16. It was I who was present in each location; as such, my mind was the carrier of one C to the other.

17. i.e., somehow thought to be liftable from the location of its inscription.

18. If interpretation and memorization were the only modes by which C could have been carried forth (thought), then recall, likewise, could only have been addressed in these modes. Under these conditions, recall, itself, becomes a second order quotation; i.e. recall= quoting my initial interpretation (a quotation), or memorization (also a quotation). This suggests possible signal loss (forgetting) and/or possible misquotation.

19. both implicitely and explicitely

20. cf. fn. 19

21. ...unless the pointing, doing, and location were identical. This circumstance is addressed below. Cf. "sameness" in text 3.1, 3.2, 3.3

22. cf. distinguishing features fn. 32 below

23. the interaction between denotation and connotation as well

24. actually assembling a phenomenological view of C from a diversity of contexts.

25. and comparative methods

26. I equate relational observations with epistemology and interactive observations with cognition. Relationships (and therefore, relational observations) are always the case if one observes at all, and thus are trivial. Relational observations do not include interactive ones, while interactive observations necessarily include relational ones.

27. Cf. text (1.2) p.2 last paragraph

28. That this is so does not suggest context can altogether explain (describe) its elements, or be its elements; nor can context be lifted out to describe another element residing elsewhere. Cf. fn. 17.

29. ...or someone who transmitted C to me

30. C was/is reflexive (self-referential) in its first, second, and all instance(s), since it is I who was/am doing the observing, and observations were/are imaged in me. The issue therefore is to what aspect of self does C refer? To quotation, or context; to processing or process; to definition or acquisition; to static, isolated, accumulated information, or dynamic, assembling, continuing unfolding; to epistemology or cognition?

31. in memorium: Heinrich Schenker, 1868-1935

32. If one recognizes distinguishing features, say, between 2 Cs, and/or 2 contexts which include C, and/or 2 C-elaborations, then such may be described as contradictions of one by the other, and not joinings (as in classifying).

33. ...unless, of course, the analytic system and its description are inferred from actual context. If so, then analytic systems are also contextual (context-dependent), and cannot be compared.

34. C...IS was first read in an advanced analysis class at the U.of Illinois in the spring of 1968. It was revised in January 1969. There also exists an unpublished performance version, ...paraphrased and much reduced, entitled: Generalization II, given at UCSD in 1972 in the context of a Schenker analysis course.

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KENNETH GABURO

PAPER: 1964-

The Beauty of Irrelevant Music

→ C, ... IS

MURMUR

EXTRACTION

a NON-SGATOLOGICAL SET of PRELIMINARY REMARKS for NMCE IV

THE MUSIC IN SAMUEL BECKETT'S:

PLAY 1974-

(C)...IS

Kenneth Gaburo
1968- 1969

In so far as I currently am able to conceptualize: (C), taking some expression: C, to be an element of music,   I submit:

   (1.1) Initially: I acquired its sign (i.e., C could not have been self-evident); I acquired language for its recognition and its description, presumably sufficient to the moment of its acquisition (i.e., C was some C, and in this instance, an only one); its description was provided me by, and in the language of someone else (i.e., C was given as memorized, interpreted, or translated); C's sign, when received, was in some notation (i.e., C was exampled/sampled).

I do not argue whether C existed prior to this acquisition, for I would not have been able to observe it unless it was available. Nor do I argue for my existence, since C would not have been able to signal me unless I was available. I argue only about what could possibly have been done with and to C once received. I submit:

   (1.2) In that first instance, someone's language (literally someone's C-sign/language), became 'assumed' by me. By assumed, I intend: either I memorized[1] or interpreted[2] the C-sign/language of another[3]. If memorized, then C was not mine but a quoted/quotable C. If interpreted, then C became mine as-if self-initiated[4].

In either case, however, could this acquired knowledge about C[5] yet have anything to do with cognition of C[6]? I doubt it since pedagogues, especially, have generally neither been sufficiently attentive to the complex network of referents and interactions involved in the description of signs, nor instructive about the contexts in which they reside[7].

Herein, such description is considered to be context-dependent and cognitive only if it exhibits denotative, connotative and reflexive language.

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In the general absence of the above conditions, taken as a whole, we observe, but: acquire knowledge mostly by denotation; perpetuate denotation by formulating denotative language; our language suggests that we are not part of that to which we point; regard signs as "objects" and by language attempt to "objectify" them[8]. Given the likely presence of this limited (and limiting) kind of description, it is probable that C, when first instanced was transmitted and assumed as an item, ...a lexical entity, ...a definition. As such, C was a matter of someone's hear/say and was carried forth in this light.

But, what could have caused (prompted, provoked) me to not simply memorize, or interpret the first C as an item (object) lifted (divorced) from context? I doubt anything would have unless by some happenstance, necessity, or sense of inquiry I, or someone, noted its linkage and dependency on context for any description of it. Had such been the case I might have asked, or been asked: "Imagine, by any means: (C), taking an expression: C, to be an element of music[9]":

        e.g., imagine C by: placing it on a staff (e.g., giving it note significance); referring to it as a frequency (e.g., 525.25 hz); describing its tonicity (e.g., in the scale of C major); calling forth its letter name: 'C'; noting it as a fifth of an F-chord; considering it as the key of Mozart's Jupiter; locating it as the 7th p.c. of a 12-tone set; regarding it as a weighted tendency in Stravinsky's Symphony of Psalms; articulating middle C on some piano; hearing it on some 'Cello's C-string.

To do so would be to imagine C in some context in each instance, or to imagine nothing at all [10]. E.G.: if C could be lifted from some 'Cello's C-string (as-if to objectify it), then exactly what would its nature be? Or, to put it another way: what would be left in the location of some 'Cello's C-string if C could be so-lifted from it? Or: what would there be of some 'Cello C-string which is referable; e.g., how could it refer to, (describe), some piano's middle C? (I think it could not).

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Could some 'Cello's C-string even be a sign for some piano's middle C? (I also think not, since its sign is intrinsically linked to the very location which exhibits it[11]).

Thus, to describe any C denotatively (as-if a lexical item in some location), or analagously (as-if transportable to some other location), or abstractly (as-if an entity without location), or subtractly (as-if a self-contained "whole" within any location) is impossible, although we speak so all of the time. I submit:

(1.3) Consider C in the light of so-called: "Common Practice[12]"; "Commonality"; "Cadential Formulae"; "Expectations"; "Scales"; "Tuning Systems"; "Tonality"; "Atonality"; "Functional Harmony"; "Romantic Music"; "Standardized Notation"; ...et alia.

NOTATION ONE

For an observation (say: looking at C) and
its description (say: C-language) to be
interactive (knowledge of something) and not
merely relational (knowledge about something),
contextual states (conditions) of C must
necessarily be noted: (1) within, between, a-
mong members of a location; and (2) within,
between, among members and that location.

****

But what could C have been like when I observed it a second time[13]? In so far as I currently am able to conceptualize: (C), taking some expression: C, to be an element of music, I submit:

(2.1) Secondly: I recognized its sign (i.e., C could not have been self-evident; I acquired language by its recognition and its description, presumably sufficient to the second acquisition (i.e., C was some C, but now not an only one); its description was provided me by, and in the language of someone, (i.e., C was given as memorized, interpreted, translated)[14]; C's sign, when received, was in some notation (i.e., C was exampled/sampled).

-3-

The above conditions were so whether the C-sign/language came to me via: a describer acting in place of, or in conjunction with, an inscription; an inscription[15]. But what could possibly have been done with and to the second C once received?   I submit:

(2.2)   In that second instance someone's language (literally: another C-sign/language) became 'assumed' by me, since the viewing of the first and second C took place in my mind which imaged both[16]. By assumed, I intend either the first (memorized or interpreted) C became a displaced (lifted) C[17] as I brought it to my viewing of the second (memorized or interpreted) C[18], or the other way around.

In either case each C would have been quoted or interpreted in the light of the other. Neither would have been described uniquely with regard to what each was (denotation)[19], AND what each was actually doing (connotation)[20] in its respective location[21]. In the absence of these thoughts, the main difference between the first and second C-acquisition was the direction of the recognition maneuver (first-to-second; second-to-first). As such, the second C would likely be carried forth as was the first.

But what would have caused (prompted, provoked) me to not simply memorize or interpret the second C as an item (object) lifted (divorced) from context? I doubt anything would have unless by some happenstance, necessity, or sense of inquiry I, or someone, noted at least one distinguishing feature, contextually inferred, between the two[22]. Had such been the case I might have asked, or been asked: "Consider by any means: (C), taking some expression: C, to be an element of music":

e.g., consider:

(1) What is some (first) C doing in the location
of some other (second) C, (if anything)? (2) What
is some (second) C doing in the location of some
other (first) C, (if anything)? (3) What is some
second C doing in its location? (4) What is some
first C doing in its location? (5) Have I acquir-
ed two Cs, each in its location (thus 2 locations);

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or one C instanced twice (thus one location)?
(6) Do I consider what I do with/to some C
once signalled, and what some C does with/to
me once called? (7) Does this new instance of
some C help me to transform, expand, change
my formerly-held view of (C)?   (8) Is either
C: the C; my C; your C; someone's C; C's C?

If I did not reflect on such matters, I would again have been:
operating on C denotatively, ...out-of-context (so-to-speak:
processing C); adding another item to my lexicon, ...out-of-
context (so-to-speak: calling it a fact); furthering my defini-
tion, ...out-of-context (so-to-speak: classifying C as (C)).

If I did reflect on such matters, I would at least have been oper-
ating on each C denotatively and connotatively, ...and to this ex-
tent, interactively[23]: ...so-to-speak, involving myself in the pro-
cess of C's unfolding; accumulating knowledge of C (calling neither
the C); furthering my awareness of (C)[24]. To further stress the
necessity for contextual assessment, I submit:

   (2.3)   Recognition of C a second time was linked by some
familiarity with its sign, otherwise it would not have been possible
to recognize it at all.

Recognition, however, is a measure of some degree of redundancy (say:
between two Cs). But, since aspects of either may appear non-redun-
dant, those which are may be referred to as constants, those which
are not as variables. The relation between constants and variables
allow for predictions (if-then), which in turn link with expectations
and probabilities (also if-then). If-then outcomes verify (or do not)
that which is, weighed against that which was. The linear attributes
of this network:

          ...familiarity, recognition, constants, variables,
          predictions, expectations, probabilities,
          verifications,

describe the features of a particular analytic system which implies,
certainly at its most vigorous level, contextual assessment. However,

I think it does not take context into account fully enough because
the uniform operation between any attributes of the above network
is comparison[25]. And, comparisons, at any level, are, in them-
selves, displacement (lift-out) operations. E.G., today's C in the
light of yesterday's C. As such, comparisons are intimately in-
volved with quotation and interpretation. E.G., yesterday's C is a
quote if it appears in the context of viewing today's C.

At best the above network, when applied, describes systems of
relations not systems of interactions[26]:

               e.g.: noted variables about 2 given Cs
          do not describe (C)'s variability (as in the
          case of performance); collected familiarity
          with 2 Cs cannot provide a description for one
          of them, even if one is instanced twice (as in
          the case of instant replay); desired expectations
          (a sense which resides in the mind), cannot be
          mapped onto a given C with regard to how it is,
          what it is doing, or what some C may be like in a
          future encounter (is there any sense in asking:
          what does C expect?); assumed predictions, based
          on observed Cs, cannot be generators for how, why
          or where some next context may need C's presence
          (as in locations noted by its absence); et alia.

Thus: if C as an attribute of some context cannot be lifted from it[27],
how could some context be lifted from its C? Or, to put it another
way: what would be left if some context which included C could be so
lifted? Or: what would there be of some 'Cello's C-string (without C)
which could refer to (describe) some piano's middle C (without C)?
(I think nothing). Could one even be a sign for the other? (I think
not, since context is intrinsically linked to the elements which it
includes[28]).

By the foregoing I suggest it was not C (say in its second instance)
which was redundant, but the means by which C, in each case, was
assessed. However, the means were within me because it was I who was
doing the comparing, interpreting, memorizing and not the 2 Cs[29].

Further, it was C's actual presence in the initial instance, but my quotation of it which caused C to be familiar in the second instance. At the same time, it was I who was present in both instances. But did familiarity with myself have anything to do with what each C was doing? Could it be that the very process of C's unfolding, along a line of unlimited distinctions, was already being subverted by my means?

NOTATION TWO

Contexts consist of the influence of context on membership, and membership on context,... where members are also contexts and contexts also members.

****

In so far as I currently am able to conceptualize: (C), taking some expression: C, to be an element of music, I submit:

(3.1) Now: There are numerous compositions in C of which Mozart's Jupiter is one. I take it that Jupiter consists of Mozart's hearing of C, and may, may not, or may not yet be my hearing of Mozart's C; although certainly, if I hear at all, Jupiter will be my hearing. On the other hand, my hearing, although self-referential (reflexive)[30] insofar as I maintain a domain of interactions with C, cannot explain Mozart's domain of interactions with C; although Jupiter maintains its domain of interactions which presumably are "Mozart's". That is: I cannot explain my hearing of Jupiter as Mozart's, nor could he explain mine. Thus, Mozart's C, by way of Jupiter, may only further provoke (C)'s unfolding in me. Given these conditions it is clear that no reductionist position concerning (C) is tenable.

Moreover: my acquired Jupiter-C cannot verify previously acquired Cs, since contexts cannot verify contexts. E.G., the Jupiter-C in my head does not verify Beethoven's First Symphony-C also located there. Neither can these works verify each other in their respective locations since the one is unable to observe the other, (they cannot even 'stare' at each other). All I am able to do is interact with each, and then, via some

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inferential-analytical system, describe the interactions. I note the contexts and assess that each speaks for itself as do I for myself. One cannot represent another. To observe thusly, ...including the actual circumstance of the observation, is to put the whole question of (C) in a phenomenological domain.

(3.2) Now: In my analytic experience part of each C's uniqueness is due to its articulation by non-C attending elements (e.g. C's dominant in the case of Mozart's Jupiter). Thus, concomitant with (C)'s own variability is the variability of those elements which attend it, ...elaborations[31] of (C) which also appear to be infinitely varying. If elaborations of a C influence our perception of its very nature how can such be referred to except as: another C? When could C be a same (reducible) C? If a C cannot be separated from its context, and its context cannot be separated from itself, how can C's elaboration(s) be separated from either one[32]?

(3.3) Now: To refer (C) to self (reflexive) involves not the same thought process as that which generates notions of self-evidence. How one proceeds from a sense of knowledge as a matter of 'assumed' self-evidence (which presumes to exclude self from context), to a sense of cognition as a matter of self-reference (which presumes to include self in context), involves, among other things, a radical shift in the means by which one acquires a view of any C. Before a view of (C) can be expanded, certain conceptualizations of how to view (address) each C must be changed. I submit:

(a) Cognition of (C) consists of an assemblage of each instance of C, contextually, ...each another view of (C). Since meaning takes place in the mind, cognition of (C), also located there, becomes the context for a (or any) meaning of (C), but never the meaning, and not for (C). An assembled view of (C) is a metaphoric (C).

(b) (C) needs to be regarded as a subject in which ones resides and not an object to which one points.

(c) Each C-acquisition: (1) reverses, alters, transforms, changes formerly-held notions of: (C), or: (2) adds itself to formerly

-8-

acquired Cs. The latter would be lexical and perceptive, the former would be conceptual and cognitive.

(d) It makes no sense to bring forth previously acquired Cs, or analytic systems, as experiential 'determinants' for the assessment of a C currently being observed. To do so (whether needed or not), could seriously bias acquisition of any unique state(s) which a current C may possess. In this it makes more sense to re-gard any C under observation as-if a first instanced one. Once a current C has been substantially assessed, recursive analyses of previously acquired C-contexts become valid and necessary.

(e) (C) as a phenomenological system is not extendible by lexi-cal addition, but expandable within its system, taken as a whole, including aspects which are simply not-yet known.

(f) If each C is acquired, am I always to be dependant on a language of another for each not-yet known C? Can I imagine C in a context not-yet known? If so such a condition would be described as: compositional.

<div align="center">NOTATION THREE</div>

Environmental systems as well as their attributes (members) can only describe themselves, taken as a whole, each to the other. Analytic systems (form-ed elsewhere) which attempt to link environments actually only describe themselves. The one cannot be used to describe the other33.

<div align="center">**************</div>

In so far as I currently am able to conceptualize: (C), taking the expression: C, to be some element of music, I submit:

(4.1) C...IS. So what, and now what34?

<div align="right">Kenneth Gaburo
Urbana - La Jolla</div>

1. memorized= literal

2. interpreted= non-literal (e.g. paraphrase

3. I doubt I could have translated the C-sign/language in this instance since I neither had sufficient knowledge of the describer's language nor had acquired of my own to do so. In any event, I now make a distinction, however fussy, between language as memorized, and as translated.

4. but also quotable

5. About: on all sides, around, out, outside, in circuit, here and there, almost, approximately, near, vicinity

6. Of: from, derivation, source, cause, motive, reason, made, filled, formed with, extent, distinguished by, belonging to or separated from, connected with

7. Herein the expression: Context, is used interchangeably with location/environment.

8. Contexts, however, are not simply "there", as we describe signs we observe with-in them. The presence of context must also be observed. The process of acquiring knowledge of it is a necessary condition for the description of its sign(s). Contextuality includes, but is not reducible to denotation. The crux of the pre-sent argument rests on distinctions between 'subject-dependent' and 'subject-independent observations. That is: even though I am dependent on something in order to observe (i.e. the observed), I am also independent of it in the sense that my mind is where observations take place and are considered. However, if there is to be any consistency between what is there (to be observed), and what I describe (of the observed) both the observer (I) and the observed (it) must be included in my description. To do so would be to put the observation in a subject (I) - subject dependent (IT/I) domain, and not a subject (I) - subject independent (=object: I/not IT) domain. Since I do not think the latter is poss-ible, I am unable to admit the term: object in any discussion concerning cognition.

9. Note: C is already contextual.

10. i.e., the context to which the imagined C refers and of which it is a member.

11. i.e., to within its context. That a C-sign is a necessary attribute of and in some location however, should not suggest that it can altogether describe the location, or be the location any more than it can be lifted out to describe another location.

12. e.g., in what sense is the C in the opening measures of Beethoven's First Symphony in common practice with the opening measures of Mozart's Jupiter Symphony even though the term: "common practice" presumably includes each? If one is an example of common practice then the other cannot be since, in every respect, each C main-tains its own integrity and not the other's.

13. I assume unawareness of its context-relatedness although the mere 'calling forth' of the acquired C-sign is/was contextual; i.e. recognition as a state is, in itself contextual.

14. i.e., someone else or self; cf. fn. 3 above.

15. i.e.: (a) someone initiated action and placed an inscription somewhere; ...it did not inscribe itself; (b) a second instance could have been my recursion to the first instance.