia corpora esse cicatricibus ipsius." And see Aquinas, *ScC*, bk. 4, ch. 88, vol. 15, pp. 275–79; and ST 3a, q. 54, art. 4, vol. 55, pp. 30–35. See also Supplement to *Summa theologica* 3, q. 96, art. 10, on whether the scars of the martyrs are an aureole; *Supplementum*, compiled and edited by the Brothers of the Order, in *Sancti Thomas Aquinatis Opera omnia*, vol. 12 (Rome: S.C. de Propaganda Fide, 1906), p. 238. In general, thirteenth-century theologians drew on Augustine’s *City of God*, bk. 22, ch. 17 ("... vita detestabatur, natura servabitur") on this matter; see Weber, *Aufstehung*, p. 79, n. 194.

64. Allen, *Concepts of Woman*, pp. 256–59. Weber quotes Augustinus Triumphans, writing on the resurrection, to the effect that, if persons were to rise in the opposite sex, they would not be the same persons: "Non omnes resurgentes eundem sexum habebant, nam masculinis sexus et femininis, quanvis non sint differentiae formales facientes differentiam in specie, sunt tamen differentiae materiales facientes differentiam in numero. Et quia in resurrectione quilibet resurget non solum quantum ad id quod est de identitate specifica, sed habet esse in specie humana, verum etiam resurget quantum ad id, quod est de identitate personali, secundum quam habet esse in tali individuo. Ideo operatur unusquidque cum se ipsum proprium et cum aliis pertinentibus ad integritatem seae individualis naturee resurgere, propter quod femina resurget cum seae feminino et homo cum masculino, remota omni libidine et omni vitiocitate nature" (ibid., p. 258, n. 479). Moneta of Cremona, writing against the Cefars, argued that God created sex difference; see Moneta, *Adversus Catharos et Valdenses Libri quinque* (Rome, 1743: repr. Ridgewood, New Jersey: Greg Press, 1964), bk. 1, ch. 2, section 4, and bk. 4, ch. 7, section 1, pp. 121 and 315.

65. The resurrected bodies of the damned will be incapable of corruption (i.e., of dissolution or of loss of their matter) but not incapable of suffering. Indeed, scholastic theologians held that the damned also receive their bodies whole after the resurrection, because only the permanence (i.e., the perfect balance or wholeness) of these bodies insures that their punishment will be permanent and perpetual; see Kübel, "Die Lehre ... nach Albertus," pp. 316–17.

66. The philosophical significance of this cannot be overstated. One may simply conclude from it that the Christian notion of a resurrected body is an oxymoron. But one might also reason that Aristotelian notions of body and matter were fundamentally incompatible with Christian doctrine exactly because the Christian conception of body makes possible—indeed necessary—an unchanging body. Already in the second century Tertullian realized that he had to raise drastically the Aristotelian definition of change in order to accommodate it to Christian teaching. See Tertullian, *De resurrectione mortuorum*, ch. 55, ed. J. G. Ph. Borlefs, *Tertulliani Opera*, pt. 2, Corpus christianorum: series latina (Turnhout: Brepols, 1954), pp. 1001–3. Much thirteenth-century discussion of the resurrection of the body seems to realize that Aristotle’s notions of change present fundamental difficulties. See Nolan, *Giles of Rome*, pp. 76–78.


68. Guibert, *De pignoribus*, bk. 1, PL 156 (Paris, 1853), cols. 611–30. Guibert argues that Mary must have been assumed bodily into heaven, because otherwise the vessel which bore Christ’s body (and by implication then Christ’s body itself) would experience corruption, and such a conclusion would be scandalous; *De pignoribus*, bk. 1, ch. 3, cols. 637–23–24. At the same time, Guibert opposes elaborate coffins which retard decay and thinks corpses should be allowed to return to “mother earth”; ibid., chs. 3–4, cols. 624–30. Clearly decay is a highly charged phenomenon for Guibert. Thus he does not wish cadavers to be disturbed. It would seem to be exactly because he desires bodily resemblance and finds it so counter-intuitive (because putrefaction is, to him, so horrifying) that he seeks such extravagant guarantees that all particles of the body will rise at the Last Judgment.


70. For Guibert’s fascination with the details of bodily torture, see *De pignoribus*, bk. 4, ch. 1, cols. 668–69. Indeed so worried is Guibert about tor-
ture and bodily division that he does not wish to espouse a eucharistic theory that equates the sacrifice of the mass with the crucifixion. Guibert does not wish Christians to be reminded of the dividing of Christ's body; the body on the altar is rather, he argues, the body of the resurrection. See De pignoribus, bk. 2, ch. 6, col. 648; also bk. 3, ch. 2, obj. 6, col. 654.

72. In De pignoribus, bk. 2, ch. 2, cols. 632–34, Guibert argues that if I destroy a fingernail, I claim that I, not merely a part of me, am hurt. We call friends or relatives “ourselves.” How much more is all of Christ included in the me of Qui manducat me (John 6:58)? Those who eat the Eucharist eat the 1283 manuscript, is probably a later interpolation but is fully in the spirit of the other chapters; see Boureau, The Life of Christina the Astonishing, ch. 5, number 36, pars. 47-48, and J. Vrin, 1986), pp. 27-56, gives an interpretation opposed to that of Boureau and Reames. 


76. Bouroue, La Légende dorée, pp. 60–61 and 115–33.

77. On stories of early Christians reassembling the bodies of the martyrs, see below note 101.

78. Of the 153 chapters (many of which tell several stories), 91 chapters treat martyrs; the majority of the martyrs discussed are not merely killed but in some way dismembered. According to my rough count, there are only 6 cases of male saints whose body is preserved intact. According to my rough count, 23 of 24 female martyrs, only 9 of whom, it almost seems as if women’s stories are It is worth noting that Sophia is said to have gathered up the remains of her daughters and buried them, with the help of bystanders; she was then buried with her children. This chapter, not found in the 1283 manuscript, is probably a later interpolation but is fully in the spirit of the other chapters; see Bouroue, La Légende dorée, pp. 27–28.


80. Ibid., pp. 203-4. It is worth noting that Sophia is said to have gathered up the remains of her daughters and buried them, with the help of bystanders; she was then buried with her children. This chapter, not found in the 1283 manuscript, is probably a later interpolation but is fully in the spirit of the other chapters; see Bouroue, La Légende dorée, pp. 27–28.

83. James also uses the seed metaphor in his discussion of the death of the contemporary saint, Peter Martyr; see Legenda aurea, ed. Gräße, p. 262: “Sic granum frumenti cadens in terram et inihilium manibus comprehensum et moerens ubiorem consurgit in spicam, sic botrus in tunicari cal­
catus liquet, sed redunbat in copiam, sic aromata pilo centussa odorom plenius circumfundunt, sic granum sinapis contrum virtutem suas multiplicar demonstravit.” The metaphor was extremely important in the earliest Christian discussions of resurrection; see A. Michel, “Résurrection des morts,” cols. 2515–2520.

84. Bourouze, La Légende dorée, p. 126, makes something of the same point when he emphasizes that the tombs themselves is not the fundamental concern of these passages: “En construisant une échelle des peines, on s’est basé dans la perspective du bourouze, alors que la seule orientation pertinente est celle de la Providence.” Cazelles, Les corps de saintets, pp. 48–61, also stresses that stories of division of saintly bodies tend to underline their non-bodiliness.

85. Another place where the concern with part/whole is present in med­ieval theology and popular practice is in eucharistic doctrine and devotion. For a discussion of the intense emphasis in miracle stories and saints’ lives in the fragmentation (fragmenting) Christ’s body in the wafer, see HFFH, chapter 2. The stress in such stories on the fragmenting of the host is matched by an intense sense that it remains fertile and whole as a symbol of the believer and of the community of the church. For the importance of these themes in late medieval drama, see Leah Sinanoglou, “The Christ Child as Sacrifice: A Medieval Tradition and the Corpus Christi Plays,” Speculum 48 (1973): 461–480.

86. Louis-Vincent Thomas, Le cadavere: de la biologie à l’anthropologie (Bonnard, Éditions complèse, 1980).

87. See note 14 above.

88. Geary, Forta sacra, p. 39, says: “The relics were the saint... they were... the reality symbolized since they referred not beyond themselves but to themselves, as the saint residing among his followers.” See also ibid., p. 162; and Stephen Wilson, “Introduction,” to Saints and Their Cults: Studies in Religious Sociology, Folklore and History, ed. Wilson (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983), p. 11. For certain Greek fathers who said thatouching the bones of the martyrs was participating in their sanctity, see H. Leclercq, “Martyr,” Dictionnaire d’archéologie chri­steene et de liturgie, ed. F. Cabrol and H. Leclercq, vol. 10, pt. 2 (Paris: Letouzey et Ané, 1932), col. 2452. The fifth­century church historian Theodoret tells of a hermit named James who col­lected relics in a casket in order to live, and die, near them; see Leclercq, “Mar­tyr,” col. 2457. Nonetheless it seems significant that medieval texts do not say the bones are the saint and that an awareness of the bones as bones or dust is pervasive in the literature of the Middle Ages. See below n. 91. The point

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I wish to stress is the inconsistency and ambivalence of medieval attitudes.

89. Peter Brown, in The Cult of the Saints: Its Rise and Function in Latin Christi­anity (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1981), has described the assumption, found in older scholarship, that popular and elite attitudes are separate and distinguishable and has delivered trenchant criticism against it.


91. Sermo Petri Venerabilis... in honore sancti illius cuius reliquiae sunt in pyramide, PL 189, cols. 1001–3; reprinted by Giles Constable, in “Petri Venerabilis sermones tres,” Revue bénédictine 64 (1954): 269–70. One can find such expressions all through the Middle Ages. For example, one early epitaph reads: “Nil iuvat, immo gravat, tumulis haerere piorum/ Sanctorum meritis optima virtus prope est...” and another: “Haec tenet urna tum venerandus corpus Vincenti abbatis/ Set tua sacra tenet anima, caeleste sacerdos/ Regnum mutasti in melius cum gaudia/ Corpus tuarum universis circumfundit, sic granum sinapis contrum virtutem suas multiplicar demonstravit.”


102. Eusebius reports this in the same passage where he cites with scorn the Roman conviction that scattering bodies prevents resurrection; he also tells us that the Romans had to post guards to prevent the faithful from stealing the remains to bury them; see *Ecclesiastical History*, bk. 5, ch. 1, vol. 1, pp. 435-37. For stories of early Christians caring for remains, see Hermann-Mascard, *Les Reliques des saints*, pp. 25-26. James of Voragine repeats such stories in *The Golden Legend.*

Many scholars have pointed out that a belief in resurrection tends to emerge in situations of persecution, for adherents want to claim that those who die for the faith will be rewarded in another life with the good fortune they have clearly in some sense been denied in this life. Lionel Rothkrug gives a more profound version of this argument when he suggests that, to Jews of the Maccabean period and to early Christians, resurrection was a substitute for the burial owed to the pious; see Rothkrug, *German Holiness and Western Sacracy* (note 14 above), pp. 215-29. Thus early Christians could concur in the hope of resurrection and yet display intense concern for the remains (relics) of their heroes.

103. For bones inviting their disturbance, see Caesarius of Heisterbach, *Dialogus miraculorum*, dist. 8, chs. 85-87, ed. J. Strange, 2 vols. (Cologne: Böhlau, 1891), vol. 2, pp. 151-55; for resisting, see dist. 8, chs. 53 and 60, vol. 2, pp. 125-26 and 133. To Caesarius, the bones both attract and are not the souls of the ancients. "Many of the souls of the ancients [for instance, the soul of the Roman general] are present in the face, nevertheless they have regard for their bodies, and when they see us de­vote to them, they have much delight in this" (ibid., dist. 8, ch. 87, vol. 2, p. 155) He also tells (Dialogus, ed. Strange, dist. 8, ch. 88, vol. 2, pp. 155-56) of bones which sort themselves out so that the false relics are eliminated.

104. Richard K. Greenstreet indeed seems to have forbidden division of his corpse on his deathbed; see E. A. R. Brown, "Death," p. 227 and 243. Guibert of Nogent in the *De pignoribus* tells several earlier tales which are intended to indicate that relics do not wish to be dismembered; see *De pignoribus*, bk. 1, ch. 4, cols. 626-30.


106. Thomas of Cantimpré, *Supplementum*, ch. 1, pars. 6-7, pp. 574-75. The hairs, which effected two cures, are repeatedly called a "relic." Thomas recounts an occasion or which they came alive for almost a whole hour; ibid., par. 7, p. 575.

107. For Mary of Oignies's teeth, see ibid., ch. 3, par. 14, p. 577. For the incident of the head in the *Life of Barbara*, see Cazelles, *Le corps de sainte*, pp. 55-56.


109. L. Thomas, *Le cadave*, pp. 39-44 and 199; Ariès, *Hour of Our Death*, p. 160. We find in Guibert of Nogent an ambivalence about decay that is characteristic of medieval writers: on the one hand, it is horrible (and therefore cannot touch the bodies of Christ or Mary); on the other hand, it is a return to "mother earth" and should not be inhibited by elaborate coffins. See above note 69.


115. J. G. Bellamy, The Law of Treason in England in the Later Middle Ages (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1970), pp. 9, 13, 20-21, 26, 39, 45-47, 52, and 226-27. As Bellamy points out (ibid., p. 227), historians often know the nature of the crime only from the type of execution inflicted. We know, for example, that a homicide had been adjudged petty treason in fourteenth-century England if the male perpetrator was drawn and hung, or the female perpetrator burned. See also Camporesi, Incorruptible Flesh, pp. 19-24.


117. E. A. R. Brown, "Death"; and Paravicini Bagliani, "Rajeunir au Moyen Âge," and "Ruggero Bacone, Bonifacio VIII e la teoria della 'prolungatio vitae' ."

118. See Bynum, HFHE, pp. 252-53.