

---kenneth gaburo:
WHOLE LANGUAGE LANGUAGE¹

BRAIN:

**... HALF
A
WHOLE²**

SR projection 1

It
may at least be said
that concerns about the brain
have been operative from Hippocrates
to the present time.



SL projection 2

The brain is a double organ: ---a cerebrum consisting of two symmetrical halves, designated as the Right and Left Hemispheres. These hemispheres are connected by an isthmus of nerve tissues,---the corpus callosum and other commissures.

Various historic views of brain function have generally hinged on the following two conceptualizations:

- (1) We possess one brain with two *distinct*³ halves: i.e., a duality, with the halves acting more or less *independently*⁴.
- (2) We possess one brain with two halves acting more or less *synchronously*.

A third view was advanced more recently⁵. It was discovered that when the connecting fibres between the two hemispheres of the cerebrum were cut (cerebral commissurotomy), each hemisphere functioned as-if it were a complete brain. This observation led to one current question:

- (3) Does cerebral commissurotomy produce a splitting

or a doubling of the mind⁶?

Brain descriptions depend on observations with regard to capacities which the hemispheres exhibit. An extraordinary amount of such information is based on observed lesions, ---that is, on brain damage to either the left, right, or both hemispheres, which cause humans to exhibit certain dysfunctions (disturbances) when contrasted with humans without lesions. This kind of observation has led to rigorous analysis, now generally referred to as *lateralization*⁷, as well as lateral *specialization*⁸, of brain functions. In sum:

Do functions exist in the right hemisphere, the left hemisphere, or both?

Concerns for lateral specialization, ---in particular, of the left hemisphere, are of recent origin. They appear to have been initiated around 1874 when dysphasia⁹ was postulated as a left hemispheric symptom. Jackson says:

"Not long ago, few doubted the brain to be double in function as well as physically bilateral; but now that it is certain...that damage to one lateral half can make a man entirely speechless, the former view is disputed...(It is) supposed that but one half of the brain---the left in the vast majority of people --- is educated in words¹⁰."

And so, ---given a culture caught up in rational thought and the power of the word; ---and, given the social disabilities of the dysphasic which were "so much more obvious than the defects of right hemispheric lesions¹¹", it turns out that focus, almost immediately, was put on the left hemisphere. Moreover, overwhelming support for this direction was provided by observations that the left and right hemispheres cross-function, such that left hemispheric outputs control the right side of the body, and right hemispheric outputs control the left side of the body¹². Cunningham says:

"It thus comes about that the left cerebral hemisphere controls and regulates the muscles of the right side, and its *functional superiority* over the right hemisphere is indicated by the *sub-servient* position which the left hand holds with reference to the right¹³."

Strong & Elwyn say:

"In man the *higher* cortical functions are vested principally in one cerebral hemisphere, the left one in right-handed individuals, ...the *dominant* hemisphere...lesions of the *other* hemisphere producing as a rule no recognizable disturbances¹⁴."

As functions were observed and lateralized, so were descriptive terminologies formulated. The following list of pairings spans from 1864 to the present¹⁵:

TABLE 16

	<i>left</i>	<i>right</i>
1864	Expression	Perception
1874	Audito-articular	Retino-ocular
1876	Propositionizing	Visual imagery
1935	Linguistic	Visual or kinesthetic
1951	Storage	Executive
1951	Symbolic or propositional	Visual or imaginative
1952	Education of relations (abstract reasoning)	Education of correlates (analogic reasoning)
1958	Verbal	Perceptual or non-verbal
1960	Discrete	Diffuse
1961	Symbolic	Visuospatial
1963	Linguistic	Pre-verbal
1965	Verbal	Visuospatial
1968	Logical or analytic	Synthetic perceptual
1969	Propositional	Appositional
1976	Parts	Whole
1977	Language	Non-language

Concomitant with these investitures comes the expression: *cerebral dominance*. However, this expression does not, as one might informally assume, refer to the whole mind/body connection (thereby giving heirarchical weight to the brain as our central control system), but, contrarily, almost always refers to the left hemisphere, per se. I submit:

THERE IS SOMETHING EXTRAORDINARILY PEJORATIVE IN THE USE OF DESCRIPTIVE LANGUAGE WITH REGARD TO LEFT/RIGHT HEMISPHERIC ACTIVITY.

Following are further extractions taken from responsible scientific literature:

"The hemisphere which controls handedness, expression, and comprehension, is known as the *dominant hemisphere*¹⁷."

"The right hemisphere assumes a *compensatory* role following left hemispheric lesions¹⁸."

"In every case the right hemisphere shows a manifest *inferiority* when compared with the left, and plays an *automatic* role only¹⁹."

"The right hemisphere is probably a *regressing* organ²⁰."

"The data indicate that the *mute, minor* hemisphere is *specialized* for Gestalt preception²¹, being primarily a synthesist in dealing with information input. The speaking *major* hemisphere, in contrast seems to operate in a more logical, analytic, computerlike fashion, ... The findings suggest that a possible reason for cerebral lateralization in man is basic *incompatibility* of language functions on the one hand and synthetic perceptual functions on the other²²."

Descriptions such as these, no matter how seemingly transformed by current inquiry, continue to resonate all about me. Neither are they only minimally pejorative and astonishingly naive with respect to the brain, per se, ---especially since the assumptions to which they also refer are made in the *absence* of rigorous right hemispheric analysis²³; nor are they only maximally evident and complexly biased in and by that larger domain commonly referred to as our "culture²⁴"; but also, I, for one, am frequently debilitated by the immensity of those collected thoughts which, by their practitioners localize (reduce) *linguistics/language essentially within the left*, and *music/art essentially within the right*. This is so even when the practitioners are well-wishers. Desmedt says:


"Because speech is such a salient feature of human culture, this fact led to the view of the *absolute superiority* of the left hemisphere. This concept of cerebral dominance now appears to be misleading and recent *data* increasingly document the *apparently* major role of the right, *non-language*, hemisphere for several non-verbal cognitive functions ... such as the perception of melodies ...²⁵."

Wertheim says:

"It has been asserted that there is a wide relation between the musical function and speech. As a matter of fact, music is completely different from speech: whilst speech is a *precise* symbolic system, the 'contents' of music are *vague* and subject to interpretation²⁶."

I submit:

I AM NOT
AMUSED²⁷.



SL projection 3

Furthermore,
of music has been so localized, has been so to within *brain*, and *not*,
---almost *never* not, to within *music*²⁸. what
(of Ravel who
suffered left
hemispheric
Aphasia²⁹),
Alajouanine says:

"... (his) analytic recognition of musical notation, and playing the piano to sight were grossly disabled; ... (his) melodic, rhythmic, and stylistic *sense* were unimpaired, ... (his) playing or singing from memory were largely retained: ... although *all* artistic realization is *forbidden*, his artistic sensibility does not seem to be in the least altered³⁰."

Given observations, assumptions, and assessments, such as the
foregoing, I submit:

Either I have been provided with a functioning brain-description for music by which I may presumably proceed with impunity, or
I might seriously ask:

What, ---of MUSIC, ---and of BRAIN, ---to say
nothing of MIND, could possibly be preserved
or advanced by such descriptions?



SL projection 4

**WORST
CASES :**

...ACTUAL

SR projection 5

---But we need descriptive language.
If it is true, as Humberto Maturana
suggests:

"Anything said is said by an observer, ... (and)
to an observer³¹,"

---then

descriptive language *says* what is said. Unless we acquire descrip-
tive language in order to *view* descriptive language, we are
ultimately left with the issue of self-evidence, e.g.:

In what sense would *corporeality*, as it is contextually
operative within Partch's *Revelations*, be self-evident
without cognition of both the word and its conceptual
description?

In what sense could a freshman theory student of WOES,
(parenthetically, the expression: WOE, I assure you, *is*
a proper name), ---without cognition of both the word
and its merest description, locate an augmented sixth
chord, or recognize one, if only told: "On this page
is an example of an augmented sixth chord; find it!"?

In what sense can self-education
ever find anything?

In what sense can self-education
ever lead to self-discovery? ---
unless, of course, it could be
said:

"All of *that* is self-evident".

---Still, (even
though I don't believe it for a
moment), I *could* say:

"I may be self-evident, and
the observed *may* be self-evident",


---but, I could not possibly say:

"*We* are self-evident, each to
the other";

---unless, of course, it could be
said that cognition is operative
when reduced to a state of *signs*
looking at signs.

(Unfortunately, I cannot even say
that without invoking descrip-
tive language.) And so,
it is not trivial to ask:

CAN A DESCRIPTIVE LANGUAGE
EXIST *without* DESCRIPTIVE
LANGUAGE?



Actually, the issue is neither do I, or do I not need descriptive language, (as-if I could ever do anything about that); ---nor is the issue resolved by asking: "What IS descriptive language?", (as-if the descriptive language necessary to answer the question could do so without corrupting definition by its own terminology); ---but the issue is:

ON WHAT DOES *a* DESCRIPTION *of*
DESCRIPTIVE LANGUAGE DEPEND?

---precisely:

On WHAT does it depend, and on
what does IT depend?; ---the
one,

---and the other,

---on each side³².

Following are some notions:

Descriptive language, on either side, depends on its *make-up*, (---that is: on its *structure*); on its *acquisition*, (---that is: on its *procedures*); and on its *functions*³³, (---that is:

- 1) is descriptive language the language of *an* observer?; ---if so, I describe it as: *interpretive* function.
- 2) is descriptive language the language of *the* observed?; ---if so, I describe it as: *translational* function.
- 3) is descriptive language the language of the observer *and* the observed?; ---if so, I describe it as: *intrinsic* function.
- 4) is descriptive language *neither* the language of the observer *nor* the observed?; ---if so, I describe it as: *articulative* function; ((---but, no-one merely mutters!)))³⁴.

I think each and every descriptive utterance involves the above language states, and depends on them. Thus, these states may be referred to as conditions *of* descriptive language, and conditions which *exhibit* descriptive language.

But, exhibited conditions may be described as *actual* or *potential*. As

potential, descriptive languages require actuation in order to be fulfilled; as actual, descriptive languages become fulfilled. Moreover, conversion from one state to the other requires a switch. A switch could be you, me, you and me, or neither of us. However, each time a switch *is* activated, ---a switch which converts potential descriptive language into actual descriptive language, we find ourselves *in* some particular location. That location may be described as *contextual*, or, if you like,---environmental. I submit:

LANGUAGE IS CONTEXT-BOUND, AND
CONTEXT IS LANGUAGE-BOUND.

In the unfolding of this paper, I shall elaborate this statement.



SL projection 7

It might be difficult to see an issue here, precisely because we carry an extraordinary amount of language around with us. In every situation³⁵, as we *view* it, we are in a state of *superabundant* language with regard to the language of that particular situation. This is not to say that a particular situation is not superabundant with respect to its language:

SUPERABUNDANT LANGUAGE FACES
SUPERABUNDANT LANGUAGE.

Perhaps it would be nice if psychologists could resolve this condition by providing us with an operational language which would *flawlessly* map each and every linguistic stimulus into appropriate response, under each and every condition. But, alas, in the absence of such operational language, ---and in contemplation of the absolute sterility of such refinement, I submit that language, itself, would disallow it!

But, there *are* actual situations, surely experienced by each of us, in which our superabundance fails. I refer to those conditions in which superabundant language *cannot* produce *intrinsic* language. Remember, an intrinsic language is one which includes the language of the observer *and* the observed. I put focus on this particular condition because superabundance can always produce interpretive,

articulative language, and almost-always can produce translational language.

However, in those contexts where intrinsic language is inoperative, it is not the failure or inadequacy of language which is disabling, but the *absence* of necessary and sufficient intrinsic language which is. The lack of intrinsic language, I shall refer to as lack of *appropriate* language, and the environment which gives rise to the condition as: *worst-case*. Still, ---in worst case, it remains to be seen whether appropriate language will have resided in an observer's superabundant language after all, or whether the context, which gave rise to the question says: it must be acquired.



SL projection 8

Recently, I had occasion to meet with a linguist at Salk Institute, ---an insightful person with regard to sign language, ---the language of deaf-mutes. During a lively discussion, Ella Mae³⁶ entered the room and sat down with us. Ursula³⁷ introduced Ella Mae to me, commenting that she was a deaf-mute.

I *verbalized*: "hello".

Ella Mae *signed*: "hello".

Ursula then commented:

"Ella Mae is working on certain problems having to do with the structure of sign-language poetry, and she is an actress as well."

I verbally expressed great interest.

Ella Mae answered in sign.

I had many questions,

and thought:

"Now what do I do?", ---"I cannot sign,
cannot read lips, but can speak; Ella
Mae can sign, can read lips, but can-
not speak." Still,

there were certain other bi-directional linguistic modes available:


- 1) We could write notes (which we did);
- 2) We could point (which we did);
- 3) We could engage in an assortment of sensorial, kinetic languages (which we did not do since most seemed too intimate at the time).

And so, the available modes proved extraordinarily inappropriate. We literally faced each other with worst-case languages. We both pressed a switch. The switch was Ursula. But Ursula faced a different contextual problem:

Variously, her descriptions were clearly those of an observer, (i.e., she *interpreted*); of the observed, (i.e., she *translated*); of neither the observer nor the observed, (i.e., she *articulated*).

We all faced worst-case languages. Our collective superabundance failed us. And: we knew it! Ella Mae finally asked me if I wanted to learn to sign. I did not ask Ella Mae if she wanted to learn to speak. Instead I said: "Yes".

Ursula commented: "It was a beginning".



But, superabundant language, when not faced by actual worst-cases, allows for all sorts of things. Here are some:

- 1) *familiarity* (one can indulge in it, and be indulged by it);
- 2) *fuzziness* (one can get away with it);
- 3) *precision* (one can *not* get away with it).

At the same time, it is my observation that I need superabundant language in order to take *any* first step. As well, ---unless I am deceived in and by its very existence, superabundant language, ---when faced by actual worst-case contexts reminds me, not of its *un-necessity*, but of its *insufficiency*. When it does *that*, it should also remind me of another, ---perhaps self-forgotten language: the language of *admission*. Can I admit that I don't have *enough* language, ---that is, not quite ---yet?

(Beckett says: "never admit"!)



SL projection 10

I conclude this section with the following:

- 1) Actual worst-case contexts give rise to the observation that they *are* worst-case.
- 2) Actual worst-case contexts *evidence* conditions which describe what *could* be done in order to acquire appropriate language.

- 3) Actual worst-case problematics can only be resolved *in*, and *by* the conditions of that context which generated them. To not do so is to deny the influence of context on membership, and membership on context³⁸.

BRAIN:

**...A
ONE-
SIDED
WHOLE**

SR projection 12



SR projection 11

In a bulletin of the Los Angeles Neurological Society, an article:

The Other Side of the Brain: An Oppositional Mind, may be found.


In it, the author is particularly careful in his choice of the word:

"*Oppositional*", as a class-characterization of Right Hemispheric functions.

Bogen says:

"We would do well therefore to choose *arbitrarily* a word, *homologous* in structure with the word '*propositional*'³⁹ but sufficiently *ambiguous* to permit *provisional* use. For example, we can say that the right hemisphere has a highly developed '*oppositional*' capacity. This term implies a capacity for apposing or comparing of perceptions, schemas, engrams, etc., but has in addition the virtue that it implies *very little else*."

I agree that a word, ---any word, in its isolated state implies very little. However, even single word utterances are never completely non-implicative, neutral, or context-free. Assuming the merest recognition, any single word utterance is *action-directed*. If a direction is not supplied, we will, in our thought, supply one⁴⁰:



BORE

BUT, when one intentionally directs a particular term, such as "appositional" to some designated location, ---for instance: the Right Hemisphere, a potentially loaded contextual spark is initiated. In the above description, the following actualities obtain:

- 1) The expressions: "propositional/appositional", are each respectively directed to lateralized hemispheric functions of which (for instance) linguistics is left, and music is right. If the respective hemispheres are propositional/appositional, then linguistics and music are; i.e., they, somehow, *do not* exhibit the same structure.
- 2) The expression: "homologous", is directed to both class-expressions: appositional and propositional. If the hemispheres are homologous, then linguistics and music are; i.e., they, somehow, *do* exhibit the same structure.

Given these resonances, I doubt that anyone would wish to maintain the notion that the term: "appositional", has the virtue of implying "very little else".



SL projection 14

The recent history of refining terminology, presumably in order to more rigorously characterize brain functions, is not, however, due to any substantial increase in appropriate language acquisition. In the absence of such, class-terminology is substituted by class-terminology; models are substituted by models.

We are inundated.

Such procedures, too, may be described as superabundant. Moreover, the extent to which appropriate language may be *absent* within any context is the extent to which *language* may be described as *dys-functional*.



SL projection 15

Quite recently, a psychologist/linguist advanced the term: [*part*] as a substitute for propositional, and the term: [*whole*] as a substitute for appositional, via the same claim that they are homologous to within left/right hemispheric functions. Tom⁴¹, with a certain logic, suggested that these substitutions are to be regarded, not only as more "appropriate", or more "controversial", ---but as more "radical" departures from current terminological brain-thinking.

(parenthetically, I agree that the mere substitution of any class-term, by another, changes *sensibility* to within context; ---for instance:

RH= appositional (music)
RH= whole (music)

;---but, I do not agree that Tom's terms clarify or characterize any better. However, they *do* classify, and they do *involve* us in the issue of action-directed words.)


I carried these thoughts in my head as I listened to Tom elaborate . His parts/whole distinction, ---certainly with reference to music, seemed to rest on a distinction between *melody* and *chord*. Tom placed melody in the *left* hemisphere, ---presumably because it is linear, i.e.: *parts*, (---and linearity appears to be a function of left hemispheric activity).

(parenthetically, in order to accept *that* localization, I had to dismiss a neurological position which localizes melody in the *right* hemisphere as evidenced by patients with left-hemispheric lesions⁴².)

Tom placed chord in the *right* hemisphere,---presumably because it is non-linear, i.e.: *whole*, (---and non-linearity, in the sense of

gestalt, appears to be a function of right hemispheric activity.

Notwithstanding my difficulty with assigning conceptual term: [part] to *half* a brain, and conceptual term: [whole] to *half* a brain, and notwithstanding that Tom assigned music to *within* brain, (---referring to brain functions as "behavioral"), but not brain to *within* music, (---I suppose I could regard music functions as 'behaviors'), ---when provided with an opportunity, I asked: "Where would the sense of *whole* reside if I were to consider chord, contextually, as *verticalized* melody, and *part* reside if I were to consider melody as *horizontalized* chord?" Tom smiled knowingly, and began looking for another question. For the hell-uv-it, I persisted, rephrasing mine: (I quote myself): "quote: In what manner can you describe *whole*, aside from merely articulating the sign: whole, which will *not* refer as well, to its parts?; ---AND, in what manner can you describe *part* aside from merely articulating the sign: part, which will *not* refer as well, to its whole? (I un-quote myself)." Un-quote. To these Tom responded: "You sound like an Aristotelean". In the sense that his response could have been a partial answer to my question, ---and not a dismissal, I answered: "But I am ---Aristotle".



SL projection 16

It would be easy enough to suggest that the problematic is lack of information, e.g.: I lack neurological information, and the neurologist lacks musical information. (If we could only exchange roles for awhile.)

Perhaps it is that simple.

But, I argue that the issue is lack of focus, awareness, and attention to what language, itself, is *doing* as it describes and addresses particular contexts.

Further, it would be easy enough to suggest that the problematic is terminological (if we could only find the *right* word), or logical, (what do we replace syllogistic reasoning by?).

Perhaps it is that simple.

But, I argue that the issue is lack of focus, awareness, and attention to what language, itself, *is* doing as it describes⁴³ and addresses particular contexts. From a large number of language dysfunctions I shall refer to two: ---they are *means* and *word-processing*. By the former I do not intend: meaning, ---by the latter I do not intend: process. I submit:

MEANS:

---Bogen says:

"(a) We recognize that the lateralization

of higher functions is *not invariable*, (b) ---there have been reports in which a unilateral lesion disturbs *both* propositional and appositional functions. (c) *But we must not permit the rich diversity of natural phenomenon to obscure our recognition of the common and representative types*⁴⁴."

---Thus in one and the same language-location exists an action-directed linguistic *clue* which cries for a context, cf. (a) above; an *insight* by which the clue could be fulfilled, cf. (b); and a *rule* which takes away the clue and the insight, cf. (c).

LANGUAGE FUNCTIONS AS MEANS.

WORD-PROCESSING:

---Bogen says:

"We would do well ... to choose *arbitrarily* a word, homologous ... with the word 'propositional' but sufficiently *ambiguous* to permit *provisional* use ... If it is correct that the right hemisphere excels in capacities as yet unknown to us, the *full meaning* of 'appositional' will emerge as these capacities are further studied and understood⁴⁵."

---Certainly on the level of surface structure, this outwardly directed language exhibits denotative and connotative attributes. As a self-reflexive language, particularly in its deeper structure, however, the language exhibits the following:

The expression: "provisional", ---further qualified by the expressions: "arbitrarily" and "ambiguous", is concluded by: "full meaning will emerge". In the space of ten lines (by actual count), a significant transformation has taken place. What IT says is that the word: "Appositional" will not be easily given up; ---and if not, what will eventually emerge, in any case, is: Appositional (music) is Appositional.

Process, in whatever sense *that* expression can have meaning here, subsists merely in the initiation of the word: Appositional. Whatever follows, ---by whatever means, will only validate the term.



SL projection 17

If language is doing that to *thinking*, then thinking is doing *that* to language. But in those instances when neurologists exhibit *brain-language*, or lawyers exhibit *law-language*, or musicians exhibit *music-language*, or linguists exhibit *language-language*, on whose shoulders does responsibility for descriptive language of *any* kind rest? In what manner(s), precisely, can anyone of us acquire⁴⁶ appropriate language, with regard to another context, if the language issued forth from context is, in itself, *not* appropriate?

It seems to me that responsibility for descriptive language rests with the describer, ---since descriptive language IS a describer's language. I think one *could* notice this crucial structural aspect of language except in those contexts where language,---by any language, ---by its describer functions as *means*, or as *word-processing*.

What I wonder about is why it generally seems so essential that one proceeds *from* definition rather than *toward* it.

A PRIORI;
A POSTERIORI;



SL projection 18

BRAIN :

...LOOPS

SR projection 19

I,

is in world: I views self, I views world, I views self.
In viewing self, I cannot dismiss world.
In viewing world, I cannot dismiss self.
From whichever vantage point, I is present.

I appears to be central.
I observes: self is here, world is there.
I finds it incomprehensible that self can be there, and world here.
Since viewing appears to depend on self's presence, ---from here,
I takes world in.
Other bi-directional relations implicit in the expression: I views
self, I views world, I views self, become subverted by self's
presence.

Because I cannot stand the notion that items observed could possibly
exist disconnected, I attempts connection.
Words help.
Self helps.
I locates a few words.
The words are subject, object.

Self converts subject into I (and *I* allows it to).
I converts object into world (and self allows *it* to).
Within I, self-subjects appear intimate.
Within self, I-objects appear not to be;
(*objects* reside outside⁴⁷).

There are too many.

I attempts gathering, ---to get a handle on things, ---to manage the seeming incomprehensibility of separate existences⁴⁸.

(Luria says:

" ... *What* is it which is actually localized in the brain, or in other words, what is the nature of the mental functions which can be correlated with the brain, and *How* must mental activity be localized in the brain ... ^{49?}"

Commenting on these observations,
Bogen says:

"Furthermore,
if we could solve
this fundamental difficulty
..., we would have another; our
understanding of brain function would
consist
of a myriad of items without cohesion⁵⁰.")

So, I gathers and self groups.
I observes and self interprets.
I allows self to group and interpret.
Self seems satisfied and tells I so.
I is encouraged.

There are still too many objects; so,

I, by the encouragements of self, begins to group and self gathers.
I interprets and self observes.
Self allows I to group and interpret.
I seems satisfied and tells self so.
Self is encouraged.

The collusion between I/self takes on a kind of resonance.
Objects are imbued with a kind of intimacy.
I/self seems full.
Whatever controversies remain are resolved within I/self.
I/self has gathered world in by language.
Language becomes superabundant.
I/self is satisfied.
I/self cannot go back over all that ground.
I/self applies language.
Applied language appears to be appropriate.
The appearance of appropriate language, applied, results in the appropriation of language.

(Bruner says:

"The elegant rationality
of science, and the metaphoric
non/rationality of art operate
with deeply different
grammars; perhaps
they represent a
profound
complementarity⁵¹.")

I/self does not recognize that *items* have been *consumed* by the very words formulated to describe them.

I/self *believes*: "Beauty *is* in the eye of the Beholder."

(Croce says:

" ... Man, faced with natural
beauty, is *exactly* the mythical
Narcissus
at the pool⁵².")

I/self has clues within its language but does not recognize them.
I/self cannot correct, ---either by referring to old dictionaries,
or by making new ones, because I/self cannot recognize that
language is *unable* to correct itself.

I/self recognizes *tone* as a condition of music on the assumption
that *tone lacks word*, and lateralizes it to the right;
recognizes *word* as a condition of language on the assumption that
word lacks tone, and lateralizes it to the left.

(Sperry says:

"Findings
suggest that a
possible reason for
cerebral lateralization in man
is basic
incompatibility
of language
functions
on the one hand, and
synthetic perceptual functions on the other⁵³.")

It does not occur to I/self to ask whether objects are other I/
selves, (---which, as such,
also view I/self).

(Smith says:

"Hesitantly ... I predict

... some *new* principles of
 heirarchy that will
 enable the effective resonance
 between molecule
 and organism
 to be explored: ... ((to
 be)) understood only
 by a *parallel* aggregation
 of viewpoints, one intellectual,
 atomistic,
 simple and certain, the other
 based on the enjoyment of the
 grosser
 forms and qualities⁵⁴.)

I/self recognizes that its language descriptions have been
 formulated by comparative methods⁵⁵, but does not (---cannot?)
 recognize the states of the compared languages, nor the languages
 to which the states refer. In the absence of this recognition,
 I/self only compares *output form* with *output form*, and
 designates the action: "*conceptual*".

(Price says:

"... under fire
 from economic reaction
 and Romantic rebellion,
 science must look
 to a new political
 strategy ...
 I predict a more
 human future
 based on the symbiosis of
 exact knowledge ... and
 experience ...
 ((two)) processes of *thought* ...
 ((one)) analytic,
 reductionist,
 simple,
 or provable, ... ((the other))
variously, ... synthetic,
 concrete,
 complex, and
 disorderly
 56.")

I/self cannot (---does not) recognize that it is in a lop-sided,
 supremely stretched, tautological loop.



SL projection 20

But suppose,

by some happenstance,

it occurs that tone is only a *sign* which directs I/self, ---not to *itself*, but to the specific music of which that tone is a sign; ---and suppose, by some happenstance, it occurs that word is only a *sign* which directs I/self, ---not to *itself*, but to the specific language of which that word is a sign?

Suppose,

by some happenstance,

it occurs that language is not brain-initiated, but only brain-comprehended⁵⁷?

Suppose,

by some happenstance,

it occurs that the expression: "*extended* vocal techniques", (e.g., vocal multiphonics), is not an extension of anything, but only inappropriate language description of functions already present in the trachea?

Suppose,

by some happenstance,

it occurs that items *absorbed* by word are not necessarily nor intrinsically *connected* by word, e.g.:

WE;

YOU/ME;

I/SELF?

Suppose,

by some happenstance,

it occurs that output languages are *not* conceptual,---that each, in itself, suggests the pointlessness of comparison by conceptual description at that level? Suppose, contrarily, that output languages also are *signs* which, by way of physiological, acoustical, syntactical attributes exhibited, direct I/ to deeper structures, ---at the base of which reside: *conceptual processes*, ---ideas of order for instance, which, once observed, could have generated either the word *or* the tone⁵⁸?

Suppose,

by some happenstance,

all of *that* occurs?

---then what would /self do?



WORST CASES :

...AS-IF

If language is to be regarded:
not as a *tool*;
not as a *piece* of standardized
equipment;
not as *activity* in the name of
communication;
not as *property* endemic to, or
characterized by, particular
linguistic groups;

---then something has to happen
to cause language to do more
than these;
---more consistently more than
these.

LANGUAGE
CANNOT
CORRECT
ITSELF

I submit:

SR projection 22

By regarding language in the
light of its *mereness*, and not
in its superabundance, can it become more than words. Words,
in their collective superabundance, have to become *unloaded* in each
instance where appropriate language is desired; ---unloaded, once
again, by regard for the mere signs of language, ---which,
after all, is what *language* has always been:

THERE IS NOTHING ABOUT A SIGN WHICH
IS *intrinsically* MEANINGFUL

Meaning is only possible when there exists an *intricacy* between
language as a description of itself, coherent with that of which it
is a description; as in a coherent performance of a new composition.
Under such conditions a state of *intimacy* also could be said to
exist; *each describes the other.*

In the beginning was the "word"
, ---but the word got 'loaded',
---so-to-speak.



SL projection 23

But, how does one *unload* superabundant language?

Between the impossible and incomprehensible state of *signs staring at signs*, and the excess which states of *superabundant language staring at superabundant language* generate, there exists a large number of other language conditions. I cite some, ---many of which will be familiar to you:

one may unload by genetic manipulation,
psychiatric shock treatment,
or Zen meditation;

one may unload by persuasion,
seduction,
outright submission,
or political strategy;

one may unload by undefined gut,
socialized admission,
public confession,
or mind-control as in bacteriological warfare;

one may unload by legislation, as in law.

However, ---for me at least, in these consist not nearly enough of merely.

But, how *does* one unload superabundant language?

I think of unloading as a matter of discipline, ---discipline available *within* the conditions of language itself. Following are two:

1) one can unload superabundant language
by putting focus on its *mereness*,
(i.e., its functions are operative,
---but *barely*).

2) one can unload superabundant language
by *temporarily*
depriving it of functional biases
which reside within it;
namely: interpretive,
translational,
articulative states;
(i.e., it functions as
context-free grammar).

I quote from my diary:

"7/4/76: In the merest signs of language,
I search for signs of life *in* language.
I think a lot about periods, commas,
colons, ---and coordinating conjunctions.
The mereness of AND or BUT.
In BUT resides the mereness of *argument*;
in AND resides the mereness of *connection*.

Mereness, *but* deeply resonant;
Mereness, *and* deeply resonant.

(In its mereness, can Brain be
conceptualized as an AND-state? In
its mereness, can Brain be conceptualized
as a BUT-state? In
its mereness, can Brain be
conceptually reduced to merely one,
or the other?
---I cannot think so.
With *both*, one can compose.)"



In various locations of this paper I have tried to express that the *correction* of language, per se, has not resulted in more appropriate language as long as such corrections were made on the functional basis of interpretive, translational, or articulative languages, i.e.:

1) *interpretive* linguistic functions put focus on the language of an observer, to the probable *exclusion* of the language of the observed:

(e.g., *one* notion of pianissimo will suffice).

2) *translational* linguistic functions put focus on the language of the observed, to the probable *exclusion* of the language of the observer:

(e.g., *some* notion of pianissimo will suffice).

3) *articulative* linguistic functions put focus on neither the language of an observer, nor of the observed, to the probable *exclusion* of both:

(e.g., *any* notion of pianissimo will suffice).

But in intrinsic, ---i.e., appropriate, language, the language of an observer includes the language of the observed, to the probable *exclusion* of neither:

(e.g., *no* notion of pianissimo will suffice, ---yet!).

Together, another language, (perhaps a *third* one?), is formulated, to within context of *both* relationships:

(e.g., my description of what pianissimo is doing in this measure, and this music's description of what pianissimo is doing in this measure: *this and that; that and this*. The relationship is not exclusively one or the other, or neither, but *intrinsically* one and the other⁵⁹. This is possible, unless, of course, I am forever condemned by the sound of my own voice, ---or unless I forget: ---yet!).



SL projection 25

I hold that appropriate language is: intrinsic language is:
compositional language. (Of course the other linguistic functions
referred to may produce "compositions" as well.) However,

appropriate language is the only condition which offers the *possibility* for *correction* (here, I do not intend "correct"), within the *formulation* of language itself. I do not suggest this position because I wish to put forth compositional language as some lofty, elitist circumstance;---but contrarily and precisely because it contains within it the *seeds* for making its own corrections. Since in the formation of appropriate language *I* cannot distinguish myself from that which I *do*, composition also provides me with the possibility for *self*-correction.

In *each* beginning
there are tiny,
little words,
and dots,
and dashes,
and commas,
and notes,
and pulses---



SL projection 26

**WORST
CASES :**

...WHOLE

to consider my I/self as *visible* language. Visible language is not private⁶⁰. What lurks also shows:
 in a blink of an eye, ---a nervous twitch, ---a tight-ass, ---a
 twist of the pen, ---a voice print, ---what I stand for, by whatever
 signs, no matter how *unobserved*, ---but observable.
 Visible language seems frightfully public to me.

But,
 my *private* language:
 ---that which is issued forth,
 ---that which is not my public, visible state,
 ---that with which I associate the term:
 composition,
 is not *public*.
 It is *not* visible language.

It may be said that my public state is more of a whole than my private one.

No,
 my issued compositions are not part of me.
 It is their 'apartness' which makes them private.

Still---,
 each and every private utterance is not only
 an instance of my whole language, ---but
 instances me in the sense that it is not part
 of my visible, public language which is *always*
 instanced.

Yes:
 issued compositions are *made*;
 ---with my help.



In this paper I have tried not to provide a definition for whole language. I would not even if I could.

Each and every instance of it is only a description of each and every instance of it.

But, unless I *think* I am *wholly* within language, I cannot instance it.

However, one could say that each instance *pushes* the whole system⁶¹.

In these senses, I initially regard each and every linguistic utterance which I observe, as worst-case;

---at the same time,
I hope I do not merely *play* with words:



SL projection 29

62



Stage center projection 30

FOOTNOTES

1. This paper was first performed by its author on March 5, 1977. The occasion was the 12th National Conference of the American Society of University Composers, University of Illinois. It was revised during October, 1977.
2. In performance, a succession of 35mm slides are projected in three stage locations (stage left, right, center), of which this is the first. Those slide reproductions which, herein, appear in right columns (denoted as SL projection 2,3, etc.) are from Laurie Stokes' composition: *Stair-well*, and are used with her permission.
3. All italics and parentheses in this paper, ---in or out of quotations---, are the author's, except for the quote of A.R.Luria (cf. text and footnote 49).
4. i.e. with the corpus callosum intact.
5. Gazzaniga, Michael S., "The Split Brain in Man," *Scientific American*, 217, no.2, August 1967, pp.24-29.
6. Bogen, Joseph E., "The Other Side of the Brain: An Oppositional Mind," *Bulletin of the Los Angeles Neurological Societies*, 34, no.3, July 1969, pp.135-162.
7. Luria, A.R., *The Human Brain and Psychological Processes*, (translated by Basil Haigh), New York, Harper and Row, 1966.
8. Levi-Agresti, J., and Sperry, R.W., "Differential Perceptual Capacities in Major and Minor Hemispheres," *Proc. Nat. Acad. Sci. U.S.*, 61, (1968), p.1151.
9. Dysphasia: speech impairment, e.g., uncoordinated speech, and inability to arrange words in their proper order.
10. Taylor, J., ed., *Selected Writings of John Hulings Jackson*, New York, Basic Books, 1958, p.129.
11. op.cit., see fn. 6.
12. This phenomenon is commonly known as "handedness".
13. Cunningham, D.J., (M.D.), *Right-Handedness and Left-Brainedness*, (Huxley Memorial Lecture, Oct. 21, 1902), Anthropological Institute of Great Britain and Ireland, London, 1902.
14. Strong, O.S., and Elwyn, A., *Human Neuroanatomy*, Baltimore, Williams and Wilkins, 1943, p.374.
15. The Dramatis Personae, in order of their appearance, are as follows:

(1864) Taylor, J., ed., *Writings of John Hulings Jackson*, London, Staples Press, 1958, Vol.2; see under "Hemispherical Co-ordination: Case of a Large Cerebral Tumor Without Optic Neuritis and with Left Hemiplegia and Imperception," p.146.

(1874) *ibid.*, see under "Affections of Speech: Notes on the Physiology and Pathology of Language," p.130.

(1876) *ibid.*, see under "Affections of Speech: On Affections of Speech from Disease of the Brain," p.186.

(1935) Weisenburg, T., and McBride, K.E., *Aphasia: A Clinical*

and *Psychological Study*, New York, Commonwealth Fund, 1935; reprint: New York, Haffner, 1964.

(1951) Humphrey, M.E., and Zangwill, O.L., "Cessation of Dreaming after Brain Injury," *J. neurol. neurosurg. Psychiat.*, 14, (1951), pp.322-325.

(1952) McFie, J., and Piercy, M.F., "Intellectual Impairment with Localized Cerebral Lesions," *Brain*, 75, (1952), pp.292-311.

(1958) Milner, B., "Psychological Defects Produced by Temporal Lobe Excision," *Res. Publ. Assn. Nerv. Ment. Dis.*, 36, (1958), pp. 244-257.

_____, "Laterality Effects in Audition," in Mountcastle, V.B., ed., *Interhemispheric Relations and Cerebral Dominance*, Baltimore, Johns Hopkins Press, 1962

_____, "Interhemispheric Differences in the Localization of Psychological Processes in Man," *Brit. Med. Bull.*, 27, no.3, (1971), pp.272-277.

(1960) Semmes, J., Weinstein, S., Ghent, L., and Teuber, H.L., *Somatosensory Changes After Penetrating Brain Wounds in Man*, Massachusetts, Harvard University Press, 1960, pp.51-56.

_____, "Hemispheric Specialization: A Possible Clue to the Mechanism," *Neuropsychologia*, 6, (1968), pp.11-26

(1961) Zangwill, O.L., "Asymmetry of Cerebral Hemisphere Function," in Garland, H., ed., *Scientific Aspects of Neurology*, London, E. and S. Livingstone, 1961.

_____, "Speech and the Minor Hemisphere," *Acta Neurol. Psychiat. Belgica*, 67, (1967), pp.1013-1020.

(1963) Hecaen, H., de Ajuruaguerra, J., Angelueres, R., "Apraxia and its Various Aspects," in Halpern, L., *Problems of Dynamic Neurology*, Jerusalem, Hebrew University Hadassah Medical School, 1963, pp.217-230.

(1965) Bogen, J.E., and Gazzaniga, M.S., "Cerebral Commissurotomy in Man: Minor Hemisphere Dominance for Certain Visuospatial Functions," *J. Neurosurg.*, 23, (1965), pp.394-399.

(1968) op.cit., see fn. 8.

(1969) op.cit., see fn. 6.

(1976) Bever, T., Psychology Department, Columbia University in an address: "The Biological and Behavioral Basis of Language," Salk Institute, La Jolla, California, November 11, 1976.

(1977) Desmedt, J.E., (Brain Research Unit, University of Brussels), "Active Touch Exploration of Extrapersonal Space Elicits Specific Electrogenesis in the Right Cerebral Hemisphere of Intact Right-Handed Man," *Proc. Nat. Acad. Sci. USA*, 74, no.9, (September 1977), pp.4037-4040.

16. Credit for the formulation of the Table, dates 1864-1969, inclusive, goes to J. Bogen, op.cit., see fn. 6; additional dates are those of the author.
17. Grinker, R.R., Buey, P.C., and Sahs, A.L., *Neurology*, Springfield, Illinois, Thomas, 5th ed., 1959, p.621.

18. Henschen, S.E., "On the Function of the Right Hemisphere of the Brain in relation to the Left in Speech, Music, and Calculation," *Brain*, 49, (1926), pp.110-123.
19. Ibid.,
20. Ibid.,
21. A typographical error: "preception", or perception?
22. Op.cit., see fn. 8.
23. This is not to say that there have not been isolated instances of interest and inquiry with regard to the Right Hemisphere, nor is it untrue that current interest, in some sense, appears to be on the increase. Here are some instances:

Luria, A.R., *Higher Cortical Functions in Man*, New York, Basic Books, 1966.

_____, Tsvetkova, L.S., and Futer, D.S., "Aphasia in a Composer," *J. neurol. Sci.*, 2, (1965), pp.288-292.

_____, *Neuropsychological Studies in Aphasia*, Amsterdam, Swets and Zeitlinger, 1977.

Teuber, H.L., "Postscript: Some Needed Revisions of the views of Agnosia," *Neuropsychologia*, 3, (1965), 371-378.

Schlesinger, B., *Higher Cerebral Functions and their Clinical Disorders*, New York, Grune and Stratton, 1962

Wertheim, N., (Tel Aviv), "Disturbances of the Musical Functions," in Halpern, L., ed., *Problems of Dynamic Neurology*, Jerusalem, Hebrew University Hadassah Medical School, 1963, pp. 162-180.
24. For instance:
 - (a) Parallelistic ideas of "psychomorphology"; i.e., the notion that psychological functions have their corresponding permanent "cerebral organs", and that an "isomorphism" exists between the mental processes and the brain structure generating them; see Luria, op.cit., fn. 7.
 - (b) The right-good, left-bad polarization; see Domhoff, G.W., "But Why Did They Sit on the King's Right in the First Place?" *Psychoanal. Rev.*, 56, (1969), pp.586-596.
 - (c) Reductionism, dualism, either/or-ism, standardization-ism.
 - (d) Bimodal Consciousness, see Deikman, A.J., "Bimodal Consciousness," *Arch. gen. Psychiat.*, 45, (1971), pp.481-489.
25. Op.cit., see fn. 15 (Desmedt). However, Desmedt is not the first to use the expression: non-language. I find it appearing at least as early as 1935, (see Weisenburg, op. cit., fn.15). Apparently there was something called the Pinter-Paterson performance scale, and the Pinter-Patterson non-language mental test. Weisenburg remarks (Chapter VI, p.134): "To make the extensive survey of mental functioning in Aphasia (the chief object of this research), a wide variety of tests were chosen". (Here follows an outline: speaking, naming, repeating, understanding spoken language, reading, writing, arithmetic, language intelligence tests, reproduction of verbal materials,

- ((and then: non-language tests, of which one was drawing))).
26. Op. cit., see fn. 23.
 27. Amusia: Impairment of ability to make or understand musical sound(s).
 28. Strictly speaking, this is not quite the case. For instance, Wertheim (op.cit., p.178, see fn. 23) has developed certain 'criteria' by considering more fully the properties of music to which the brain (say in the case of Amusia) may be referenced. Here they are: (1) The ability to turn musical perception into emotion; (2) The rhythmic sense; (3) The sense of sounds (particularly "relative hearing" and "absolute pitch"); (4) The sense of musical intervals; (5) The agogical and dynamic sense.
 29. Aphasia: Defect or loss of expression by speech, writing, or signs, or of understanding spoken or written language.
 30. Alajouanine, T., "Aphasia and Artistic Realization," *Brain*, 71, (1948), pp.229-241.
 31. Maturana, H.R., *Biology of Cognition*, Biological Computer Laboratory Report 9.0, Department of Electrical Engineering, University of Illinois, Urbana, 1970, 96pp.
 32. (*author note*) Here Maturana is speaking of human systems. His expression: "To an observer" refers to another which could, as well, be one's self.
 33. At the moment, I regard the expressions: *function*, *state*, and *condition* as intimately linked, such that they form a linguistic (phenomenological) network. For me to think (use) any one of them is to invoke the others. At the same time, they are not interchangeable; i.e., they do not lack distinct features. In this paper, the use of any one of them implies the 'presence' of the others.
 34. Given any particular describer/description, it may be that only one or another function may obtain. It may also be that motion between and among them may obtain. I suggest that these four functions, as a 'complex' entity, hold membership in a *dynamic* (not heirarchical) interactive system.
 35. i.e., situation = location.
 36. Ella Mae Lentz
 37. Ursula Bellugi, The Salk Institute for Biological Studies, La Jolla, Ca. I cite some of her recent work:

Bellugi, U., and Klima, E.S., "Wit and Poetry in American Sign Language," paper for a Symposium of the American Association of Anthropology, Mexico City, 22 November, 1974.

_____, Klima, E.S., and Siple, P., "Remembering In Signs," paper for Cognition: International Journal of Cognitive Psychology, 1975.

_____, and Klima, E.S., "Perception and Production in a Visually Based Language," paper for conference on Developmental Psycholinguistic and Communication Disorders, New York, Academy of Sciences, 1975.
 38. For an elaboration on this point, see Gaburo, K., *My, My, My*,

- What A Wonderful Fall*, La Jolla, Lingua Press, 1976.
39. Op.cit., see fn. 6. N.B., in what follows I do not argue with the important work which Bogen has done, and continues to do. I argue only with his descriptive language.
40. For an elaboration on this point, see Brun, H., and Gaburo, K., *Collaboration One*, (Statement no. 18), La Jolla, Lingua Press, 1976, and Gaburo, K., *Privacy One (Words Without Song)*, La Jolla, Lingua Press, 1976.
41. Op.cit., see fn. 15 (Bever).
42. Head, H., *Aphasia and Kindred Disorders of Speech*, (1926), New York, Hafner, 1963 Reprint, Vol.1, p.520.
43. i.e., a *reflexive* attribute of language; see Gaburo, K., *C---IS*, La Jolla, Lingua Press, 1976, and elsewhere in this paper for further discussion of the reflexive, denotative, and connotative attributes of language.
44. Op.cit., see fn. 6. In this particular quotation, the designations (a), (b), (c), are mine.
45. Ibid.,
46. I contend that language, however one may already possess it, has always been, and is, acquired. It seems to me that one may never have made the connection between language and its acquisition, or soon forgets that this is the case. Perhaps this is so because language seems so "naturally" a part of one's being, ---as-if it was *always* there---, and so, whatever of it is possessed, may also be regarded as all that is needed.
47. Op.cit., (p.9ff), see fn. 7.
48. Here, I equate the expression: "separate existences", with the expression: unique complex entities.
49. Op. cit., see fn. 7.
50. Op. cit., see fn. 6.
51. Bruner, J., *On Knowing: Essays for the Left Hand*, Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Press, 1962, p.74.
52. Croce, B., "Aesthetics," (1901), in Carritt, ed., *Philosophies of Beauty*, London, Oxford University Press, 1931, p.244.
- Ibid., see Carritt, E.A., (introduction), xxvii.
- Ibid., see Ruskin, J., "Modern Painters," p.179.
- Ibid., see Plotinus, "Enneads," p.49.
- Ibid., see Lipps, T., "Empathy, Inward Imitation, and Sense Feelings," p.252.
- Ibid., see Gentile, G., "The Philosophy of Art," p.326.
53. Op.cit., see fn. 8.
54. Smith, C.S., "Matter Versus Materials: A Historic View," *Science*, 162, (1968), pp.637-644.
55. Op.cit., see fn. 43.

56. Price, D.K., "Purists and Politicians," *Science*, 163, (1969), pp. 25-31.
57. For a more formal statement, see Conant, R.C., and Ashby, W.R., *Every Good Regulator of a System Must Be A Model of That System*, Biological Computer Laboratory publication 202, Department of Electrical Engineering, University of Illinois, Urbana, 1970, p.97.
58. See Gaburo, K., *The Music In Samuel Beckett's: PLAY*, La Jolla, Lingua Press, 1976.
59. i.e., interactive.
60. On March 3, 1977, (see fn. 1), previous to the first reading of *Whole Language Language*, and, as a structural link to it, my composition, *Privacy One: Words Without Song*, (see fn. 40) was presented. *Privacy One* is the first of a continuing series of compositions on the subject: *Private/Public*.
61. Insofar as I am aware, credit for the expression: "Pushing Whole Systems", (to which the statement is a reference), belongs to the artist Newton Harrison.
62. In performance, *Whole Language Language* closes with a 16mm film of Samuel Beckett's *Play*, performed by Linda Vickerman, Philip Larson, and Elinor Barron (members of NMCE IV); filmed by George Manupelli, 1973.

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COLLECTION **2**

